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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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30 January 1985

USSR REPORT

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VOL'SKIY CRITICIZES U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 9 Aug 84)
pp 5-15

[Article by V. V. Vol'skiy: "Against the Policy of Blackmail and Aggression"]

[Text] The entire world community is paying close attention to events in Central America. The Nicaraguan people recently celebrated the fifth anniversary of their revolution. During 5 years of continuous struggle they defended their liberty and independence, won after more of a century of battle with American imperialism. The United States has grown accustomed to viewing Central America as its own private domain. Its colonization of Central America began in the middle of the last century, when Washington decided that this territory would be convenient for an interoceanic canal and sent a gang of mercenaries headed by William Walker there. Since that time the White House's Central American policy has essentially remained unchanged.

Nicaragua was occupied by U.S. troops from 1909 to 1933. American officials even headed the National Bank and the highway, telegraph, tax and customs administrations. A colony of the United States--this is what Nicaragua was at that time, and its people fought a selfless struggle to liberate their homeland from foreign oppression to win freedom and to settle matters pertaining to government and self-determination.

Of course, this revolution was much deeper than the one attempted by the people's army led by Sandino, who was treacherously murdered by the mercenaries of American imperialism. Real patriots could not reconcile themselves to the situation in which the United States, after putting Somoza on the "throne," became the master of someone else's house. This situation demanded radical changes, the eradication of the social base on which American colonialism rested, and the political and economic liberation of the country. And it is this that Sandino's heirs are successfully accomplishing.

The Nicaraguan people's struggle for independence, just as the socialist construction in Cuba, is wrecking all U.S. strategic and technical plans on the continent. The course of historical development is inexorable. Imperialism and colonialism--this entire anachronism--is entering a state of irrevocable obsolescence. Attempts to destroy the Sandinist revolution and to drown the people of El Salvador in blood when they were fighting for the right to decide

their own faith turned out to be futile in today's world, even for the most powerful police state.

The international reactions to the escalation of American aggression against Nicaragua provide vivid proof of this. The world community actively opposed the United States' policy of violence, outright robbery and imperious claims, which it is pursuing in Central America to "teach a lesson" to other countries in the region.

The intervention in Grenada and the undeclared war on Nicaragua should serve as a warning to even the Latin American governments that have been relatively friendly with Washington. They now face a dilemma: Which state will be next if the United States manages to stifle the revolutions in Nicaragua and El Salvador? This is why the international community is vehemently protesting U.S. Central American policy. This is why an international conference of solidarity with Nicaragua and for peace in Central America was held in Lisbon from 3 to 6 May. This international forum was organized by 20 non-governmental organizations working for the United Nations, including the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Peace Council, the International Democratic Women's Federation, the World Council of Churches, the International Association of Democratic Jurists and several other organizations. The conference was attended by more than 300 delegates from 72 countries.

The conference was truly of the broadest representative nature: It was attended by world-renowned statesmen, public spokesmen, parliamentarians, scientists, cultural figures and representatives of various political parties, trade unions, women's organizations and youth organizations in various countries. The elected presidium consisted of Chairman of the international preparatory committee and Chairman of the International Democratic Women's Federation Edith Ballantine; widow of the assassinated Chilean president, Hortensia Bussi de Allende; the heroine of the Nicaraguan people, Comandante Monica Baltodano; representative of the Salvadoran Front for National Liberation Josefina Gomez; Nobel Prize winner, Argentine clergyman Adolfo Perez Esquivel; Bishop Sergio Mendez from Mexico; former Foreign Minister of India D. Singh; Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam Nguyen Thi Binh; President Romesh Chandra of the World Peace Council; prominent Venezuelan statesman Luis Prieto Figueroa; Portuguese journalist Carlos Sequeira; and Greek composer Mikis Theodorakis.

The people present at the first plenary session of the conference listened with great interest to the detailed report of the Nicaraguan delegation. This was followed by 3 days of discussion in four committees, attended by a total of over 200 people. A resolution was drafted and was adopted by a consensus, winning an ovation in the crowded auditorium. The press in the Portuguese capital and other mass media gave the international forum extensive coverage. More than 120 journalists from 50 countries were accredited in the press center.

The success of the conference was not only the result of its huge scales and highly representative nature, but also primarily because the participants, who held the most diverse ideological, political and religious views, were

virtually unanimous in their chief demand--an end to U.S. intervention in Central America. This demand was voiced throughout the conference. Latin America, Central America, Nicaragua and El Salvador should have a guaranteed right to complete self-determination. There should be no intervention in any form or on any of the pretexts generally sought by the United States. This was the main result of the conference.

One of the main topics of lively discussion in Lisbon was the cause of the conflict in Central America. Participants unanimously concluded that it can be found in the dependent status of these countries, the poverty and illiteracy of their people, hunger, the extremely high mortality rate, the low standard of living and the lowest life expectancy figure in the Western Hemisphere. All of this is a result of the authoritarian behavior of American monopolies and the bloody dictatorships patronized by the United States.

Even the notorious "Kissinger Commission" was unable to avoid the acknowledgment of these irrefutable and widely known facts. In particular, the "commission" had this to say about U.S. actions in Nicaragua in its report: "The United States conducted direct intervention in Nicaragua in 1909 when it sent Marines there and removed the president.... With the exception of a short interval, it stayed there until 1933. Before leaving the country, the U.S. Government set up an independent national guard there, assigning it defensive functions and responsibility for all Nicaraguan policies."¹

Of course, the "Kissinger Commission" discusses all of this in the past tense. Now, presumably, the U.S. attitude toward Central American countries has changed for the better, and could supposedly be even better if "communism" in these countries could be destroyed with the aid of American dollars and mercenaries. When Reagan received the "commission's" report, he asked the Congress for 1.5 billion dollars a year to "stifle communism" in Central America in the next 5 years by supporting pro-American dictatorships. All of the policies of the Reagan Administration, however, are intended to maintain forcible dominion in Central America and can lead only to the unavoidable growth of opposition to American imperialism. Furthermore, even Americans are growing increasingly aware of this. NEWSWEEK magazine wrote: "Many American citizens believe that Reagan is paying too much attention to the fight against communism and not enough to the social and economic ills engendering leftist rebel movements."²

The conference in Lisbon exposed Washington's hypocritical and awkward attempts to portray the escalation of aggression in Central America as a "Marxist-Sandinist" instigated internal conflict between countries in this region, in which the United States supposedly plays the role of a "mediating peacemaker" and "fighter for democracy."

Statements by conference speakers and conference documents stressed that the United States was committing aggressive and illegal acts against the people of Latin America long before any kind of "communism" existed in the world, and then, long before the appearance of revolutionary Cuba and Nicaragua, constantly set their "communist" bogeyman in motion whenever disobedient countries, governments or movements had to be rebuked. Washington officials

accused Sandino of "communism" (now they are trying to prove that Sandino was an anticommunist!), and they level the same accusation at the Mexican governments sympathizing with the struggle of the "free people" of Nicaragua.

The entire world knows what kind of "democracy" the United States is serving with its interventionist policy. This was attested to with monstrous eloquence by the countless victims of the Somoza clan's bloody dictatorship, the more than 100,000 people exterminated in Guatemala in the last 30 years, and the genocide committed by the Salvadoran "death squads"--and all of this was done under U.S. patronage.

Besides this, the White House is accusing the Sandinists of breaking their promises to observe the principles of democracy, pluralism and a mixed economy and of "exporting revolution" to El Salvador. These false pretexts were invented by the Reagan Administration simply because it could not find any others.

The author of this article has been fortunate enough to visit the new Nicaragua several times, to tour academic institutions, factories and co-operatives, to see how actively and extensively the masses are participating in the administration of their country and how wholeheartedly they support their government, and to become convinced that this is a genuine democracy and a genuine people's government. The Sandinists are not prohibiting legal actions by the opposition on the right and the left. Nicaragua has nine political parties in addition to the largest political organization, which won authority in the long struggle against Somozism--the Sandinist Front for National Liberation. Representatives of the opposition are part of the government. National and foreign private capital can operate freely in the country. Furthermore, the private sector's efforts to revive the national economy are being supported to the maximum. More than two-thirds of all government credit is used to support this sector.

In spite of the difficult conditions stemming from invasions by U.S. mercenary gangs, general elections were scheduled for 4 November of this year in Nicaragua. At the conference in Lisbon, the head of the Nicaraguan delegation, Julio Lopez, member of the secretariat of the Sandinist front's national leadership, invited friendly countries and organizations to send their observers to Nicaragua on behalf of the national leadership and the Nicaraguan people. The Nicaraguan leadership has openly consented to these elections and has invited all opposition forces to participate in them on a constructive basis.

It is no coincidence that the final declaration of the Lisbon forum said: "Conference participants are greatly pleased by the heroic struggle of the Sandinist Front for National Liberation and the people of Nicaragua in their victorious battle to overthrow Somoza's tyranny. They applaud the profoundly humane policies of the Nicaraguan Government, which is consolidating the democratic gains of the revolution and developing and clarifying the democratic solutions to all of the country's economic, social and cultural problems.

"The conference respects Nicaragua as a state securing the freedom and rights of the individual."

Members of U.S. ruling circles who try to teach "democracy" to the entire world cannot even brag about it at home. Suffice it to say that Reagan was elected by only 26 percent of the U.S. voters. Furthermore, it goes against common sense when the Sandinists are accused by the very people who encouraged Pinochet in his bloody conspiracy against the legally elected and most democratic Chilean Government of Salvador Allende and who have maintained "cordial relations" with the odious dictatorships of Haiti, Guatemala and Paraguay for decades. Even the American magazine NEWSWEEK admitted that the recent "elections" organized in El Salvador by the United States, in which Jose Napoleon Duarte "won" on the strength of millions invested by America, were the first in 50 years.³ Where was the White House, which is so concerned about democracy in Latin America, for all of this time?

The crux of the matter is that the rabid zeal of U.S. reactionary forces is not aroused by the absence of democracy, but by genuine signs of it, which are unavoidably connected with anti-imperialism in Latin America. The current U.S. administration has continued the traditional "big stick" policy and apparently cannot understand that the days of the official colonial empires and of "dollar empires" are gone, and that absolutely new forms of interrelations must be developed even in the Western Hemisphere.

As for the "export of revolution," now it is no secret that this is not the problem. A revolution can only be started by the people themselves, during the course of their own historical experience. Neither assistance nor even the personal courage of revolutionaries from other countries can evoke the social protests of the masses. For this reason alone, the accusations Washington levels at the Sandinists about the "export of revolution" are false--not to mention the fact that they are not even consistent with facts. The Reagan Administration cannot even provide its own Congress with any kind of trustworthy evidence to support its accusations. They are so groundless that CIA employee David McMichael decided to announce this publicly when he resigned. On 11 June 1984 the ASSOCIATED PRESS reported that "the secret intelligence data he analyzed about Nicaraguan deliveries of weapons to leftist partisans in El Salvador do not support the Reagan Administration's allegations that the volume of these deliveries to Salvadoran partisans in the last 3 years was quite substantial. After spring 1981 the intelligence data about weapon shipments sanctioned by Nicaragua simply disappeared.... In his words, he decided to make his doubts public because the U.S. administration is still using the argument about contraband weapons to justify CIA-supported attacks against the Sandinists."

The unanimous conclusion at the conference in the Portuguese capital was that the U.S. administration is mainly to blame for the situation in Central America and for the escalation of the military conflict in this region. In essence, this conflict broke out because the United States was trying to absorb (as in the case of Puerto Rico) the small states of the isthmus where the people were fighting a selfless struggle for their independent national existence.

In its geopolitical desire to make the Central Americans obedient at any cost and to make the Central American regimes carrying out U.S. wishes inviolable,

the Reagan Administration is breaking all human and judicial laws and the universal standards of international law and is cynically violating treaties and charters. In addition to its "regular" budget expenditures, the CIA was allocated 73 million dollars on Reagan's personal orders to equip and support Somozist mercenaries fighting against Nicaragua. As THE WASHINGTON POST reported, when the House of Representatives refused to authorize another 21 million dollars for this purpose in 1984, the CIA organized the financing of the mercenaries through Israel and Saudi Arabia⁴ and then received this sum in its 1985 budget.

The U.S. press has reported that the CIA has been growing even more quickly than the Pentagon under Reagan.⁵ Agents with American warships have mined Nicaraguan ports and conducted "operations" to blow up oil and food storage facilities and contaminate crops and plantations. The agency's employees are training Somozist mercenaries in special camps in Honduras and are leading their bandit raids on Nicaragua. The scales of the "preventive" U.S. occupation of Honduras are growing, and the country has been turned into a military base, aimed primarily against Nicaragua. Within a short period of time and under the guise of virtually continuous maneuvers, the United States moved large shipments of heavy artillery, espionage equipment, aircraft and helicopters to Honduras and built eight new air force bases to add to the existing four near the Nicaraguan border.

The CIA has simultaneously done everything within its power to involve neighboring Costa Rica, which has declared neutrality, in the conflict with Nicaragua. Raids by gangsters from the territory of Honduras and Costa Rica have already cost Nicaragua almost 2,000 lives, not to mention incalculable material losses. In addition to all this, Washington is committing aggressive acts against Nicaragua through all other available channels: At the CIA's suggestion, Nicaraguan exports have been boycotted, purchases of U.S. food and medicine have been prohibited and American airports have been closed to the planes of the Nicaraguan Aeronica company.

Anger and indignation were voiced by speakers at the Lisbon conference who asked the following type of question: How can a country which calls itself civilized pretend to support normal diplomatic relations with Nicaragua and simultaneously commit all of these criminal and shameful acts under the cover of hypocritical demagogy and vicious slander?

In complete accordance with the moral standards of the current U.S. administration, however, it does not consider its actions to be shameful and even takes a cynical pride in them. For example, Jeane Kirkpatrick, the official U.S. representative to the United Nations, went so far as to call the mining of Nicaraguan ports the "legal" exercise of the United States' "...right to self-defense," asserting that the United States did not intend to observe the principles of nonintervention and nonaggression recorded in the UN Charter. It is not surprising that the CIA and all of the rabble-rousers it sponsors express frank appreciation for the "services" of such "officials" from the White House team: Recently one of the new Somozist gangs formed by the CIA in Honduras was named the "Jeane Kirkpatrick operational unit."

World public opinion, which was specifically expressed at the forum in Lisbon, is resolutely demanding and end to U.S. intervention in Central American affairs. This demand has also been made more than once in the world community's highest official body--the United Nations. In May 1984 the World Court in The Hague investigated Nicaragua's complaints about U.S. aggression. In its decision, which was unanimous, including the vote of the American judge, the World Court described the mining and blocking of Nicaraguan ports as a crime against Nicaragua and against the freedom of international shipping and trade and demanded that this arbitrary behavior cease. In addition, the Court issued a statement condemning all U.S. policy toward Nicaragua as interventionist behavior and declared that the political independence of this country "should not be violated in any way by military or other actions."⁶ This second decision was supported by 14 judges and was opposed only by the U.S. representative.

It is also extremely important that opposition to Reagan's aggressive policy in Central America is also growing in the United States. Public opinion polls consistently indicate the extreme unpopularity of this policy. At the end of May NEWSWEEK magazine reported that "support for this policy is now constantly under 40 percent."⁷

Americans are protesting Reagan's policy in Central America for different reasons: Some--for example, Spanish-speaking minorities and the black population--because they have experienced discrimination; others because they sympathize with the Nicaraguan people's years of heroic struggle; others because they cherish the honor of their country and want to keep it unsmirched in the eyes of the world; others because they simply feel that Reagan's policy in Latin America is nearsighted and futile.

Committees for solidarity with Nicaragua have been formed in many American cities and states and there have been mass rallies and protest demonstrations against Reagan's policy in Central America. In spite of their different approaches and views, the supporters of U.S. nonintervention have already united on the national level. The members of the American delegation who took an active part in the Lisbon conference included representatives from the nationwide American organization "United States Out of Central America" (USOCA). The list of the 350 charter members of the organization includes names known throughout the world, such as Nobel Prize winners Linus Pauling and George Wald, Congressman Ronald Dellums, former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, religious leaders Daniel Berrigan and Ron Burke, researchers Marlene Dixon and Richard Falk and experts on Latin American affairs Helen Safa and Timothy Harding. There are branches of the USOCA in 125 U.S. cities. They conduct a great deal of informational work, hold conferences, rallies and demonstrations, send thousands of petitions to Congress, collect funds, medicine and food for Nicaragua, send American public delegations there and publish and distribute English- and Spanish-language editions of the CENTRAL AMERICA ALERT monthly magazine, brochures, booklets and declarations.

The opposition to Reagan Administration Central American policy is having particularly impressive repercussions under the conditions of the current election campaign in the United States. All of the contenders for the

Democratic Party presidential nomination, without exception, have opposed Reagan's aggressive policy in Central America. For example, at a press conference in UN headquarters on 19 June 1984, Jesse Jackson spoke in favor of the radical revision of Washington policy in Latin American and declared that it was time to put an end to the "big stick" policy the Reagan Administration is pursuing for the purpose of stifling the Latin American people's legitimate desire for social justice and national independence. He advocated political dialogue between the United States and Cuba. Senator Gary Hart believes that the continued escalation of U.S. intervention in Central America will inevitably lead to a new version of the Vietnam war. His policy statement said: "The real enemy in the Third World is hunger, poverty and disease, and not communism."⁸ Even Walter Mondale, whose political career began in the cold war years, is now also taking U.S. public opinion into account and is advocating the immediate revision of policy in Central America.

Under these conditions, Reagan is naturally worried that his unpopular Central American policy might cost him too many votes. He has begun to pass himself off as a peacemaker. But few people believe this, because his words are in sharp contrast to his actions. Secretary of State Shultz' visit to Managua and the proposal of "confidential talks" in Mexico can probably be classified as campaign advertisements. One indication of Reagan's real intentions was the simultaneous increase in U.S. aid to the anti-Nicaraguan CIA mercenary units.

The White House has recently been making more frequent verbal courtesies to the "Contadora Group." As THE WASHINGTON POST noted, however, the Reagan Administration "expressed support for the Contadora countries, but critics in the Congress have accused it of hypocrisy."⁹ During his visit to the United States, President Miguel De la Madrid of Mexico pointedly criticized Reagan's policy in Latin America in firm and dignified terms, with no fear of financial blackmail, and, on behalf of the Contadora Group, stated that the peaceful initiatives of Latin American countries need real, and not verbal, support from the United States.

The creation of the mediating Contadora Group is a reflection of the Latin American view of the causes of the Nicaraguan, Salvadoran and Guatemalan people's struggle for their independence, freedom and social progress, a view representing the opposite of the stories composed by the White House and the CIA. A year and a half of efforts by the governments of Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela have been aimed at a search for peaceful solutions to the Central American crisis and ways of preventing further confrontation and the escalation of the conflict. The Contadora Group's efforts have been productive: Several documents have been drawn up and adopted on the guidelines and principles of a political settlement and the relaxation of tension between Central American countries. During all stages of the group's activity, the Nicaraguan Government worked constructively with it, displaying a willingness to reach agreements with its neighbors. There have also been some tangible successes: With the aid of the Contadora Group, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, which were almost enmeshed in an armed conflict by CIA-organized provocations, reached an agreement and created a joint commission for the investigation and settlement of border disputes.

The activities of the group, however, have been systematically torpedoed, either directly or indirectly, by Central American governments dependent on the United States. Washington has unceremoniously ignored agreements reached with the aid of the Contadora Group. Its goal is not the political settlement of the conflict in Central America, but the military destruction of freedom-loving Nicaragua and operations to drown the Salvadoran rebel movement in blood. Under these conditions, the talks of the nine countries participating in the Contadora process cannot produce any tangible results until there has been a change in the position of the chief culprit in the conflict--the United States of America.

The international forum in Lisbon expressed great appreciation and wholehearted support for the efforts of the Contadora Group. Conference speakers resolutely demanded that the U.S. administration cease its police actions in Central America and give up its imperious claims: It must stop escalating the military conflict and begin respecting the standards of international law and the legitimate demands of the world public. The road of political settlement and peaceful negotiations is the only realistic alternative to Reagan's adventurist efforts to heighten military confrontation and smother the Nicaraguan revolution.

The Soviet people agree completely with the world community's demands and supports them. Their sympathies and solidarity are on the side of the heroic Nicaraguan people, on the side of those who are fighting to defend their right to liberty and social progress. The Soviet people's position was explained in detail to coordinator Daniel Ortega of the Junta of the Nicaraguan Government of National Reconstruction by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium K. U. Chernenko at the time of their meeting in Moscow in June 1984. The Nicaraguan leader thanked the people and government of the USSR for their moral, material and political support of the Sandinist revolution.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America," Washington, 1984, pp 34-35.
2. NEWSWEEK, New York, 1984, No 21, p 24.
3. Ibid., pp 24-25.
4. THE WASHINGTON POST, 19 June 1984.
5. CENTRAL AMERICA ALERT, San Francisco, 1984, Vol 11, No 3, p 1.
6. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 29 June 1984.
7. NEWSWEEK, 1984, No 21, p 24.
8. CENTRAL AMERICA ALERT, 1984, Vol 11, No 3, p 4.
9. THE WASHINGTON POST, 5 May 1984.

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DIVERGENT GOALS OF MEXICAN TRADE UNION LEADERS, MEMBERS SEEN

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[Article by A. A. Sokolov: "The Ideological and Political Platform of Reformism in the Mexican Labor Movement"]

[Excerpts] One important distinctive feature of the contemporary Mexican labor movement was the bourgeoisie's ability to establish its ideological and political influence in large segments of the proletariat and take control of their leading labor organizations after the bourgeois democratic revolution of 1910-1917. Almost all of the central labor organizations and sectorial unions, uniting most of the organized workers, are collective members of the government-controlled Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and the largest central labor organization--the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM)--has been the basis of its labor sector since 1938.¹

The ideological and political platform of official syndicalism is based on the theory of permanent, developing revolution, which was worked out by ruling circles and which teaches that the gradual construction of a society of economic well-being, social justice, political democracy and spiritual freedom for all Mexicans has been secured in the country by successive governments expressing the interests of the nation and pursuing a policy distinguished by strict continuity and consistency. On this basis, an alliance with the state, in which the proletariat was initially assigned the role of a partner, was proposed as a policy line for the working class. Workers and their organizations can wage a struggle within legal bounds for their immediate socioeconomic interests, but social reforms are the prerogative of governments, which are supposed to be of a supra-class nature.²

In the past decade, however, significant changes have been seen in the behavior and aims of the traditional union leadership, and these became particularly evident at the turn of the decade. In essence, the changes consisted in the fact that the policy statements of official syndicalism and speeches by its leaders persistently suggested that the organized labor movement should combine the protection of the direct interests of workers and actions aimed at improving their status with activity "intended to transform the economic, social and political structure of society." Special emphasis was placed on the belief that the working class should become the leading force of a "new

revolutionary alliance" and propose its own plans for social development as an alternative to the existing "socially unjust" model, within the framework of which local and foreign monopolist capital is acquiring stronger influence.³

In this article, the changes in the position of official union leaders will be analyzed, their actual content and limitations will be assessed and their connection with the policies of the three last governments will be revealed.

The main elements of the ideological and political platform of official syndicalism underwent no changes for around 25 years after the end of World War II. In the 1970's, however, serious changes in the overall situation in the country and in the balance of power in the labor movement had a perceptible effect on the policy aims and behavior of union leaders and led to the modification of their tactics.

The end of the period of "stable development" which had lasted almost three decades, the severe crisis of socioeconomic structures, compounded by the severe economic crisis of the mid-1970's, the imminent crisis of the political system and official ideology and the related increase in sociopolitical friction in the country motivated ruling circles to consider the need to update the "Mexican model" and improve the machinery of capitalist economic regulation under the conditions of the continued development of state-monopolist capitalism, the expansion of government socioeconomic functions and the complication of government relations with the business community. The simultaneous exacerbation of class conflicts, the new level of the working class' socioeconomic struggle and the increasing political activity of this class demanded consideration for its growing ability to influence all spheres of public life and the modernization of the methods of its integration in the existing system.⁴²

This put the very future of "charrism" in question. The government's attitude toward the traditional union leadership acquired more importance than ever before. Two interrelated facts played the deciding role. First of all, it was extremely important to ruling circles that official syndicalism continue to exist as a mediating, balancing force in their relations with the working class and with capitalism--a force which should never put the existence of the traditional political system in question. To an even greater extent than before, "charrism" was supposed to prevent dissention within the ranks of the organized labor movement and wage a struggle against the union opposition, relieving the government of the need to intervene directly in these affairs if possible.

At the same time, ruling circles were trying to modify the machinery for the integration of the working class into the existing system, and this necessitated the preservation of official syndicalism's influence.

Concrete steps were taken to modernize this machinery when the government of L. Echeverria (1970-1976) proposed its "new deal." Trade unions were asked to participate in the resolution of the country's economic and social problems on a "tripartite" basis (government-unions-business organizations), and the

sphere of government social activity was expanded considerably to deter the growth of worker dissatisfaction.¹³ The "tripartite" policy was conducted with the complete and most energetic support of the leaders of the Labor Congress. From the very beginning, it publicized this policy as a road to "national cohesion" and the involvement of workers and their organizations in the genuine resolution of national problems, and ultimately as the road to a society of "social justice."¹⁴

It is interesting that when the union leaders accepted the thesis of "participation" by the working class, they began to depart from the traditional narrow interpretation of the organized labor movement's objectives, which were actually confined to higher wages and broader labor and social legislation, although these demands were certainly not removed from the agenda.¹⁵

The changes in official syndicalism's aims were given an analytical basis. Speaking at the opening ceremonies of the National Assembly of Organized Workers on the Problems of Mexico,¹⁶ convened by the Labor Congress, the chairman of this organization, A. Victoria Galvan, specifically said: "The Mexican organized labor movement is one of the elements of political, economic and social life and is therefore advancing to the forefront of the ideological struggle for justice in an atmosphere of liberty. It demands to participate in plans for the development of the country--into what we want it to be. We cannot be satisfied with only the position of a force creating wealth; it is our legitimate wish to participate in planning and in the very process of producing wealth and, consequently, in its distribution."¹⁷

The model of "stabilizing development" was pointedly criticized by assembly speakers as a variety of desarrollismo, incapable of securing the equitable distribution of national wealth; it was noted that "economic development cannot be a goal in itself, because it does not enhance the well-being of all people."¹⁸

One interesting feature of the behavior of union bureaucrats since the beginning of the 1970's has been the increasingly aggressive nature of their remarks about the Mexican bourgeoisie's position on the resolution of national problems and on social issues. This was particularly noticeable in 1975 and 1976, at the time of the extreme exacerbation of relations between the Echeverria government and the most reactionary circles of the monopolist bourgeoisie (primarily the Monterrey group), who saw his policy of social reforms and his "popular alliance" slogans as a threat to their influence.¹⁹ With a view to the reaction of the masses and in the fear of the possible effects of this conflict on their own position, pro-government labor leaders made extremely harsh and even threatening statements.²⁰ Criticizing the "representatives of private initiative" for their interference in political affairs and their attempts to pressure the government, they accused them of supporting foreign capital, of contributing to the maintenance and intensification of Mexico's economic dependence and of failing to make an "adequate contribution to the resolution of national problems."²¹ In addition to the reasons mentioned above, the behavior of the union leadership was also a reaction to the overt attempts of some segments of the monopolist bourgeoisie to participate in government policymaking, which was connected with the

dramatic augmentation of their role in economic and social affairs in the country. Besides this, expressing, even if indirectly, the feelings of the rank-and-file members of their organizations, the union leaders made it clear that they rejected the bourgeoisie's conservative position with regard to government social policy.

It is significant that the union leaders nevertheless continued to promote the policy of "tripartite" cooperation" under the cover of statements that the labor movement would cooperate only with the "nationalist" bourgeoisie.

The leaders of the Labor Congress and CTM unconditionally supported the "alliance for production"²² announced by Mexican President J. Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) at the beginning of 1977. Within the framework of this alliance, the workers' contribution was defined as "self-restraint in the national interests."²³ This line corresponded to the basic directions of government economic policy, specifically envisaging cuts in government spending on social needs and the substantial limitation of wage increases. This lowered the real minimum wage in an atmosphere of intense inflation and a higher cost of living.²⁴ Labor Congress leaders negotiated annual wage increase limits, lower than the inflationary rise of prices, with the government and with business organizations.

By the end of the 1970's, however, perceptible changes again took place in the aims and practices of official syndicalism.

In January 1978, at the height of the preparations for the next PRI Congress, the ninth (June 1978), the CTM published a sensational statement in connection with a government political reform, declaring that this reform, which was supposed to strengthen the "institutions of the system," was designed to postpone the necessary economic reform without which the system could not exist. The CTM demanded that the PRI draw up a program meeting the requirements of the time and the demands of the masses, advocates profound social reforms and took a more distinct stand on major national problems.²⁵

Over the next 2 years the Labor Congress and the CTM published a series of documents and policy statements.²⁶ Their chief element was the demand that the state carry out an "integral economic reform" to put an end to the development model emphasizing the satisfaction of the demands of wealthy strata and giving the workers material deprivations and social oppression. Economic development should be based on the significant expansion of the state sector and the creation of a so-called "social sector," with participation by the workers and their organizations in production planning and management. In connection with this, the immediate nationalization of several industries (food, chemical and drug, petrochemical, construction and metallurgical) and the finance and credit system was proposed.

The "integral economic reform" was supposed to be supplemented by fiscal reforms (to change the machinery of capital accumulation) and a more intense agrarian reform, signifying the resolution of agricultural problems without delay and the stimulation of the development of the "social sector" in rural areas on the basis of the ejido.

Other demands were for an "efficient and nationalist" policy in the use of natural resources and energy, especially oil, and changes in distribution patterns through the channels of the government food distribution network.

The general social thrust of this group of economic reforms was underscored. A series of social reforms was also envisaged: the updating of federal labor legislation, the creation of a unified social security system covering all categories of workers, a housing reform, an educational reform, a public transportation reform, the institution of immediate and effective measures against inflation and rising prices to maintain the purchasing power of wages, and the resolution of employment problems.²⁷

The mounting intensity of the antimonopolist and anti-imperialist rhetoric of official syndicalism is striking: The appeals for heightened action by the working class and all laborers against the "concentration of wealth by a handful of representatives of monopolist capital" and warnings against the reinforcement of the alliance of local monopolies and transnational corporations, which could lead to the establishment of a right wing authoritarian regime in Mexico and eradicate the "programs and hopes for independent national, democratic, just and equitable development."²⁸ In this connection, it was suggested that social revolution was inseparable from national revolution in Mexico, that "national liberation is the main purpose of social revolution."²⁹

When the union leaders put forth their program of social reforms, they took the liberty of criticizing government policy. For example, although the leaders of official syndicalism totally supported J. Lopez Portillo's policies, they said that measures to curb inflation and rising prices were not effective enough and suggested a higher "ceiling" on wage increases (although they eventually agreed to the government's proposal on this matter). Furthermore, there was open discussion of the failure of government policy to change the "socially unjust" development model of Mexican society.³⁰

It is quite indicative that the leaders of official syndicalism have persistently suggested in recent years that the Mexican organized labor movement should play a stronger vanguard role in the transformation of society as a result of the increasing polarization of social forces.³¹ They have stressed that the proletariat should become the "political axis of a democratic and progressive alliance" of all "revolutionary forces in the country," and that a "democratic, anti-imperialist and revolutionary front" against monopolist capital should be established on this basis.³²

All such statements, however, have been accompanied by the following explanation, revealing their class motives: The labor movement, particularly the CTM, is not seeking a "monopoly" on political power but simply wants more participation and representation for the "labor sector" in government.³³ This also sheds interesting light on the official union leadership's talk about the need to continue and intensify the political reform by extending it to the PRI, because this reform "will not be complete if the majority party in power--the PRI--is not democratized and does not secure more active participation by rank-and-file members and their sectors in decisionmaking

of primary importance,"³⁴ for which purpose the PRI should become a "labor party."³⁵ Only this kind of reorganization of the party and its policy can secure a "qualitative change in the nature and goals of government in the progressive and revolutionary spirit."³⁶

It is obvious that the detailed program of socioeconomic and political reforms proposed by official syndicalism at the turn of the decade was the result of several factors, particularly some specific elements of the policy of ruling circles (the "new deal" of the Echeverria government and the general development strategy worked out in recent years by the Lopez Portillo government).³⁷ It is probable that the platform and actions of the PRI "labor sector" were influenced by the intensification of the intraparty struggle after the passage of the 1977 law on political reform. It was evident in the ideological sphere as well and culminated in the adjustment of party aims in the spirit of "revolutionary nationalism" and the construction of a "new social democracy" at the 9th and 10th party congresses.³⁸ During this period, the influence of the "labor factor" on PRI ideology and policy grew stronger. The "program of action" of the 10th PRI congress in October 1979, for example, included a number of provisions and additions pertaining to increased government participation in socioeconomic development and to a series of economic and social reforms. The wording of these provisions was similar in many respects to the proposals of official syndicalism.³⁹

The changing situation in the labor movement had a serious effect on the position of the official syndicalist upper echelon. The growth and consolidation of the industrial nucleus of the Mexican proletariat and other of its segments, the expansion of its ranks by other categories of laborers and the augmentation of its role in economic development were all accompanied by the definite elevation of class consciousness, an increase in social activity and a rise in the political level. In addition, the laboring public was dissatisfied with the ineffective methods ruling circles were using to solve such acute social problems as inflation and unemployment. Another factor was the mobilization of the masses as a result of the growing economic strength and political aggressiveness of the monopolist bourgeoisie.

The adjustment of the official syndicalist program was accelerated by the "union revolt,"⁴⁰ which acquired its greatest dimensions in the mid-1970's, and by the activities of leftist forces proposing their own solutions to the country's cardinal problems.

The increased activity of the leftist union and political opposition affected the interrelations of various segments of the official union leadership, leading to more frequent disagreements and a tendency toward the radicalization of some of the central labor organizations belonging to the Labor Congress (the Revolutionary Confederation of Mexican Workers and Farmers, the Revolutionary Federation of Workers and the Revolutionary Labor Confederation, and some sectorial unions--the Mexican Electricians Union and the Telephone Workers Union of the Mexican Republic).

In this situation, traditional leaders, especially the leaders of the CTM, who still held a dominant position within the ranks of reformist syndicalism,

displayed a capacity for flexible response to unfavorable developments. Official syndicalism went so far as to use a number of socioeconomic and political demands of the union opposition and even leftist forces, particularly the demands consistent with the constitution and federal labor legislation.

The experience of recent years, however, proves that no fundamental changes have taken place in the policy of reformist trade unions. The main thing is that they still reject the idea of mass demonstrations in support of program objectives. In this sense, the Labor Congress leadership issued an indicative statement: "Although the patience of the working public is being exhausted," the organized labor movement will continue to fight for its demands with "exclusively legal methods"--the system of negotiations, agreements and collective bargaining--and opposes general strikes as an "unacceptable form of struggle."⁴¹

At the beginning of 1982, when Mexico became enmeshed in a new severe economic and financial crisis, leading to the further devaluation of the peso and a dramatic inflationary leap, Labor Congress leaders canceled their original demand for an immediate and nationwide increase of 65 percent in the minimum wage and accepted the government's proposed increments (from 10 percent to 30 percent, depending on salary size--far below the rate of inflation). Furthermore, they supported the government policy of "strict economy" as a "lesser evil," although they did admit that it would reduce the number of jobs. Just before the May celebration of 1982, CTM Secretary-General F. Velasquez proposed that each member of the organization contribute 1 percent of his wages to a special fund to assist the government surmount financial and economic difficulties.⁴²

The leaders of official unions completely supported the nationalization of banks, regarding it as a "deeply patriotic and revolutionary action" and further evidence of the fact that the Mexican Government is pursuing a policy of reforms in the interests of the majority and is paying attention to the demands of the working public.

In December 1982, immediately after new President M. De la Madrid Hurtado took office, the Labor Congress and the CTM signed a government-proposed "pact of solidarity" with business organizations, envisaging wage and price "restraint" as a method of combating inflation. By spring 1983, however, after the crisis had grown more severe, the inflationary spiral had climbed as a result of the refusal of businessmen to observe their part of the bargain, and as real wages continued to decline, the CTM demanded a nationwide immediate increase in the minimum wage by the amount of the price increase for 1982 and actually accepted the idea of a sliding wage scale. The responsibility for pricing policy and its consequences was assigned exclusively to the government.⁴³ At the end of May, the CTM leaders drafted their own new "national solidarity pact," envisaging a freeze on prices and wages. Besides this, the CTM and several other central labor organizations belonging to the Labor Congress, as well as some democratic autonomous unions, warned that strikes would be organized in support of wage demands during the renegotiation of collective agreements (some of the strikes took place at the beginning of June). These steps, which were taken in an

atmosphere of mounting worker dissatisfaction on the national scale, intensified disagreements in the Labor Congress and led to the deterioration of government relations with the CTM.⁴⁵ Soon afterward, however, the CTM announced the withdrawal of its draft. On 9 August the Labor Congress signed the "pact" drafted by the Department of Labor and Social Welfare and underwritten by the government. In accordance with this pact, the government would retain its leading role in economic affairs and would be responsible for price controls, and the unions would support official measures aimed at surmounting the economic crisis and refrain from excessive wage demands if the rise in prices should be stopped.⁴⁶ The CTM did not sign the "pact," but, in conjunction with the Labor Congress, it commended the policy of ruling circles in general as a means of establishing "control" over the crisis and of gradual moves toward economic recovery.⁴⁷

Subsequent months were marked by the gradual restoration of the *modus vivendi* between official syndicalism and the government. The CTM leaders continued their negative remarks about the line of "strict economy," saying that it was "reactionary" and was in the interest of businessmen, who did not want to take on any price restraint obligations; policy on wages was called contrary to constitutional provisions. The CTM also insisted on an integral program of wage protection, based on the "social strength of the labor movement and the political will of the government."⁴⁸ F. Velasquez denied the "lies" about the CTM's "estrangement" from the government, stressing that union criticism of government policy was still one of the best forms of cooperation with the government. This was followed immediately by a statement by Labor Congress leaders that the organized labor movement would continue strengthening its "historic revolutionary alliance" with the government.⁴⁹ President M. De la Madrid responded to these statements at assemblies of the CTM National Council (in September 1983 and March 1984), saying: "Friendship and alliance with the CTM constantly strengthen the government and the revolution; the government of the revolution also fulfills its obligations by strengthening the CTM." He advised "adherence to the CTM path, the same path leading us to revolutionary nationalism."⁵⁰

Therefore, the leaders of reformist trade unions are still stressing the importance of an alliance with ruling circles. Enjoying a certain degree of autonomy within the framework of this alliance, they sometimes represent the "internal opposition" to the government on some matters of socioeconomic policy, but always acknowledge and respect its omnipotence.

The connection with the laboring masses means that the upper echelon of official syndicalism associates the retention of its influence with the need for reforms to be carried out by the government. In recent years the traditional union leadership has tried to retain its influence by seeking new guidelines in an atmosphere in which its hegemony has been challenged. Under these conditions, the programs proposed by official syndicalism are intended to restore the faith of the working public in the system and surmount the crisis in pro-government unions. In addition to their attempts to reaffirm their own social function, traditional union leaders are making a maximum effort to substantiate and secure government activity as "constant government intervention" in economic and social affairs, ascribing intentions to the

government which supposedly coincide with the aims of the working class. All of these programs, which are not accompanied by any concrete action to mobilize the masses, are promoting the integration of the working class into the existing system. Official syndicalism is being updated and is still one of the important factors maintaining the stability of the social and political system in the country.

FOOTNOTES

1. The PRI consists of three so-called sectors made up of various professional and public organizations representing the main social strata and groups--labor, agrarian (the National Confederation of Farmers and the Agrarian Community League) and popular, in which the individual members are representatives of the bourgeoisie, the National Confederation of Public Organizations, cooperatives, youth organizations, women's groups and other associations.
2. "Constitucion CTM--1974," pp 12-13.
3. See, for example, ESTRATEGIA, Mexico, 1980, No 31, p 2.
12. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1981, No 10, pp 35-36; 1982, No 11, pp 48-50.
13. For a more detailed discussion, see: LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1976, No 3, pp 62-64, 67-68; "Problemy sovremennogo rabochego dvizheniya Latinskoy Ameriki" [Problems of the Contemporary Labor Movement in Latin America], Moscow, 1980, pp 90-95, 98-100, 102-106.
14. For example, see: D. L. Ramirez, "La Comision Nacional Tripartita," Mexico, 1974, pp 107-108.
15. For example, the representatives of official trade unions who worked with the National Tripartite Commission established in 1971 expressed their views on all matters without exception: unemployment and employment, the development of labor resources, their retraining, labor productivity and production growth, the decentralization of industry, the rising cost of living, housing problems, the stimulation of export sectors, environmental pollution, etc.--see: D. L. Ramirez, Op. cit.; "Asamblea Nacional de los Trabajadores Organizados Frente a los Problemas de Mejico. Congreso del Trabajo. Unidad y Justicia Social. Mejico, 10 de Junio de 1976," Mexico, 1976.
16. It was attended by J. Lopez Portillo--then an official candidate for the republic presidency.
17. "Asamblea Nacional de los Trabajadores..., Problemas Politicos," p 4.
18. Ibid., Problemas Sociales, p 1.
19. For more detail, see: Ye. S. Pestkovskaya, "Evolyutsiya klassovoy struktury Meksiki v period stabil'nogo razvitiya" [The Evolution of the

Mexican Class Structure During the Period of Stable Development], Moscow, 1979, pp 109-111; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1984, No 1, pp 27-28.

20. At the start of the antigovernment campaign launched by the Business Coordinating Council in spring 1975, a Labor Congress statement was published, in which the Congress specifically announced: "The working class reaffirms...its intention to strengthen the popular alliance as the basis of the country's autonomous development and will not allow the capitalist sector to interfere in matters which only the people have a right to decide.... The Labor Congress is fully determined to fight for the retention of the social purpose of the political regime born of the 1910 revolution"--EL DIA, Mexico, 13 May 1975.
21. D. L. Ramirez, Op. cit., pp 16-18; EL DIA, 13 May 1975.
22. The announcement of the "alliance for production" was directly preceded by the regulation of the Lopez Portillo government's relations with the Monterrey group.
23. "Problemy sovremennogo rabochego dvizheniya Latinskoy Ameriki," pp 92-94. Also see: EL DIA, 18 December 1980.
24. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1982, No 11, pp 51-52; 1984, No 1, pp 29-30.
25. EL DIA, 22 January 1978. It is interesting that the Congress was supposed to ratify a new declaration of party principles and program of action.
26. The policy aims of official syndicalism are recorded in their most complete and final form in the PRI "labor deputation" manifest "For a New Society" and in the document of the special assembly of the Labor Congress National Council "The Historic Objectives of the Working Class in the Struggle for a New Society" (December 1980)--EL DIA, 18 December 1980; ESTRATEGIA, 1980, No 31, pp 1-12.
27. EL DIA, 18 December 1980; ESTRATEGIA, 1980, No 31, p 3, 7, 10.
28. VSEMIRONOYE PROFSOYUZNOYE DVIZHENIYE, 1980, No 2, p 14; EL DIA, 18 December 1980; ESTRATEGIA, 1980, No 31, p 3.
29. EL DIA, 18 December 1980.
30. EXELSIOR, Mexico, 1 November 1979; EL DIA, 12 June 1981.
31. EL DIA, 6 December 1979; CRITICA POLITICA, 1980, No 19, p 9.
32. ALAI, Montreal, 1980, No 34, p 397; EL DIA, 18 December 1980.
33. ALAI, 1980, No 34, p 397; PROCESO, 1980, No 209, p 24.
34. EL DIA, 18 December 1980.
35. ALAI, 1980, No 34, p 397.

36. EL DIA, 18 December 1980.
37. LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1984, No 1, pp 32-34. It is indicative that in March 1980 the "alliance for production" was officially declared "democratic" (Ibid., p 33), and in December the Labor Congress leadership called it "democratic, national, popular and revolutionary."
38. For more about this, see: "Meksika: tendentsii ekonomicheskogo i sotsial'no-politicheskogo razvitiya" [Mexico: Trends in Economic and Sociopolitical Development], Moscow, 1983, pp 266-267, 270-271.
39. RESENA DE ECONOMIA Y POLITICA, Mexico, 1979, No 12, pp 4-5.
40. This was the name given to the broad but heterogeneous movement, launched at the beginning of the last decade inside and outside the official trade unions, for union democracy and for the removal of pro-government leaders.
41. EL DIA, 18 December 1980.
42. ASI ES, Mexico, 30 April-5 May 1982.
43. Ibid., 15-21 April; 10-16 June; 24-30 June; 12-18 August 1983.
44. Ibid., 12-18 August 1983.
45. The CTM line was particularly opposed by the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Farmers and the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers. The Labor Congress leaders dissociated themselves from the CTM line. In a speech in Guadalajara on 9 June, M. De la Madrid responded by calling the demand for the wage freeze "irrational and demagogic"--see: ASI ES, 24-30 June; 12-18 August 1983.
46. ASI ES, 24-30 June; 12-18 August 1983.
47. Ibid., 19-25 August 1983.
48. Ibid., 11-17 November; 18-24 November; 9-15 December 1983; 5 March 1984.
49. Ibid., 7-13 October; 14-20 October 1983; 5 March 1984.
50. Ibid., 15 September 1983; 5 March 1984.

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INDO-AMERICAN THEORY OF 'ENDOGENOUS DEVELOPMENT' CRITICIZED

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[Article by T. V. Goncharova: "Contemporary Indo-Americanism: Philosophy of History"]

[Excerpts] Different varieties of the theory of "endogenous development" have been quite popular in the social thought of developing countries in the 1970's and 1980's. This theory is reflected in a number of UNESCO documents which refute the theory and practice of the "Western model" and assert that "the Western model of development, which is based on the well-known theory of modernization, is unsuitable for the developing countries and even poses a real threat to their genuine independence and freedom."¹ One variety of this theory, which is distinct but nevertheless has all of the standard characteristics, is alive in Latin America. It has been reflected to some degree in the analytical works and public statements of many Indian ideologists and leaders and in some of the policy documents of native movements (such as the 1975 "Marandu Project," the 1973 "Tiahuanaco Manifesto" and the 1978 "Tumapasa"). It is significant that the basic premises of the theory of "endogenous development" made their appearance in the social thought of Latin America much earlier than, for example, in the social thought of Africa (at the beginning of our century) and were subsequently developed by many nationalist ideologists who made references to the cultural and ethical heritage of Indians in search of paths of historical self-determination for their nationalities.

As for today's theorists of this current, the majority have arrived at the assertion and validation of a "uniquely Indian philosophy" and are constructing their own philosophical system after an unavoidable period of "Westernization"--a period marked by the adoption of the European cultural values that they are now denying so categorically. It is true that these theorists also include some whose view of the world took shape within the Indian community, is distinguished primarily by traditional beliefs and stereotypes and cannot be called a result of familiarization with the 20th-century philosophical doctrines which have made references to the "natural man" in search of a solution to the critical state of Western civilization. This makes it all the more remarkable that all of the basic aspects of their view of the world coincide--a view in which they have an unshakeable faith, seeing it as the only

philosophy corresponding completely to the laws of human society. The analytical and political activity (which begins in various political parties and nationwide organizations, such as the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia) of the ideologists who now speak for the Indian population, such as Bolivians F. Reinaga and R. Reinaga and Peruvians G. Carnero Oke and V. Roel Pineda (the initiators and organizers of the Peruvian Indian movement), represents a specific stage in the ideological development of the Indian masses. Several extraneous features engendered by the absolutization of distinctive cultural and historical features, however, have kept their philosophical view of history from becoming the kind of genuine foundation or analytical platform of action the Indian movements are now striving to build.

In an attempt to establish a historico-philosophical system differing fundamentally from the completely refuted Western philosophical systems and to counter them with their own "Indianidad" doctrine, these Indian ideologists intend, first of all, to restore the true picture of the state of affairs in the world in general and the history of the Indian peoples in particular, a picture distorted by the colonizers; secondly, to promote the spiritual emancipation and psychological decolonization of Indians; finally, to substantiate the historical precedents for their independent declaration of demands and choice of their own course of development: "Our hearts and minds are enemy-occupied territory, we must begin a struggle to 'purify' our own way of thinking" and "we must rid ourselves of most of our present beliefs and retain only the few we find authentic."²

The "Indianidad" doctrine is based on the total denial (in much harsher terms than in the philosophical constructs of some African ideologists) of European civilization and thorough criticism of the West, representing a sort of historico-cultural monolith, identical in all of its forms, which committed a historic crime of unprecedented dimensions by casting Africa, Asia and America into the abyss of evil, and which now, in its death throes, is pushing the entire human race toward catastrophe. Capitalism, colonialism and imperialism are interpreted as inevitable and immanent forms of European civilization, forms of the existence of "the society which denies itself each day, each hour, each minute."³

When F. Reinaga, R. Reinaga, V. Roel Pineda, G. Carnero Oke and others decided to revive the "theory of their own past," they turned first to the initial categories of any philosophical system, such as time and space. In their attempt to build a "native" model of existence and philosophy, they subjected all of the fundamental European beliefs to total revision and turned to the immortal wisdom--and, in their opinion, the only true wisdom--of the ancient inhabitants of the Andes.

Although the Indian philosophers realize that the absolutized view of their history is somewhat inconsistent with the actual historical process, some of them have tried to link the idea of progress with the theory of "constant renewal": For example, they assert that the past can return with "some accumulated features," with slightly different features and forms, although with the same cosmic essence, and that this return of the past (or renewal) then

"might be of a revolutionary nature."¹⁴ The ancient myth of the Andean Indians about Pachacuti is an illustration of this eternal law of the universe. According to this myth, the past returns after a specific interval. Pachacuti's return to the Andes will signify, according to the Indian philosophers, the establishment of the "second Tahuantinsuyu" which has been declared the final goal of the native population's liberation movement in a number of programs and documents of the 1970's and 1980's.

In the final analysis, this myth (based on an idealized view of the theocratic and despotic society of the late stone age farming community) and the majority of other stereotypes and symbols of Indian ideology are supposed to substantiate the legality and historical inevitability of the reconquest of the Andes by its native population, who were, as V. Roel Pineda asserts, the first people on earth.¹⁶ Substantiating their own claims to the discovery of new facts of human history, the contemporary theorists of endogenous development build their "doctrine" in the form of a detailed comparison and contrast of the European and Indian civilizations (using this term to signify ways of life and thought) and defend the cardinal premise that the former does not correspond to their humanistic point of view.

Although this aspect of the philosophical and analytical constructs of Indian ideologists refutes several negative features of the development of West European civilization in its current phase and attempts to surmount the human race's present state of crisis resulting from the evil logic of imperialistic expansion, the denial of the rational approach to the natural laws of society has caused them to regress, back to the first steps of the long ladder historical thought has climbed in its comprehension of the world and of human existence.

In their analysis of specifically Latin American realities, the supporters of the theory of endogenous development see the basic contradiction of the ethnically heterogeneous societies of their countries in the social, cultural and psychological dualism engendered (particularly in Bolivia and Peru) by the irreconcilable conflict between the segment of the population identifying itself with the immortal heritage of the Inca nation, Tahuantinsuyu and Collasuyu,³⁶ and the segment adhering to the alien way of life imposed by the Spanish colonizers. In their opinion, this conflict could only be resolved outside the framework of capitalist progress, which is unacceptable to the native population of Latin America (and is totally identified with European civilization), through the revival of the "great Indian nation" which underwent four and a half centuries of colonial oppression (essentially ethnocide) and is now living "in a continuation of its past, with respect for its traditions and with the observance of its customs dating back thousands of years."³⁷ The present status of the Indians, according to these ideologists, is merely the result of a temporarily lost war, in which revenge is completely possible: "In essence, we have never been defeated. This is why we are as strong today as we were in the past. No one will be able to defeat us in the future either, just as no one can defeat rocks, because eternity lives in them."³⁸

Although they deny the West as a system of socioeconomic relations, many of the ideologists of even this current have nevertheless had to acknowledge the need for scientific and technical progress (complaining that "there is no modern infrastructure, there are no roads, electricity or hospitals, there is no progress on the legendary Altiplano")⁴¹ and regarding the coordination of traditional cultural and socioethnic values with the achievements of modern science and technology as one of the most urgent and most complex problems of the present day.

The conviction that the heritage of pre-Columbian civilizations is a "fusing element"⁴² in the spiritual and social revival of the native Latin American population, and the idea that the native culture is "the basis and an important instrument for the resolution of many urgent problems of the present day"⁴³ (an idea coloring the mass mentality in the majority of developing Asian and African countries) have become the foundation for the ideology of pan-Indianism, which had taken shape by the beginning of the 1980's, and have been reflected in a number of documents, including the Barbados Declaration (1977). It was adopted at a symposium in Bridgetown (Barbados), which was held mainly to promote the drafting of socioethnic plans meeting the needs and vital interests of the native population of Latin America.

Although the idea of the restoration of Tahuantinsuyu as a solution to the Indian problem in the Andes was also proposed by the Indian Council of South America (established in 1980 with a coordinating center in Cusco), far from all of the members of the native population in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador shared this belief. For example, the "restoration of the Inca nation" does not give Indians of the Amazon tribes even theoretical satisfaction, because they are justifiably afraid that this will also mean the revival of the "Inca chauvinism" that existed in the past idealized to such a degree by the Andean ideologists. Even in the Andean highlands, in the Quechua and Aymara farming communities, there are not many who believe in the social-utopian, obviously artificial (when compared to the actual development of socioeconomic and cultural processes) constructs the Indian intellectuals are trying to cultivate in the minds of their countrymen. In spite of their declared alienation from European civilization, more and more Indians are consciously abandoning many of their traditions and are striving to give their children a modern education and to "improve themselves."⁴⁹ Many of them believe that the principles of communal farming can be preserved but are insisting on the incorporation of technological achievements in the work and life of the native population, on a broader educational and public health network and on the establishment of a modern infrastructure in their communities: "Progress must reach all settlements. This is my desire and my opinion," declared S. Huillca, the native Peruvian leader who gave years of his life to the struggle for the establishment of trade unions on farms and for the social emancipation of the Andean peasants.⁵⁰

It should be borne in mind that the profound disillusionment of a specific segment of the Indian population, especially the intelligentsia, with regard to the possibility of radical changes by means of official reforms "from above" and--after the 1952 Bolivian revolution and the partisan movement of the second half of the 1960's in the Peruvian sierra failed to solve the Indian

problem--by means of revolutionary struggle in an alliance with mestizos, lies behind the separatist theories of the supporters of the Inca nation's revival. The far from adequate work conducted by Bolivian progressive forces in Peru to establish contact with the Indian peasants, particularly the communal farmers of the highlands, certainly has not contributed to the quicker and, in our opinion, historically natural and inevitable eradication of alienation between various ethnic groups of laboring and exploited peoples. Not all of the leaders of the Indian movements agree, even theoretically, with the unconditionally negative interpretation of Western civilization and are realizing that an alliance with other segments of the laboring public is necessary and expedient now that they are overcoming the tendency toward separatism in the declaration of the aims of their liberation struggle. This applies above all to the leaders of Indian organizations with specific socioeconomic and political demands. They are distinguished by the growing awareness that capitalism on the global scale (and not inherent anomalies of Western civilization) is the source and foundation of all varieties of colonialism and imperialist expansion.

More and more educated Indians, particularly those who are familiar with the works of J. C. Mariategui (whom they see as one of the fighters for Indian liberation, comparable to Tupac Amaru, and who has been almost ignored by the theorists of "endogenous development"), are realizing that the defense and affirmation of their distinctive cultural and ethnic features do not exclude the possibility of acknowledging the general laws governing the historical development of all peoples, and are recognizing the immutable significance of Mariategui's thesis that "it is senseless and dangerous to oppose the racism of those who hate Indians...with the racism of those who exaggerate the role of Indians and believe that they have been singled out by Providence for a special mission in the rebirth of America."⁵¹ In the words of one of the coordinators of the Indian Council of South America, Nilo Calluco, a Mapuche from Argentina, "Marxism contains much that is valuable and positive, much that can be of benefit and can be accepted as true."⁵²

It is significant that, in spite of all the claims of the authors of the historical-philosophical constructs analyzed in this article to a purely indigenous outlook and a unique view of the world, their "doctrine" has clearly discernible eclectic features: In addition to the ancient beliefs of the Andean peoples, which may have been inherited from pre-Columbian civilizations, and in addition to views of creation similar to the beliefs of the ancient Eastern peoples, the philosophy of the West, which the authors of the "native" theories deny so zealously, is also present in these constructs.

Turning to the sociopolitical aspect of this philosophy, we cannot fail to see that the persistent references to the idea of "endogenous development" and to native sociocultural achievements and the passionate appeals for spiritual decolonization are merely the foreground for the same "intense search for internal bases of self-determination" and "internal trends in societal development" which are characteristic of the present spiritual life of many developing peoples in Asia and Africa. This kind of exaggeration and absolutization of the unique cultural and psychological features of any people, however, cannot serve as a point of departure in the choice of a future course of

development for the native population of America and other non-European peoples, and it certainly cannot serve as an ideological platform of revolutionary liberation struggle, which was pointed out repeatedly by V. I. Lenin: "It is wrong to make direct or indirect use of slogans about the national culture. These slogans are false because all of the economic, political and spiritual life of mankind is internationalized more and more even in the capitalist stage. Socialism internationalizes it completely."⁵⁶

In spite of the appeal of the theory of "endogenous development" and the idea of the "impermeability" of ancient native cultures with regard to the unacceptable "chance to become European" (even if we ignore the objective development of two trends in the European culture--bourgeois and socialist, with their fundamentally different values and frames of mind), the distinctive political and social processes in a number of liberated countries in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's (especially Kampuchea and Iran) testify that the acceptance of these ideas, which are essentially utopian, could have the most dramatic implications, and primarily for the people of the ancient countries where ideologists and leaders claim to have found a new road to liberation and the social transformation of their societies, but are actually trying to reverse the course of history. Life itself has exposed the artificial nature of the historico-philosophical constructs of F. Reinaga, V. Roel Pineda and other apologists for Tahuantinsuyu, because a myth, even the most tenacious and appealing of myths, cannot resist the inexorable advance of human civilization, even if it begins to acquire frightening features during some stages and at some crucial moments of this advance.

The utopian ideas about a return to more primitive stages in the history of human civilization have found fertile soil in the developing countries, which have experienced the severe consequences of the ecological and food crises that are now being associated primarily with the antihumanitarian nature of European progress--progress which now poses the threat of the nuclear annihilation of the human race. Nevertheless, we cannot agree with those who see the restoration of archaic forms of existence as a solution to the present situation.

FOOTNOTES

1. VOPROSI FILOSOFII, 1983, No 7, pp 141-142.
2. G. Bonfil Batalla, "Utopia y Revolucion (El Pensamiento Politico Contemporaneo de los Indios en America Latina)," Mexico, 1981, p 92.
3. Ibid., p 100.
14. Ibid., p 136.
16. Ibid., p 130.
36. Ibid., p 112.
37. Ibid., p 119.

38. Ibid., p 127.
41. Ibid., p 223.
42. PUEBLO INDIO, 1982, No 2, p 4.
43. VOPROSI FILOSOFII, 1983, No 7, p 144.
49. J. Espinoza-Zevallos, "Aculturación de Indígenas en la Ciudad de Guayaquil," Guayaquil, 1965, pp 19-20; R. Marret, "Peru," New York, 1969, p 221; G. Escobar Sicaya, "Cambios Culturales en Una Comunidad Mestiza Andina," Lima, 1973, p 174.
50. H. Neira Samanez, "Huillca: Habla un Campesino Peruano," Havana, 1974, p 121.
51. J. C. Mariategui, "Obras Completas," Vol 13, p 30.
52. LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Riverside, California, 1982, No 2, p 103.
56. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 23, p 318.

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BOOK ON LATIN AMERICAN CAPITALISM REVIEWED

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[Review by V. G. Rastyannikov of book "Kapitalizm v Latinskoy Amerike. Ocherki genezisa, evolyutsii i krizisa" [Capitalism in Latin America. Essays on its Birth, Evolution and Crisis], editor-in-chief V. V. Vol'skiy, Moscow, Nauka, 1983, 414 pages: "Problems in Contemporary Latin American Studies"]

[Text] There is no question that the publication of this book is a significant event in our social science community, which has been investigating the problems of capitalist development on the periphery of the world capitalist economy. The reader (who will not necessarily be a specialist) of this book will be intrigued primarily because this is essentially the first thorough special investigation in which the authors decided (and, incidentally, were successful in this) to reveal the particular, and not the general, features of capitalist development on the scale of an entire continent (the general features are also revealed during the course of analysis). In the introduction, which is written in a clearly polemical style, the purpose of the book is stated as the following: "We must examine not the development level of some kind of average or abstract capitalism, but the distinctive historical features, natural tendencies and stages of development of the Latin American type of capitalism, which took shape under the conditions of colonialism and dependence" (p 7). This is essentially a work (with subject matter that is still quite rare in our social sciences) on the characteristics of capitalism in the developing world.

The authors employ several research principles to secure the more complete determination of the parameters of the Latin American model of capitalism and to prove that it "developed in a different way here than in the countries of classic capitalism" (p 7). They successfully combine their analysis of regional problems with descriptions of capitalist development in specific countries, and the origins of the spectrum of present-day conflicts engendered by capital's domination of the peripheral zone of the world capitalist economy are examined within a broad historical context: The introduction of the "evolution factor" into the research led to the more vivid description of the peculiar features of these problems at the present time.

The creative combination of these principles and their validation with a well-chosen variety of statistics ultimately led to the portrayal of the extensive panorama of the processes of capitalist development in Latin America.

The team of authors adheres to the theory of "dependent capitalist development," which is a part of Marxist analytical thinking, giving it an original interpretation. From the very beginning, the authors stress that the concise term "dependent capitalism" signifies the type of capitalism characteristic of the Latin American zone of the world capitalist economy, a type differing from "classic capitalism." Furthermore, from the very beginning they state their own fundamental approach: What is needed is not "arguments about words," but "the definition of the concept and the investigation of its meaning" (p 22). This is an extremely valid additional argument against the attempts at the arbitrary interpretation of the concepts of "dependent capitalism" and "dependent capitalist development,"¹ and in favor of transferring the arguments to the sphere of actual assessments of all of the characteristics of capitalist development and signs of its contradictions on the periphery of the world capitalist economy.

The investigation of the parameters of "particular features" (after the natural ascertainment of "general features" as the initial "point of departure") in the capitalist development of Latin America is present throughout the work. Here I will simply mention some of the general areas of inquiry and solutions proposed by the team of authors.

The authors present a detailed analysis of the factors deforming Latin American capitalism, revealing their effects during different stages of the continent's history. On the basis of information about all of the countries in question, the authors present a meaningful discussion of the "outstanding role" played by Latin America, which was reduced by the colonizers to the status of a source of primary accumulation for bourgeois mother countries, in the origins of European capitalism (pp 8-10, 180, 181 et passim). The main result of the many years of colonial robbery in Latin America was the fact that the delayed process of primary accumulation in the countries of the region (the second half of the 18th century and the 19th--see page 27) led to the stepped-up development of the expropriating functions of foreign and local exploiters (primarily large landowners) in comparison to the accumulation of monetary wealth, freely converted into capital. And it was not merely that the colossal product of these countries was diverted to the mother countries, or that a large part of the monetary accumulations of the local agricultural oligarchy was destroyed as a result of parasitical consumption (the flashy extravagance of Argentina's livestock breeders, these representatives of the "impasse" branch of economic activity--was only one of the typical examples of this kind of consumption--see pages 164-165). This deformation of the process of primary accumulation doomed the sizable expropriated population of Latin America to "non-proletarian destitution" in its very earliest stages.² Therefore, it was against the background of mass pauperism, which became an inherent feature of Latin American society in all subsequent eras, that local capital took its first steps, debilitated by the removal of accumulations, as the unequal partner of its powerful foreign contractors.

The authors examined the establishment and consolidation of latifundism, which was based on private ownership and constituted the internal (or intra-national) backbone of the processes by which the entire economic structure of the Latin American countries was deformed and they evolved under the influence of the capital dominating them. Latifundism, as the authors demonstrate, determined the social nature of capitalist development from the standpoint of internal conditions: The possibility of the "American path" in the agrarian sphere was precluded (p 114), and the development of capitalism according to the "Prussian path" became the dominant form (pp 32, 164). This kind of development gave new momentum to the deforming processes: For example, the non-productive consumption of the manufactured products was excessive in comparison to its productive use; the small size of the market precluded effective feedback from the domestic market to industry; the result was slower industrial growth (p 32 et passim). The pernicious effects of latifundism permeated all social and political life in the Latin American countries. It secured the political dominance of the landed oligarchy, which, in an alliance with various segments of the local bourgeoisie, became the main "internal social agent" of dependent capitalist development, as the authors conclusively prove, and was and is a reliable promoter of imperialist influence in all spheres and the main antinationalist force in the Latin American countries (this is the subject of many brilliant sections of the book. See, for example, pages 106, 111, 119-120, 164-165, 285-287, 291, 349-451 et passim).

The authors were particularly successful in their comprehensive analysis of foreign capital's role in the deformation of the economic structure of local society where this capital became an organic part of this structure (p 10). In recent decades, foreign capital has been gaining an even firmer foothold in the economies of the continent. The readers of this book will find a broad range of unique indicators of the depth of the dependence of Latin American countries on centers of the world capitalist economy.³

The authors trace at least three ways in which foreign capital has influenced the economies of the continent. It has deformed the national economy by means of the "exaggerated" development of their export sectors and their consequent attachment to the world capitalist economy; it has subordinated national economies to the interests of the expanded reproduction of international capital through control over their changing "nerve centers" (leading industries and various spheres of economic activity); it has bled the Latin American countries dry by appropriating parts of their national product.

Throughout the book the authors constantly stress that foreign capital is an important factor "determining the structure and tendencies of national economic development" (Argentina, p 150). Amplifying this thesis from the historical perspective, they carefully trace the role foreign capital played (and is still playing) in the formation of the "dual nature" of the Latin American economies, represented on the one hand by "an export sector concentrating on a single product" and, on the other, industries developing "within the narrow framework of far-flung national markets fettered by the remnants of the colonial past" (p 36). In this connection, special attention should be given to the authors' analysis of the establishment and consolidation

(by means of foreign capital's activity) of the raw material export specialization of the Latin American economies, processes governed by the need for the reproduction of capital in the centers of the world capitalist economy. This analysis led the authors to the extremely important conclusion, directly related to appraisals of the development potential of national capital, that "the development of the societal nature of production was mediated less by the domestic market than by the foreign one--that is, commercial production developed primarily with a view to the foreign market" (Colombia, p 251).

It is precisely with foreign capital's seizure of the export sectors of these economies, with the development of raw material specialization under its influence and with the inhibition of the growth of processing sectors of industry that the authors correctly associate the prolonged standstill (until the beginning of the 1930's) of "extensive capitalist development" (Argentina, p 121), presupposing the "extensive course of national reproduction" with its priority growth of labor-intensive production and low labor productivity (Chile, p 378). When the countries of the continent began the transition to import-substituting industrialization (in the 1930's) under the influence of changes in the world capitalist economy, foreign monopolies established broader control over the national economies, intensified their economic exploitation of the Latin American countries and even pushed national capital into the "position of a junior partner" (pp 43-45).

Here the authors have noted an extremely indicative feature of industrial growth. The countries of the continent did not experience their own industrial revolution (this was precisely one of the "services" performed by foreign capital, acting from the outside). They were only able to borrow the technical achievements of the centers of the world capitalist economy. These achievements were and are transferred to the national economies by the selfsame foreign capital; it has introduced them in the particular fields of production (primarily those connected with the foreign market) in which it has a direct interest. As a result of this "piecemeal" acquisition of the fruits of an alien industrial revolution, the organic interaction of economic sectors was not established in the national economies, "major links of the industrial structure were missing," etc. In addition to this, foreign capital inhibited the development of national scientific and technical potential. The authors call this entire process "dependent industrialization" (Argentina, pp 148-150; Colombia, pp 252-254, et passim).

The authors pay considerable attention to foreign capital's influence in these countries during its present, "transnational" stage of development; they strive to reveal the content of the new forms of these countries' dependence on the imperialist centers of the world capitalist economy, especially the forms which have been aptly and concisely termed "technological neocolonialism" in our scientific literature.⁴

The authors reveal the complexity and multileveled nature of relations between the government and government sectors in the Latin American countries on the one hand, and transnational corporations on the other. The authors prove that the transnational corporations are so strong under the conditions of a relatively developed economic structure that they can "control and regulate" the

functioning of the state sector to some degree. Furthermore, the strength of these monopolies stems from the fact that "they have become part of the economic basis and an element of the production structure" (all of this, the authors explain, constitutes one of the manifestations of the "dependent nature of capitalist development") (Argentina, pp 156-157, 148). In other cases the state itself contributes "a great deal" to the consolidation of the influence of transnational corporations, although these "two most influential" forces display "a tendency toward confrontation as well as a tendency toward cooperation" (Brazil, p 237). In addition, the transnational corporation serves as the catalyst and accelerator of the class polarization of local societies and promotes the perception of methods of exploiting the laboring population (Mexico, p 324).

Although the authors pay less attention to the ways in which the continent's economies are affected by their financial dependence on the imperialist centers of the world capitalist economy, they agree in general that this dependence, which has been growing at a particularly intensive rate since the beginning of the 1970's, constitutes the barrier keeping these countries from advancing toward economic independence; furthermore, their enslavement by means of debts has become an instrument for the appropriation of the products of these countries on an unprecedented scale. After stating that the value of the products appropriated by imperialism in Latin America increased from 9.1 billion dollars to 60.8 billion in just 9 years (1970-1979), the authors draw the important conclusion that these dynamic patterns reveal "the essence of the Latin American model of capitalism" (p 15).

Within the context of the authors' detailed analysis of the variety of relations between the countries of the continent and the centers of the world capitalist economy, their main conclusion sounds quite convincing: "Under the conditions of economic underdevelopment and dependence, the process of expanded capitalist reproduction becomes the process of the expanded reproduction of these conditions." This conclusion logically leads to another: "The vicious circle of the interdependence of economic underdevelopment and the uncompensated appropriation...of much...of the social product can only be broken by profound revolutionary reforms in the socioeconomic structure of society" (p 16).

In connection with this, it must be said that the authors certainly do not ignore the attempts in the continent's contemporary history to eradicate the system of dependent capitalist development. These attempts are examined with specific reference to three countries--Mexico, Peru and Chile. What is most indicative is that these attempts are not only connected with antilatifundist agrarian reforms (although these have been instituted with varying degrees of consistency), and not only with the dramatic consolidation of the state sector as a force opposing the foreign monopolies and the local bourgeoisie with monopoly connections, but also with the development of collective forms of worker ownership, performing direct societal functions. Under the conditions of political domination by exploiter groups and the pressure of spontaneous processes engendered by the predominance of private ownership, these collective forms of ownership, which are not reinforced by government support (or have lost this support), eventually suffer erosion (or even total disintegration) and lose their place, free of the obstructions of the

pre-capitalist economy, to the processes of accelerated capitalist development. This is what happened to the ejido sector in Mexico, nurtured by Cardenas' reforms in the 1930's; social forms of production in Peru were also threatened by this kind of erosion after 1975 (pp 301-306, 362-366). The authors also note that, whereas in the 1930's group worker ownership made its appearance only in the agricultural sphere as a result of land redistribution (the ejido), in the 1970's these forms began to appear in industrial production--for example, the "worker communes" in Peru (pp 359-360). Although the Peruvian experiment was short-lived, it certainly left its imprint on the social thinking of the laboring population.

Not all of the authors' theories can be accepted unconditionally. Above all, the very interpretation of the concept of "dependent capitalist development" is debatable. In accordance with the logic proposed by the team of authors, this form of development begins in the Latin American countries not only wherever and whenever the capitalist structure becomes an element of the multi-structural economic system, but primarily when this structure is gradually and increasingly infiltrated by foreign capital, which then subordinates the economy of the given country to the requirements of the expanded reproduction of capital in the centers of the world capitalist economy. In this way, foreign capital begins to influence the formation of the entire socioeconomic structure of local societies and the parameters of their societal reproduction "from the inside" (this influence grows stronger as the foreign capital grows stronger and persists in its "internal" expansion). The stages of "dependent capitalist development" are determined in accordance with all of this: The authors date its origins to the period of the mass infiltration of local economies by foreign capital. This was the turn of the century in Argentina (pp 119-121), the 1930's, 1940's and 1950's in Chile (pp 378, 381), the 1940's in Mexico (pp 305, 306), etc.

No matter how logically this approach is validated--from the standpoint of the research concept--it appears to reduce the spatial and temporal framework of "dependent capitalist development" substantially. In our opinion, the characteristic features of the socioeconomic dynamics of the developing society (particularly in Latin America) with regard to the concept of "dependent capitalist development" can be revealed more completely with the aid of the Marxist approach, in accordance with which a number of pre-capitalist structures, arising in countries enslaved by colonizers under the influence of outside capitalist development (for example, slavery in Latin America and many other forms based on extraeconomic methods of exploitation), are viewed as regressive forms of capital. This regression of capital originated and developed at the same time as the world capitalist economy.⁵

The pre-capitalist structures on the periphery of the world capitalist economy, which did not precede capitalism but were engendered by it, represent, in accordance with this approach, anomalous (K. Marx' term) forms of capital and are described as "neotraditional" in contrast to the actual pre-colonial local structures. This leads to an extremely important conclusion: Capitalism's relations with these pre-colonial structures are "relations between structures, relations between different historical methods of production." Capital's relationship with "neotraditional" structures, on the other hand,

is "a conflict within the capitalist order between its fully developed and anomalous...forms."⁶

The regressive structures engendered by capitalism made their appearance in the colonies (and, judging by the information in the book, in the Latin American countries as well) much earlier than the pure form of capitalist production. In our opinion, this means that the initial stage of "dependent capitalist development" can extend far beyond the chronological boundaries set by the team of authors. But this is only part of the problem.

In the Latin American countries (just as, incidentally, in other parts of the developing world), the establishment and consolidation of the capitalist order as a historically later social form did not eradicate the multiple socioeconomic structure, but complicated it and intensified it (see, in particular, page 284). Furthermore, changes in the parameters of the multiple structure (the "set" of structures, the maturity of these structures or their individual stages, etc.) occurred under the influence of changes in the capitalist system in the centers of the world capitalist economy and as a result of clashes with the development laws imposed by this system.⁷ This connection is elucidated in detail with information about virtually all of the countries examined in the book, and this is one of the strong points of the research work. But the main thing was that when capital exercised its dominion "from outside" (and later "inside"), it did not transform economic structures throughout the territory where it established its power. In fact, the authors themselves attach great significance to this "dualism," stressing that "capitalism's coexistence with pre-capitalist structures and forms of ownership" (given the different interpretation of "dependent development," they included the regressive forms of capital in this category) represents an "innate" feature of Latin American (and, we could add, Afro-Asian) capitalism (p 11).

But it is exactly here, in our opinion, that the need arises to clarify some of the authors' statements about the nature and temporal parameters of the system-forming structure in Latin America. Proceeding from the belief that the multiple structure was a national phenomenon, or a regional one in some cases (but not an international one), the authors seek (and find) the system-forming structure within these strictly delineated local boundaries. The logical conclusion is that the capitalist structure in the countries of this region did not become the system-forming structure ("as a result of national capital's self-development and under the influence of mass infiltration by foreign capital") until the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th (pp 27-28). The question of what existed prior to this time leaves considerable room for various interpretations. This also applies to the "set" of structures--the actual makeup of the multiple structure.

An assessment of the system of slavery in Latin America is perhaps of particular interest in this respect. The authors stress from the very beginning that the slaveowners' plantations "had no connection with the capitalist method of production" and that their surplus product "could only be intended for sale on the foreign market because there was virtually no domestic market in the feudal society (let us take note of this--V. R.)" (p 11). Here, as we can see, the slave holding structure is viewed as an element (an obviously

subordinate one) of the dominant feudal order. But later, in the chapter about Brazil, the main center of slavery in Latin America, the reader will encounter a different account of the problem. He will learn that "colonial plantation slaves" represented "a specific method of production," which cannot be identified with the slavery of ancient times; that this form of slavery was a "by-product of capitalism's establishment in the main centers of the new social system" (pp 175, 179, 180) and therefore apparently had a definite connection with the capitalist method of production. What is more, this "by-product" of world capital, which existed in Brazil for more than three centuries, is described as "the main, system-forming slave holding structure," and "the social order which grew out of it" was called the "slave holding" order! (pp 174, 180).

In this connection, there is a timely analysis of the view that the historically changing system of productive forces and production relations (parameters of the multiple structure) in the developing world should be assessed from two standpoints: from the standpoint of the domestic economic and social content of these systems (in this case, forms of extraeconomic coercion, for example, could be of primary significance), and from the standpoint of the functions the local complexes of productive forces and production relations perform in the system of international socioeconomic relations. K. Marx provided an example of this approach to the assessment of socioeconomic processes on the periphery of the world capitalist economy, particularly in the following statement about slavery in America: "And whereas we do not call the owners of plantations in America capitalists but they actually are capitalists, this occurs because they exist as an anomaly in a world market based on free labor."⁸

In our opinion, it is wrong to describe slavery in Latin America as a system-forming structure or as a social order with no relationship to capitalism at a time when capitalism was becoming a world system and was determining the major parameters of the multiple structure of colonial countries and the changes in this structure. Slavery was a social form--a "by-product" of capitalism (an extremely precise term!--V. R.)--not only in its origins, but mainly because it was placed at the service of the reproduction of industrial capital in the centers of the world capitalist economy from the very beginning. From the time of its birth, it presupposed, in K. Marx' words, "the existence of the market as a world market"; it was precisely the domination of this market by industrial capital that turned plantation slave farming into a commercial form of production.⁹

One of the authors' great analytical achievements was their ability to conclusively validate their main conclusion: that the development of capitalism on the periphery of the world capitalist economy is not a reserve for the reinforcement of the world capitalist system, but, rather, a factor in its continued destabilization; the growing contradictions of "peripheral" capitalism constitute one of the main factors intensifying the crisis of capitalism as a world system.

The authors have revealed the socioeconomic foundations of the revolutionary process in the Latin American countries with great scientific zeal. Although

sociopolitical subjects were not discussed in the work (with a few exceptions); it is apparent that the authors sense the difference between political situations in various groups of countries in their formulation of a "general rule" (unfortunately, not explained in detail): the more highly developed the economy and the class structure and the more extensive the dominion of foreign capital, the more decisive role class struggle plays as the laboring people seek a solution to the crisis engendered by dependent capitalist development. Conversely, when a country and its class structure are less developed and when imperialist intervention in the affairs of this country is more confined, the formation of broad class coalitions in the struggle for new alternatives is more possible (p 410).

We believe that the reader will appreciate this extremely thorough work, which takes us into the very heart of the burning problems of those who are fighting against the imperialist domination of the continent.

FOOTNOTES

1. The reader will find an "array" of interpretations of these concepts in the discussion of capitalist development in the countries of this region--LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1979, Nos 1, 2.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 4, p 56.
3. Here is just one example from the book: The total sales of just the regional branches of companies in which American capital holds the controlling share of stock were in excess of one-fourth (!) of the gross domestic product of Latin American states in 1980 (p 13).
4. V. Ponomarev, "The Joint Struggle of the Workers and the National Liberation Movement Against Imperialism and for Social Progress," KOMMUNIST, 1980, No 16, p 34.
5. For more detail, see: V. V. Krylov, "The Capitalist-Oriented Form of Societal Development in the Newly Liberated Countries (An Inquiry Into the Methodology of Marxist Research)," RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR, 1983, No 2, pp 20-37; V. V. Krylov, "Characteristic Features of Socio-economic Processes in the Developing Societies," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, 1976, No 9, pp 94-106; Kh. Grinig, "An Inquiry Into the Peasantry's Position in the System of Imperialist Dependence, Exploitation and Underdevelopment"--"The Agrarian Question and the Peasantry's Role in the Current Phase of the National Liberation Revolution. International Conference on Theory. Ulaanbaatar, 1978," Prague, 1978, pp 37-51.
6. V. Krylov, "Some Aspects of Africa's Agrarian Development," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, 1981, No 3, p 30.
7. Here reference can be made to the large group of issues raised by the authors in connection with the establishment and development of the social functions of state ownership and various forms of collective ownership.

8. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 46, p I, p 505. For an analysis of this dual approach to the assessment of the multiple structure on the periphery of the world capitalist economy, based on references to this subject matter in the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, see the aforementioned article by V. V. Krylov "The Capitalist-Oriented Form of Societal Development in the Newly Liberated Countries."
9. "Its (capital's--V. R.) main method of attaining this consists precisely in the involvement of these (pre-capitalist--V. R.) methods of production in its own distribution process"--K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 24, pp 126-127.

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THE 'CONTADORA GROUP': THE DIFFICULT ROAD TO PEACE

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 84 (signed to press 9 Aug 84)
pp 141-144

[Article by I. M. Bulychev]

[Text] One of the characteristic features of current political events in the world community is the attempt of developing countries to contribute to the guarantee of international security and to put an end to the United States' attempts to direct the course of human history in its own interests "by force." Latin America is no exception to the rule. In January 1983 the first conference of the foreign ministers of Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Panama took place on the Panamanian island of Contadora, marking the beginning of the now famous "Contadora Group's" peacemaking efforts in Central America.

Within the short period of its existence, the group has done much, and it has continued at all subsequent meetings to adhere to the principles drafted at the first conference. In the final communique of this conference, the participants clearly define their position with regard to ways of resolving the Central American crisis. Expressing their serious worries about the escalation of tension in the region, they called "direct or indirect foreign intervention in conflicts in Central America" unacceptable and declared their intention to continue aiding states of the region in the peaceful settlement of conflict situations of potential danger to the Latin American people and to the rest of the world.

Soon after the first conference, a working "technical" commission was founded for the detailed investigation of affairs on the local level and of the views of Central American governments on regional crises, and for the preparation of plans and recommendations for the search for mutually acceptable solutions.

The meeting of the presidents of Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Panama in the small Mexican health resort of Cancun in the middle of July 1983 was an important stage in the work of the "Contadora Group."¹ By this time, the immense amount of work performed by the "technical" commission (conversations and consultations with representatives of regional governments) had made it possible for these countries to begin the joint drafting of a general document listing the basic guidelines of the peaceful settlement of the Central American

crisis. This document was the "Cancun Declaration," which was signed at the summit meeting and represented a detailed and constructive program, based on the strict observance of the principles of international law, of specific obligations and joint action to relax tension in the region.

The "Cancun Declaration" proposed the establishment of effective control over weapon deliveries to Central American countries, the substantial restriction and eventual removal of all foreign military advisers, the prohibition of the use of the territory of these countries by a "third party" as a bridge-head for attacks on neighboring states, the cessation of the process of militarization and the transformation of the region into a demilitarized zone. Besides this, it envisaged the conclusion of agreements by Central American countries to create an atmosphere of mutual trust in the region and relax existing tension. One specific way of attaining these goals today and in the future could consist, according to those at the Cancun meeting, in the creation of bilateral commissions. By this time, the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican commission had accumulated considerable work experience and was commended in the "Cancun Declaration."

Copies of the declaration were sent to all of the Central American governments and to UN Secretary-General J. Perez de Cuellar and the governments of the United States and Cuba.

Nicaragua was one of the first to respond to the group's peaceful initiatives. The Sandinist Government declared its consent to multilateral talks and proposed its own program (of six points),² a program which was proposed in the spirit of the "Cancun Declaration" and which won the recognition of the UN secretary-general. It proposed the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty by Nicaragua and Honduras, the strict observance of the principles of non-intervention, self-determination and respect for national sovereignty, the peaceful settlement of all disputes and the promotion of socioeconomic cooperation in the region and the free expression of popular will.

The government of socialist Cuba also issued a quite definite statement in support of the "Contadora Group's" peaceful initiatives. Speaking in Santiago de Cuba at a rally attended by thousands to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the attack on the Moncada barracks, Fidel Castro reaffirmed the Cuban people's willingness to support international efforts to solve Central America's problems by means of adequate and fair negotiations.³

The constructive position of the "Contadora Group," Nicaragua's peaceful initiatives and Cuba's willingness to aid in the just settlement of the Central American crisis won the sympathy and support of all peace-loving forces.

The Reagan Administration had the opposite reaction to the "Cancun Declaration" and to its international repercussions. The joint American-Honduran "Big Pine-2" combat maneuvers of unprecedented scales and duration, which began soon afterward on Honduran territory in direct proximity to the Nicaraguan border, was the actual U.S. response to the initiatives of the "Contadora Group." To neutralize the unpopularity of the aggressive U.S.

policy in Central America, however, Washington officially announced the creation of a national commission on Central America on a bipartisan basis, headed by former Secretary of State Kissinger. This was an attempt to intimidate the "Contadora Group" and demonstrate the absence of opposition to Reagan's Central American policy in the United States and the "monolithic" nature of the ranks of this policy's supporters.

This maneuver did not weaken the desire of Latin American states to solve problems directly related to their common destiny and interests without the mediating services of the White House--particularly since the United States is still fighting an undeclared war against the people of Nicaragua and is still building up its military strength in the region. The adoption of a "document of aims" at the September (1983) conference in Panama City marked the beginning of a new and extremely important stage in the activities of the "Contadora Group." It outlined a program of new specific actions to stabilize the situation in Central America and laid the foundations of a lasting peace here. The conference might have been the first time that a certain level of mutual understanding was achieved by representatives of all the states in the region who attended the conference, and this was reflected in the signing of the final document. The "document of aims" thereby summed up some of the results of the "Contadora Group's" activity, listing its successes under the conditions of continuous armed U.S. provocations against Nicaragua and the growing scales of subversive CIA operations in the region.

At the beginning of January 1984, exactly a year after the formation of the "Contadora Group," another conference of the foreign ministers of Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Panama was held in Panama (the 12th, and the 5th attended by their Central American colleagues). This resulted in the drafting and unanimous adoption of a new document called "Standards of the Fulfillment of Obligations Assumed in the 'Document of Aims.'"⁴ It represented an important step toward the drafting of a peace treaty, the conclusion of which is the main goal of the "Contadora Group."

The "standards" envisage a "freeze" on the regional arms race, with the aim of gradual arms reduction, and the withdrawal of all regular and irregular foreign military subunits. The countries which signed the document pledged to guarantee absolute respect for human rights and free general elections. Considerable attention was also given to ways of solving the region's most urgent socioeconomic problems, reviving the mechanism of the Central American Common Market (CACM) and developing mutually beneficial trade and economic relations.

A decision was made at the conference to form three working commissions (on regional security matters, political affairs and socioeconomic problems) with representatives from the Central American countries. They should operate under the auspices of the "Contadora Group."

The Reagan Administration was obviously displeased with the prospect of genuine agreements to keep the armed conflict from spreading and from turning into a fratricidal war. In the hope of smothering the Sandinist popular revolution and stifling the regional struggle for the right of self-determination,

Washington made another attempt to frustrate the "Contadora Group's" efforts. Gangs of Somozist counterrevolutionaries, acting under the direct control of the CIA, intensified their armed provocations against Nicaragua from the territory of Honduras, where their main bases are concentrated. The CIA simultaneously expanded the combat zone of the Nicaraguan "contras" from Costa Rica. The mining of Nicaraguan ports, which was the most flagrant violation of the standards of international law, is known to have been conducted with the participation of the CIA and under its direct supervision. The true meaning of demagogic White House statements about "peace" and "democracy" and about the desire to "cooperate" with the "Contadora Group" in the search for a solution to the regional crisis, was fully exposed to the entire world.

Under these conditions, the Nicaraguan Government sent a letter to the countries belonging to the "Contadora Group" about the need for immediate "extraordinary measures to curb the escalation of aggression and the exacerbation of the crisis in Central America."⁵ An emergency meeting of the foreign ministers of the Contadora countries was convened at the beginning of January 1984 in response to this letter.⁶ A news bulletin published after the meeting stressed the urgent need for countries drawn into the conflict on the U.S. side to resist Washington's pressure and pursue a policy confirming their adherence to the previously signed program for the peaceful political regulation of the situation in Central America.

This was a timely appeal. Within the framework of the comprehensive plan which was drafted by the "Kissinger Commission" and was intended to exhaust the "Contadora Group" and disrupt the process it had begun, attempts to sow dissention among the countries involved in regional talks were clearly discernible. Prompted by the "commission," Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador submitted their own so-called "joint declaration," which went against the agreements that had been reached at the latest meeting of the "Contadora Group" and canceled the results of previous agreements.

This move by the Washington-engineered "mini-bloc" was pointedly criticized and was interpreted as another attempt by the Reagan Administration to impede the political settlement process and impose its own will on the Latin American people.

The White House suffered another defeat in its attempts to block the "Contadora Group" when a joint Nicaraguan-Costa Rican commission was formed on 16 May 1984 to avert the possibility of dangerous incidents in the border zone of the two countries, which the CIA is trying to turn into a permanent factor escalating tension in the region.⁷ The formation of this commission confirmed the determination of the "Contadora Group" to pursue goals consistent with the regional desire for peace and the development of friendly and neighborly relations.

The results of the June 1984 conference of the foreign ministers of the "Contadora Group" and the "Act on Peace and Cooperation in Central America," adopted at this conference, represented an important step along this difficult road.⁸ The basic premises of the act, which was submitted for investigation to the Central American governments, testify that the "Contadora Group" is

turning into a major political factor in Latin America, which is experiencing a new upswing in the national liberation struggle. The collective efforts of its members are an important feature of this upswing, and they must be taken into account by Central American regimes obedient to the United States and by the United States itself.

The persistence of the "Contadora Group" and its consistency in collective decisionmaking are winning it more and more support throughout the world each day. The Soviet Union, for example, has supported the peaceful initiatives of the Contadora countries on several occasions, including the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly.

The USSR's support of the "Contadora Group's" efforts has been commended throughout the world. This was mentioned specifically by Venezuelan Government spokesmen when a delegation from the USSR, headed by Deputy Chairman K. A. Khalilov of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, visited Venezuela in February 1984. An official visit to the USSR in June 1984 by a delegation from the Colombian National Congress was another occasion for positive remarks about the Soviet Union's support for the peacemaking efforts of the "Contadora Group," which is demonstrating the growing ability of national liberation forces to oppose imperious U.S. policy and defend the cause of peace and the interests of their people.

FOOTNOTES

1. EL PAIS, Madrid, 19 July 1983.
2. BARRICADA, Managua, 20 July 1983.
3. GRANMA, Havana, 28 July 1983.
4. EL PAIS, 10 January 1984.
5. BARRICADA, 26 March 1984.
6. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Paris, 10 April 1984.
7. EL PAIS, 17 May 1984.
8. BARRICADA, 11 June 1984.

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PROBLEMS FACING ARGENTINA DESCRIBED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 17 Sep 84)
pp 5-10

[Article by Yu. M. Korolev: "A Time of Decisions"]

[Text] Argentina is the subject of this special issue of the magazine. A year ago, important political changes took place in the country through the efforts of the Argentine people: The reactionary repressive military dictatorship left the scene and an elected civilian government was formed.

The articles in this issue describe the events leading up to Argentina's difficulties of recent years and the main factors influencing its current development.

Argentina is one of the most highly developed countries in Latin America. Features characteristic of developed capitalist countries and of developing states are closely intermingled in its socioeconomic and political structures. Although the country has industrial potential and a large agrarian sector geared to export, it nevertheless bears the marks of prolonged economic dependence on imperialism. Although Argentina has representative institutions of bourgeois democracy, it nevertheless has experienced direct intervention by the military in political affairs several times in recent decades and has lived under five military dictatorships.

The end of 1983 was marked by important changes in this country: A civilian bourgeois-democratic government was formed, headed by Raul Alfonsín, the leader of the ruling Radical Civic Union party (UCR).

But is this the final solution to the problems in the political renovation of the society? Does this mean the end of the period of "transitional" and "critical" situations? These questions are now applicable to several developing countries, especially in Latin America: Regimes promoting authoritarian capitalist modernization have been discredited everywhere and have evoked angry public protest on the continent and condemnation everywhere else in the world. Finally, they have simply failed to work from the sociopolitical standpoint because they cannot defend bourgeois law and order.

"Non-military" Argentina has suggested that the solution lies in an anti-crisis liberal-democratic alternative. How will world capitalist problems

affect this alternative? What will it display of general, international significance, and what will distinguish it from other attempts by developing countries to take their rightful place in the world (in particular, from Nicaragua's revolutionary-democratic alternative) and will not be reflected in the course of world development?

The scientific interpretation of the "time of decisions" and a constructive approach to the search for solutions to the crisis on the Latin American continent will certainly depend on the correct determination of the possibilities for the development of the state sector and the reorganization of the agrarian sector, on the actual involvement of various sociopolitical forces in these processes and, finally, on consideration for the latest tendencies in the current stage of the internationalization (or transnationalization) of capital.

Experience has shown that essentially insurmountable difficulties, stemming from the different phases of societal development in the capitalist powers and the countries of this region, have arisen in Latin America during the course of capitalist modernization to surmount underdevelopment under various forms of political rule. Today this is reflected in the objective "readiness" of structures for transnational integration and in the subjective view of its consequences, which leads to vacillation in the dominant groups in developing countries (their tendency to alternate between idealizations of either transnational or national development projects) and the inability to find a compromise solution to the crisis. Modernization in accordance with the transnational model of the capitalist world order has essentially been completed in these countries, its socioeconomic potential has been exhausted, and its supporters, who already lacked a substantial social base in the past, are now actually in a state of political isolation within their own countries.

But here the factor of dependence comes into play: Transnational reorganization has not been completed in the zone of highly developed capitalism, leading to the continuation of the previous neocolonial policy of holding on to transnational sectors of the economy in the developing world even when national liberation forces take charge of the countries here. For the United States, this policy in Latin America has virtually always been connected with more or less authoritarian methods of rule.

The exhaustion of transnational "modernization" in the developing countries brings about the deceleration, stagnation and even decline of production. Under these conditions, the constant imposition of decisions in the interests of the world capitalist system at the expense of national interests (as in the case of the Malvinas crisis, for example) engenders and strengthens nationalist feelings. Confrontations are transferred to the sociopolitical sphere and objectively diminish the tendency toward authoritarianism.

The effects of the "transnationalization" of Latin American countries with rightwing authoritarian regimes have had a considerable impact on the social and political structure of society and on mass organizations and parties. The growth of new segments of the working class has been accompanied by increased unemployment in old sectors. Most of the hired workers (especially the young) for whom there was the greatest demand in the transnational

corporate labor market have turned out to be, on the one hand, employed in the main sectors of production (up to 35-40 percent of the GDP) and, on the other, not affiliated with labor organizations. Labor unions have lost much of their previous significance as defenders of worker interests. Repressive measures have weakened their position even more. As a result, wages have accounted for a much smaller part of national income, which has been deliberately redistributed in the interests of transnational "modernization."

The decline of public purchasing power and the exposure of the limits of "transnationalization" in the late 1970's and early 1980's, however, were accompanied by the revival of the labor movement. Furthermore, this has occurred in both of the incompatible hemispheres of the "dualist economy": in the form of a larger strike movement in the "traditional" portion, and in the form of intense efforts by workers to establish their own organizations in the "new" portion. In some cases, this has been reflected in the establishment of so-called branches of "transnational unions." The clearly political thrust of worker demonstrations and the definite politicization of all public life (demands for the liberation of political prisoners, the democratization of labor unions, the punishment of police-executioners, information about the "missing," political liberties and others) are indicative. Unions are being reorganized on the national scale. In the late 1960's and early 1970's this was prevented in some cases by the prohibition of activities by leftist political parties, and in others by the reformism of the leaders of large national labor associations. But now the crisis has passed, and Latin America is experiencing a qualitatively new upsurge of the labor movement. All of this stems from the existence of new sociopolitical realities.

Of course, this is only part of the process of the growth of mass-scale public social protests. There have been considerable changes in middle strata--that is, the categories of hired labor not classified as "working class": engineering and technical personnel, civil servants (including the military), administrative personnel, physicians, instructors and artists. "Seized" by the spirit of "modernization," they--or, more precisely, some of them--were temporarily under the influence of technocratism and corporativism, but the crisis of the "policy of transnationalization," its failure and the need for democratic institutions brought them back to the fold of the dictators' opponents by the second half of the 1970's. Middle strata are actively involved in the general democratic struggle and they usually support either bourgeois-liberal parties or parties of the social-democratic type. In addition, they are augmenting the mass base of communist parties, forming revolutionary-democratic parties and organizations and advocating sweeping socioeconomic and political reforms. It is indicative that the leaders of middle strata of the 1980's are not propounding the doctrines of the 1960's, when these categories of labor sometimes set themselves up in opposition to the proletariat and sometimes focused only on national revival; now they are more likely to advocate an "equal social partnership" in the struggle against the crisis. The demands of the working class and middle strata have several important points in common: the reinforcement of the state sector and the introduction of elements of planning, the reform of the education and public health systems, the democratization of social life, the pursuit of an independent foreign policy and others.

Urban petty bourgeois strata are still sizeable in the Latin American countries, representing 15-20 percent of the economically active population and 25-30 percent of the adult population and voting public. They--craftsmen, small businessmen, women and domestic workers--were the basis of the "passive" portion of the social base of the rightwing authoritarian regimes that appeared in the 1960's and 1970's. Now the urban petty bourgeoisie is distinguished by loud protests against dictatorships and demands for the democratization of social life, changes in government credit policy and the defense of local industry and business in general. As a rule, however, they also oppose the reinforcement of the state sector and defend private initiative.

Important processes can also be seen in agriculture. In addition to its industrialization, accompanied by the rapid proletarianization of peasants and farmers, sectorial priorities were reordered in the 1960's and 1970's: Traditional crops for export and local use were replaced by new ones, the development of which was dictated by the conditions of transnational agrarian integration. The establishment of the "dualist economy" in Latin American rural areas is acquiring increasingly pronounced social features and is expanding the mass base of the struggle for the renovation of society.

All of these basic changes are characteristic of the "time of decisions" and the current period of Argentine politics. In general, political developments have been distinguished by considerable potential for social activity, the nature and purpose of which are still difficult to discern. In any case, it is obvious that this potential will complicate the establishment of the kind of order imperialism wants. In this connection, it is probable that all sorts of attempts will be made to pressure new political leaders to curb the mass movement, neutralize its democratic thrust and divide pluralist forces. Therefore, we can predict attempts to uphold the supporters of authoritarian principles of government. This does not mean that efforts will be made to abolish constitutional rights, etc. The same goals can be attained with the aid of other methods: the promotion of dissent in the labor and democratic movements, the discouragement of political (including electoral) activity by the population and the usurpation of the initiative of leftist forces--that is, an attempt to prove that everything can be decided "from above."

This position is specifically adhered to by the grand and middle local bourgeoisie, having little or no connection with transnational corporations. It has proposed its own plan for capitalist modernization, envisaging some limitation of the omnipotence of TNC's, a stronger economic role for the state and the encouragement of national private capitalist enterprise. These groups could become the "historical reserve" of the TNC's in the future; regardless of their intentions, their economic policy is gradually "leading" new subdivisions of the national economy to the point at which "direct dialogue" with transnational business is possible.

Today the local grand bourgeoisie is separated from it by large monopolist capital, the landed oligarchy and, in some countries, the authoritarian regime, but it is striving to use changes in the mood of the general public in its own interest to compel these forces to agree to the "democratization" of political life (that is, the transfer of authority). But this process could acquire an internal dynamic and inevitably escape the control of moderate forces.

The radicalization of most of the national-democratic movement has already made the social-democratic alternative (with some adjustments for the specific conditions of Latin America) the main bourgeois-democratic anti-crisis option in some Latin American countries. Bolivia, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Argentina have already accepted different varieties of this alternative, and Brazil might be next. This could be a long-term solution because the process has had a profound effect on the army and has apparently given rise to new tendencies within it. This alternative can be described as social-reformist and leftist-centrist. It represents a broad range of specific political and economic decisions--from compromises with TNC's to the adoption of radical national-democratic development programs.

This sets new objectives for leftist forces, and the main one is united action to prevent the decline of national-liberation, revolutionary-democratic attitudes in the masses.

It is a "time of decisions" for Argentina. A process of democratization has begun in the country under qualitatively new sociohistorical conditions. It is being observed carefully by all those who cherish the ideals of peace, democracy and progress.

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ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY UNDER ALFONSIN'S PRESIDENCY DESCRIBED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 17 Sep 84)
pp 11-24

[Article by A. I. Stroganov: "The New Government's First Steps"]

[Text] For more than half a century now, ever since 1930, Argentina has been unable to overcome its social and political instability. What has taken shape in the country is what is sometimes called a "catastrophic balance" between various parties, blocs and sociopolitical forces. This is the reason for the frequent and sometimes quite abrupt political shifts which periodically bring bourgeois-reformist groups to the surface and then submerge the country under the power of military regimes and again evoke a wave of proletarian and popular demonstrations.

Will the new government of R. Alfonsin represent a new spiral in this "vicious circle" or will it take advantage of a "gap" in the circle to start the process of Argentina's revitalization? This will depend largely on the government's policies.

Initial Boundaries

The discredited military dictatorship of 1976-1983 left an oppressive legacy. The anti-people and antinational policy of the military leaders who were striving to strengthen the positions of the agricultural and exporting oligarchy, transnational corporations and big local capital at the expense of the masses led to the severe impoverishment of large segments of the population, the ruin of small and middle businessmen and stagnation and crisis in the economy. In 1981 and 1982 the GNP decreased by 11.6 percent, per capita production fell to the level of the first half of the 1970's, and employment in industry was reduced by more than a third. The number of unemployed, according to union data, rose to 1.5 million, excluding indirect unemployment in the form of the excessive manning of public services and small-scale retail trade and in the form of emigration (up to 2 million people emigrated from a country with a population of 28 million).¹ The real wages of the laboring public were reduced by half during the years of the military regime. Inflation took on catastrophic scales: Between April 1976 and November 1983 it reached the astronomical figure of 40,000 percent.² The foreign debt rose to 44 billion dollars within 8 years. In 1984 Argentina's payments on foreign loans totaled

20 billion dollars, a figure far beyond its capabilities. Up to 30,000 people died as a result of the military regime's repressive actions, most of them without a trial or investigation (the so-called "missing").

The absolute bankruptcy of the military government's policies was underscored by the outcome of the 1982 Anglo-Argentine conflict.

The regime was discredited to such a degree that opposition democratic parties won more than 95 percent of the vote in the elections of 30 October 1983. By that time the Multipartidaria had disintegrated, but its two main elements--the radicals and the Peronists, the main contenders in the elections--proposed election programs similar to the provisions of the Multipartidaria platform. It is true that the radicals have the greatest influence in middle and petty bourgeois strata while the Peronists are supported mainly by organized labor. Reformist currents prevail in both parties, and some social-democratic influence has recently been noted, including influence on the position of R. Alfonsin, representing the leftist-centrist wing of the Radical Civic Union (UCR).

Alfonsin's campaign platform contained demands for the restoration of constitutional legality, the guarantee of democratic rights and freedoms for the entire population, the control of the army by a constitutional government, the repeal of repressive legislation and the eradication of the repressive network, and the prosecution of military leaders accused of illegal repressive actions. Alfonsin advocated the revitalization of the economy and domestic market, the support of local businessmen, the eradication of inflation, the augmentation of real wages, the restoration of the rights of labor unions, the improvement of conditions for the laboring public and the popular masses, and the development of culture, public education, public health services and housing construction. In reference to the foreign debt, Alfonsin announced that he would seek preferential repayment terms and refinancing for Argentina.

The program proposed the pursuit of a sovereign, independent and peaceful foreign policy, more active participation in the nonaligned movement, the promotion of cooperation and integration by Latin American states and the restoration of Argentina's sovereignty over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands through diplomatic efforts and with the help of the United Nations.³ It did not envisage sweeping reforms, but it did meet the immediate demands of large segments of the population and coincided at several points with the policy statements of other democratic forces.

The radicals' impressive victory (over 52 percent of the vote) came as a surprise to many. In previous elections--March and September 1973--the UCR candidate (R. Balbin) received 21 percent and 24 percent of the vote respectively, while the Peronists won 49.6 percent and 62 percent. This time the Peronist candidate, I. Luder, was far behind Alfonsin, winning the support of only 40 percent of the voters. This result, however, was affected by the polarization of forces during the campaign. This gave Alfonsin the votes of not only the traditional supporters of the UCR, but also many of Peronism's opponents who had no chance of winning on their own and were merely trying to keep the Peronist candidate from winning.

The radicals also won an absolute majority in the congressional Chamber of Deputies (128 of 254 seats) and 7 gubernatorial seats (out of 22), including the ones in such major provinces as Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Entre Rios and Mendoza.

The Peronists, however, won 111 seats in the chamber and the majority in the Senate and headed the administration of 12 provinces. But the main thing is that the organized labor movement remained under their control. The radicals had a smaller social base because the real base did not correspond to the number of votes Alfonsin received. Much now depends on the relations between the radicals and the Peronists.

With a view to this fact, the Communist Party of Argentina issued an appeal for the support of the new government's efforts to carry out campaign promises and suggested that the dividing line be based not on party affiliation (that is, Peronists vs. radicals), but that it be drawn between democratic forces and their opponents, and advocated the unification of all those who wanted reforms.⁴ The Peronist leaders, including I. Luder, also expressed their willingness to cooperate with the Alfonsin government. After the elections Alfonsin himself tried to prove that he expressed the interests of all the people and that he supported dialogue with opposition democratic parties for the sake of national unity.⁵

The new president reduced the number of cabinet posts and formed a government of only eight radical ministers. The majority were his colleagues from the leftist-centrist wing of the UCR.

The Radicals and the Armed Forces

When Alfonsin took office, he immediately began to reorganize the armed forces. The functions of the supreme commander-in-chief were turned over to the president of the republic. The commanders of different branches of the armed services were discharged and their functions were turned over to chiefs of staff, united in a combined general staff headed by a representative of the ground forces.⁶ These measures undermined the military command's autonomy in relation to the central government. After all, it was the commanders of the different branches who had headed the military coups and military regimes of past years.

The government conducted a purge of the army. In the very first days, 38 of the 56 generals were discharged.⁷ Carrying out a campaign promise, the government repealed the "National Pacification Act" the military regime had passed in September 1983, not long before the change of government. This "self-amnesty act" (as the Argentines called it) relieved the military of all responsibility for the crimes committed during the period of dictatorship. The president ordered that all cases involving violations of human rights, torture, killings and kidnappings be investigated and that the perpetrators be put on trial. The government approved the formation of a national commission to learn the fate of the "missing." The commission was actively supported and assisted in its work by democratic organizations and the population. It received extensive press coverage. It played an important role in exposing and isolating the reactionary military establishment, in stimulating activity

by the democratic public and in consolidating the constitutional structure and law and order.

Nine members of three military juntas, headed by former Presidents R. Videla, R. Viola and L. Galtieri, and several other top-ranking officers from the army, the security service and the police were tried as the main perpetrators of violations of the law and the mass-scale torture and murder. The members of the last junta, headed by L. Galtieri, were also accused of bringing about Argentina's military defeat in the Anglo-Argentine conflict.

The president pointedly criticized the "national security doctrine." Measures were taken to abolish repressive agencies. A new law repealed the previous code of military justice. Military tribunals would henceforth try only crimes of a purely military nature, and civilian courts would try all others, including cases involving people from the military. It is true that the government agreed to one compromise when it gave the Supreme Military Tribunal jurisdiction over the cases of the perpetrators of repressive actions during the period of dictatorship, but even in these cases the highest court of appeals was the civilian federal court. The government was also inconsistent when it offered to drop the charges against people who were carrying out the orders of their superiors. This relieved most of the people directly responsible for the repressive actions of all responsibility for them.⁸

The government tried to organize cooperation with most of the army personnel by encouraging servicemen loyal to the constitution to take part in its undertakings. It tried to avert the growth of opposition feelings in the army by promoting new personnel to replace those who had been discharged, entrusting them with judicial matters concerning the crimes of the military regime and relieving junior command personnel of the responsibility for these crimes.

In some cases this reduced the effectiveness of efforts at democratization. There were many delays in the military tribunal's investigations. Despite the president's criticism of the "national security doctrine," training in military establishments was still based on its premises.⁹ When the behavior of the Galtieri government during the Anglo-Argentine conflict was investigated, there was a tendency to censure its armed occupation of the Falkland Islands and the subsequent severance of "friendly relations" with the United States instead of its repressive actions and defeat.¹⁰ There were still many opponents of government policy in the army. There were even signs of overt opposition on the part of some generals and officers,¹¹ and rumors of an army conspiracy against the government.¹²

The armed forces are still loyal to the constitution, but the symptoms listed above testify that the process of democratization is being resisted, and this could jeopardize the democratic regime.

In general, the establishment of legality, the isolation of the army from active interference in politics and the exposure of the reactionary military leaders' crimes represented some of the new Alfonsin government's most important initial steps. The military budget was cut by more than half. The

government restored the civil rights of people who had lost them under the military regime and took steps to encourage emigrants to return to the country.¹³

On the International Scene

Positive changes were also apparent in foreign policy. The new government announced its intention to develop relations with various countries, including the socialist states, with the Soviet Union among them. Alfonsin proposed a conference on disarmament for the members of the nonaligned movement in Buenos Aires. On 22 May 1984 he signed the joint declaration of the heads of state and government of six countries (Argentina, Mexico, India, Tanzania, Greece and Sweden) requesting the great powers to take steps toward nuclear disarmament. This declaration promoted the growth of Argentina's international prestige. It was wholly supported by the Soviet Union.¹⁴

Priority was assigned to the development of contacts with Latin American countries. Argentina advocated closer cooperation by Latin American states in the defense of national sovereignty, for the revision of the inter-American system and against the threat of U.S. military intervention in Central America and the presence of foreign armed forces in Latin America.¹⁵ The Argentine Government supported the efforts of the Contadora group in Central America¹⁶ and took steps to develop cooperation with Cuba and Nicaragua. Argentina demanded the demilitarization of the Malvinas Islands and offered to negotiate their future with Great Britain, suggesting in the United Nations the decolonization of these islands and the restoration of Argentine sovereignty over them. The Alfonsin government displayed a willingness to reach a compromise with Chile in the border dispute over the Beagle Channel.

The changes in foreign policy helped to strengthen the sovereignty and international influence of the republic, enhance the government's prestige within the country and unify patriotic and democratic forces in support of projected progressive changes.

It must be said, however, that some inconsistent and contradictory moves were made in foreign policy. In connection with the construction of an English military base on the Malvinas, the Argentine Government proposed the creation of a joint system for the defense of the Atlantic coastline of South America through the efforts of adjacent states, without U.S. participation. This proposal also had its negative aspects, particularly the prospect of the militarization of the region by countries connected to Washington by military and political bonds.

The Alfonsin government announced its willingness to contribute to the struggle for nuclear disarmament but simultaneously refused to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, alleging that it would diminish Argentina's opportunities for nuclear research. In time, members of government circles began to discuss Argentina's ideological connections to the West, the need for mutual understanding and cooperation between Argentina and the United States and the need for a Latin American dialogue with the United States, and not against it.

This displayed the government's hope of avoiding conflicts with the United States and with oligarchic pro-imperialist groups within the country, and also

its inconsistency, which could neutralize the positive changes in foreign policy.

Socioeconomic Policy and the Foreign Debt

The problem of foreign indebtedness hung over the government's anti-crisis measures like a "sword of Damocles" from the very beginning. When Alfonsín took office, he reaffirmed his intention to meet Argentina's financial obligations on the condition that payments be deferred, that excessive interest rates be lowered and that repayment terms conform to the country's economic capabilities. He stressed that Argentina would not be bound by terms disrupting the government's plans in the socioeconomic sphere.¹⁷ After reviewing the foreign financial obligations inherited from the military regime, the cabinet concluded that half of them had no legal force.¹⁸ The deferment of payments on the main types of debts until 30 June 1984 was announced for the purpose of seeking solutions acceptable to all sides.¹⁹

Alfonsín's cabinet simultaneously took steps to coordinate the positions of Latin American debtor countries. On 10 May 1984 the president asked the governments of the region to collectively oppose the discriminatory practices of international financial capital, especially U.S. banks, and proposed that a conference of Latin American states be convened for this purpose.²⁰ This initiative was supported and a conference of the foreign and finance ministers of 11 Latin American countries began on 21 June 1984 in Cartagena (Colombia).²¹

Members of the ruling party also discussed the possibility of a unilateral moratorium on payments on the foreign debt if foreign financial organizations should refuse to settle the matter on acceptable terms. In talks with the IMF and American banks, however, the government had to agree to a compromise. In April 1984 it signed a "memorandum on mutual understanding" with the IMF, stipulating the terms of the negotiations.²² The IMF expressed its willingness to defer Argentina's payments, establish more preferential repayment terms and refinance the debts, but in exchange it demanded that Argentina reduce its budget deficit and curb inflation by putting a freeze on wages and cutting social expenditures.

The compromise with international financial capital with regard to foreign debts restricted the government's freedom in domestic policy and socioeconomic affairs. This was also a serious concession to the Argentine ruling classes. The process of national democratization ultimately depends precisely on socioeconomic policy, because a more solid and economic foundation for the process of democratic renewal can be laid only after the economic and social power of the local landowning and bourgeois elite and foreign capital has been undermined and after socioeconomic measures have been taken in the interests of population strata with little or no property. But it is precisely here that the moderate nature of the radical government's reforms is reflected most clearly. To a certain extent, this has been admitted by the leftist-centrist wing of the UCR. At a rally on 16 February 1984 Alfonsín accused the privileged classes of defending free enterprise by putting a time-bomb under democracy and declared that the government would not allow them to emerge from the crisis at the expense of the people.²³

During the campaign Alfonsín and his associates pointedly criticized the military regime's socioeconomic policy as an antinational and undemocratic line and advocated its revision in favor of the masses, "social justice" and the restriction of the excessive profits of the propertied elite. They advocated the encouragement of local production and the development of the domestic market and criticized the economy's excessive dependence on agricultural exports. It is true to B. Grinspun, the new minister of the economy, warned even before he took office that the radical government had no intention of resorting to "revolutionary measures," nationalization or the redistribution of property for the purpose of surmounting the crisis. Furthermore, he asserted that priority would continue to be given to the stimulation of the private sector.

After taking some temporary measures to combat the crisis, the government intended to increase the GDP by 5 percent in 1984, reduce inflation from 433.7 percent to 60-70 percent a year, reduce the budget deficit from 14 percent of the GDP to 4 percent, secure a positive balance of 3.5 billion dollars in foreign trade and raise the real wages of workers by 6-8 percent. Employment and production growth were to be stimulated by extending credit to businessmen.²⁴

For this purpose, price controls and a 40-day freeze on prices were announced in December 1983. Workers' wages were raised at the beginning of December, but only by an amount slightly in excess of the price rise in November, so that there was virtually no increase in real wages.²⁵ In January 1984 the official minimum wage was 68 percent of the minimum subsistence level.²⁶

The price regulations and temporary price freeze won the approval of progressive forces, but without effective control by the government and without the participation of democratic organizations and the population in this control, these measures were sabotaged by big businessmen and merchants. Prices continued to rise and the government was unable to curb inflation. During the first 4 months of 1984 the cost of living rose 87.6 percent. In annual terms this was equivalent (from May 1983 through April 1984) to 522.4 percent.²⁷ Food prices more than doubled between January and April. Whereas the wage increases set by the government each month allowed wages to keep up with the cost of living through March, real wages began to decrease in April.

Strikes began to be held at the end of January.²⁸ At the end of February the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), the Argentine central labor organization, organized a workers' march on the Ministry of Labor building to demand stronger price controls and higher wages.²⁹

The Government, the Unions and Political Parties

The government's relations with labor organizations were exacerbated even earlier by the union democratization bill the government had sent to the National Congress for discussion in December 1983. The bill envisaged union elections on all levels. It further envisaged the offer of one-third of the leadership positions to the majority opposition group if it should win at least 25 percent of the vote.

The bill seemed to be the implementation of one of Alfonsin's campaign promises. But the Peronist union bureaucrats who controlled the organized labor movement saw this action as an obvious attempt by the radical government to reduce their influence in the unions on the pretext of their "democratization."

The CGT, headed by Peronists and uniting the overwhelming majority of unions, turned into a powerful center of opposition feelings. The confrontations between the central labor organization and the government became particularly acute in February, when the Chamber of Deputies approved the bill and it was passed on to the Senate.

Steps to establish government control over some unions on the pretext of their democratization only intensified the resistance. At the beginning of March the CGT drafted a plan for the mobilization of the workers for a series of mass demonstrations throughout the country, including a general strike to protest R. Alfonsin's union and socioeconomic policies. On 15 March 1984 the Senate rejected the government bill on unions by a vote of 24 to 22.³⁰

It became obvious that the attempt to "seize" the unions from the Peronists or at least to undermine Peronist influence by taking advantage of internal disagreements in the labor movement and of the dissatisfaction in low-level organizations with the authoritarianism of the Peronist union bureaucrats was not a success. On the contrary, it intensified confrontations between the government and the CGT, and therefore between the two main parties in the country.

Leftist forces, especially communists, condemned these confrontations within democratic and popular forces because they could split these forces and undermine the stability of the democratic regime. They opposed the Peronist leadership's policy and simultaneously opposed government intervention,³¹ stating that the question of the movement's democratization should be decided by the workers themselves through free democratic elections. The party feels that the CGT, as the unified central labor organization, should be independent of the government, employers and political parties.³² The supporters of this position established the "national workers' meeting" (ENTRA) in January 1984. This was a movement within the labor movement and it was supported by several low-level union links. Other groups opposing the Peronist bureaucrats were also formed. To coordinate their efforts, ENTRA and these groups established a "liaison commission."³³ Its struggle to defend union autonomy has been supported by virtually the entire labor movement.

In this respect, some lessons were learned from the sad experience of the severe defeat democratic forces suffered at the time of their grave split in the mid-1970's and the positive experience of their successful joint actions against the military regime on the basis of a common program within the Multipartidaria in 1981-1983. Under these conditions, the Communist Party persistently advised the government to start a dialogue with all democratic forces and to create a national front capable of successfully withstanding the pressure of the oligarchy and imperialism.³⁴ These appeals were also voiced by members of other parties, including Peronists.³⁵

The complications the government encountered in various fields of its activity and the failure (incidentally, similar failures were suffered by all of the previous radical and military governments from the 1950's to the early 1980's) of its attempt to crowd the Peronists out of the CGT leadership and impose its own variety of democratization on labor unions, as well as the threat of the ruling party's isolation, motivated Alfonsin to reach a compromise with the Peronists. On 24 April, A. Mucci, the minister of labor and social security who had actively fought for the bill on labor unions, resigned. The president began negotiating with CGT leaders. At the opening of the latest National Congress session on 1 May 1984, Alfonsin appealed to political and social forces in the country for reconciliation, dialogue and unity. That same day, workers who spoke at May Day demonstrations noted the working class' important role in the struggle for democracy and called for unity and solidarity in connection with the need to defend constitutional institutions against reactionary intrigues.³⁶

At the beginning of May the government reached an agreement with the CGT on union elections and on the democratization of unions on terms benefiting the Peronists. This paved the way for a dialogue. Alfonsin invited Maria Estela Martinez de Peron, the leader of the Justicialist Party, now in Madrid, to come to Argentina for talks on cooperation. The government also began consultations with other parties, including the Communist Party of Argentina.

Alfonsin's talks with political parties ended on 9 June with the signing of an agreement³⁷ on common views regarding the protection of the constitutional system and basic domestic and foreign policy directions. The agreement was signed by the Justicialist Party, the Movement for Integration and Development, the Christian Democratic Party and several other political organizations.

The agreement called for "Argentine national unity and reconciliation" and for "an accord based on joint action by all Argentines" as the sole condition for guaranteed public well-being. The document stressed the need to maintain and enforce constitutional laws and the democratic regime, based on pluralist principles, "with participation by all citizens in national life." It said that the armed forces "will be given the necessary support in the safeguarding of national defense with the strict observance of constitutional provisions," acknowledged that "any attempt to overthrow the legally elected government with the aid of force is a crime" and secured the rights of labor unions and business organizations.

The document said that "democratic life in the country presupposes social justice and public participation in the attainment of current objectives." This thesis was interpreted within the context of the policy of "effecting the steady growth of real wages, strengthening the position of labor unions and establishing broader opportunities for education and public health care." There was the stipulation, however, that the increase in real wages would be possible only "under the conditions of full employment and steady economic growth," accompanied by "the restoration of savings and accumulations and the modernization of production." In this way, an important development issue was postponed until after the country's emergence from the crisis, while priority was assigned to economic objectives, the modernization of production and the accumulation of capital. The document envisaged the assistance of national and foreign private capital on the condition that their investments "serve the

purpose of national development." This was actually a concession to dominant classes and the IMF. The Communists and the Intransigent Radical Party reaffirmed their willingness to continue the dialogue and defend the democratic regime but did not sign the agreement because several of its points are not in the national interest. The Communist Party was most critical of the postponement of the increase in real wages and the delays in the improvement of living conditions for the masses. The agreement reaffirmed the sovereign nature of foreign policy, the goals of which were declared to be the observance of the principles of self-determination and non-intervention, the development of "relations with all countries, regardless of their ideology" and the "guaranteed unity and integration of Latin America, particularly in the southern cone." The document demanded the dismantling of the British military base on the Malvinas Islands and the restoration of Argentine sovereignty over them and other islands in the South Atlantic through negotiation.

The document called for attempts to reach an agreement in the talks on foreign debts on terms allowing Argentina to fulfill its obligations "without injuring national interests or national pride," "without injuring the status of the laboring public and impeding the revitalization and development of the economy." The special importance of "united action by all debtor countries in Latin America" was underscored.

The very fact that extensive political dialogue with opposition democratic parties had begun in the country strengthened the prospects of the democratic process. The text of the agreement, despite all of its flaws, recorded past accomplishments and made several important statements about the future.

In some cases, however, the government has displayed hesitation and has departed to some extent from its initial intentions when it has encountered numerous problems.

It is still too early to make any definite predictions about future events because the democratic process is still in its initial stage. There has not been enough time to make any definite statements about the exact factors influencing the future performance of the Alfonsin government. Much will depend on the ability of the working class and all popular forces to participate actively in this process.

FOOTNOTES

1. EL PAIS, Madrid, 5 February 1984.
2. LA NACION, Buenos Aires, 21 November 1983.
3. BOHEMIA, Havana, 1983, No 44, p 71.
4. QUE PASA, Buenos Aires, 2 November 1983.
5. GRANMA, Havana, 12 December 1983.
6. BOHEMIA, 1984, No 10, pp 73-74.

7. GRANMA, 27 December 1983.
8. NUEVA ERA, Buenos Aires, 1984, No 12, p 17.
9. Ibid., pp 20-21.
10. QUE PASA, 29 February 1984.
11. BOHEMIA, 1984, No 10, pp 73-74.
12. GRANMA, 28 January 1984.
13. EL PAIS, 5 February 1984.
14. PRAVDA, 24 May 1984; GRANMA, 23 May 1984.
15. GRANMA, 6 February 1984.
16. NUEVA ERA, 1984, No 11, p 3.
17. LA NACION, 19 December 1983.
18. GRANMA, 25 May 1984.
19. NUEVA ERA, 1984, No 10, p 7.
20. GRANMA, 11 May 1984; 15 May 1984.
21. IZVESTIYA, 21 June 1984.
22. GRANMA, 13 April 1984.
23. QUE PASA, 22, 29 February 1984.
24. LA NACION, 30 January 1984.
25. NUEVA ERA, 1984, No 10, p 6.
26. QUE PASA, 22 February 1984.
27. GRANMA, 9 May 1984.
28. TRABAJADORES, Havana, 1 February 1984; QUE PASA, 15, 22 February 1984.
29. LA NACION, 5 March 1984.
30. GRANMA, 16 March 1984.
31. QUE PASA, 15 February 1984.
32. NUEVA ERA, 1984, No 11, pp 11-12.

33. Ibid., 1984, No 12, p 15.
34. Ibid., 1984, No 11, p 4; GRANMA, 16 April 1984.
35. NUEVA ERA, 1984, No 11, p 4.
36. GRANMA, 2 May 1984.
37. CLARIN, 10 June 1984.

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INTERNATIONAL

ARGENTINA'S CURRENT ECONOMIC, SOCIAL POLICY KEY TO FUTURE

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 17 Sep 84)
pp 25-28

[Article by P. N. Boyko: "For the National-Democratic Alternative"]

[Text] Argentina is living through a time of dramatic changes, difficulties and tension.

Washington's official display of ostentatious delight with the country's move toward democracy was followed by the exertion of almost unconcealed pressure on the new government by American banks, the IMF and local financial-oligarchic circles. These actions have been accompanied by "predictions" (essentially threats) of a coup d'etat "by 1985."

Various forms of "direct action" to restore the atmosphere of tension and fear among the people have become more frequent. They are being committed now, just as in the past, by imperialist special services and the local agents in their employ--the very gangs and groups that promoted overt confrontations between the armed forces and the people even before the military coup of 1976, provoked such confrontations and waged an internal "dirty war" of unprecedented brutality after the coup, costing the Argentines numerous lives.

Nevertheless, the major trend consists of successes in democratization efforts and in the struggle for national sovereignty and social progress, and concrete steps to unify democratic, progressive and national-patriotic forces, steps which have been taken in spite of the opposition of those who are trying to prevent the onset of long-overdue changes.

The intensification and exacerbation of the contradictions of dependent capitalist development and the quicker process of differentiation within dominant classes are being accompanied by the objective growth of the struggle of Argentine workers and the masses for national and social liberation and the resistance of imperialist diktat and robbery by various strata and segments of the local bourgeoisie, whose members have had to sacrifice their own economic and political interests for the sake of the global strategy of imperialism, the transnational monopolist elite and its junior "national" partners.

In the political sphere, this became quite apparent during the events on the Malvinas Islands, when ruling circles in imperialist countries, with the

masters of the White House in the lead, looked like "traitors" even to many who had regarded themselves as their "partners." The war in the South Atlantic displayed the glaring discrepancy between the interests of the political development of Latin American states as sovereign nations and the interests of the global imperialist strategy.

Economic conflicts are now most clearly reflected in the existence of what is known as the problem of foreign indebtedness. The snowballing sums of interest payments on past credit are becoming an unbearable burden for the economies of even the most highly developed Latin American countries. Argentina's per capita foreign debt to American and other Western banks is one of the highest in the world.

There was some recent economic growth in the country (2.8 percent in 1983) and the hope that difficulties would soon be surmounted. But the recent (the third this year) rise in U.S. interest rates (0.5 percent) added 200 million dollars to Argentina's foreign debt.¹

In other words, transnational monopolist capital and the U.S. monopolist elite are robbing the Latin American countries on an ever greater scale. Furthermore, the most diverse social classes are having to pay this "tribute," although in differing proportions. The conflict with imperialism is essentially acquiring nationwide scales in each country.

The struggle for the national-democratic development alternative is the prevailing tendency, uniting all groups and currents fighting for the optimal combination of the objectives of national and social liberation, in Latin American countries with a relatively developed and diversified socioeconomic structure (Argentina is one of these states) during the current stage of historical and sociopolitical developments.

At the 15th Congress of the Communist Party of Argentina in September 1983, Argentine Communists noted: "The growth of political maturity, militancy and a stronger tendency toward the unification of popular strata can be seen everywhere. It is apparent in trade-union activity, in the work of various local commissions established by the people, in demonstrations by peasants, students and the intelligentsia, in the policy statements and actions of progressive political parties and in the views of the church, various civilian and military groups, youth and women."²

"Our time," the statement goes on to say, "calls for new ideas. We must unite democratic forces on all levels and in all parts of the country...for the purpose of pursuing a policy of genuine national salvation, backed up by a broad democratic coalition government."³

The national-democratic alternative is not defined as a form of government, but as the tangible, class-related purpose of power. In this respect, we could say that the national-democratic alternative represents the possibility and probability of establishing and consolidating a national-democratic government in the countries economically dependent on imperialism, a government representing the workers and the elements of the main classes and strata

that have been suppressed and exploited by the transnational monopolist oligarchy and have displayed their willingness to attain the goals of national and social liberation.

This certainly does not mean that the national-democratic alternative will automatically eliminate class conflicts and bring about class peace. This is impossible in a society divided into antagonistic classes. But it will immediately establish principles of class relations which will objectively define their level and nature in the countries dependent on imperialism and set "rules of the game" which will not prevent any national social-class force from displaying its viable potential (if it exists) and playing a positive historical role.

The national-democratic alternative reflects a comparatively long-lived, and not temporary, tendency toward peaceful, stable and independent democratic development.

In the post-Malvinas period, particularly after the masses had gained civil liberties and restored the constitutional standards of political life, real prospects took shape in Argentina for the continued intensification of processes here and their evolution in the direction of the national-democratic alternative.

The new government has been defined by Argentine Communists as a "bourgeois democratic government with reformist leanings, consisting of progressive forces and forces inclined toward conciliation."⁴

The program proposed by President R. Alfonsín when he took office and the first steps taken by the new government reflected the demands of the Argentine people in many respects and coincided with the policy statements of other mass and progressive parties and sociopolitical forces.

This applies to important aspects of domestic and foreign policy. Several of Argentina's initiatives in the international arena (for example, the appeal to all nuclear powers from Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden for the prevention of thermonuclear war and the cessation of nuclear stockpiling) had great repercussions abroad. The appeal was highly commended in the Soviet Union. The official response to the joint declaration, published in PRAVDA, said that "the Soviet leadership unconditionally adheres to the same view as the authors of the declaration: Nuclear war must not be permitted in any form."⁵

The new government's positive steps⁶ met with the approval of the majority of Argentines and various sociopolitical circles, including the Communists, who announced at the December (1983) CPA Central Committee Plenum that the Communist Party, without departing from its fundamental position, would "resolutely support legislative initiatives or government undertakings (and make every effort to unite forces for their implementation) contributing to the realization of the Argentine people's democratic ambitions, their desire for progressive changes and their hope of securing the cause of peace. The communists will also continue to criticize any statement or undertaking that

might be injurious or contrary to the public interest, for the purpose of which they will match their actions to their words and will actively develop united action to correct these undertakings."⁷

The time that has elapsed since the elections and the inauguration of the constitutional government has demonstrated the profundity of the Argentine people's desire to consolidate positive tendencies and secure the country's advancement toward peaceful, stable and independent democratic development. This desire was vividly reflected in the demonstration by 100,000 Argentine youths from all mass and progressive political parties--Radicals, Peronists, "Intransigents," Christian Democrats, Communists, Socialists and others--at the end of 1984 under the slogan: "Against dependence, oligarchy, imperialism and the IMF, and for Latin American unity."⁸

The period since the elections has also demonstrated the difficulties the country can encounter in connection with imperialist and reactionary intrigues. These are broad-scale, carefully organized, "comprehensive" intrigues. In the economic sphere their chief aim is to keep the new government from carrying out the program promised to the voters and thereby undermine the entire process of democratic development. In connection with this, the Argentine progressive public was disturbed by the plan for the partial "privatization" of the state sector, which "some people would like to liquidate as a way of 'paying off' foreign creditors."⁹

In the political sphere their aim is to divide democratic, progressive and national-patriotic forces, set them in opposition to one another, and weaken them enough to create the necessary conditions for a takeover by the proteges of the international monopolist elite and local financial-oligarchic elite, perhaps by means of another coup d'etat.

As speakers noted at the latest CPA Central Committee plenum in May 1984, rightist forces, the oligarchy and imperialism have destabilized the situation and are now provoking dissent, escalating prices and inflation, preventing wage increases, exerting all types of pressure and threatening the country with what the president of Argentina has called the danger of "Lebanonization."¹⁰

All sorts of attempts to prevent the genuine democratization of the power structure, including the Argentine Army, are an important part of rightist strategy. Every opportunity is being taken to neutralize national-patriotic currents in the armed forces. The most diverse media of propaganda and psychological influence are being employed for the possible mobilization of "special commandos" or units organized according to the Bolivian "Leopard" model, trained and actually controlled by U.S. special services.

"The present government," CPA Secretary-General Athos Fava said in this connection, "must retain and perform its functions throughout its constitutionally secured term of 6 years, according to the wishes of the voters who elected it."¹¹

The crisis in the country is severe--that is, all-encompassing--and is focusing attention on such urgent matters as agrarian reform; the nationalization

of the entire financial system and foreign trade; the consolidation and development of state companies managing the country's national wealth and energy resources; the guarantee of genuine and stable democracy, reflecting the wishes of the population and its ideals of social justice; the pursuit of a policy of effective solidarity with all people fighting for their own liberation; the uncompromising defense of the cause of peace throughout the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. In this connection, Vice President Victor Martinez of Argentina proposed the creation of a "debtors' club," so that the countries belonging to it could negotiate foreign indebtedness problems from a stronger position. The CPA announced that this approach to foreign debt negotiations would be supported by it and by the workers and the entire population--ZA RUBEZHOM, 1984, No 31, p 11.
2. "Todos juntos, por la liberacion contra la dependencia. Congreso nacional del Partido Comunista," Buenos Aires, 1983, pp 71, 75.
3. Ibid., p 75.
4. "Despues de la dictadura: consolidar una democracia verdadera y estable. Informe del Secretario General del PS a la reunion del Comité Central del 28 y 29 diciembre de 1983," Buenos Aires, 1984, p 39.
5. PRAVDA, 2 June 1984.
6. For more detail, see the article "The New Government's First Steps" in this issue.
7. "Despues de la dictadura," pp 40-41.
8. QUE PASA, Buenos Aires, 1984, No 174, pp 8-9.
9. PRAVDA, 13 June 1984.
10. "Ante todo ganar la estabilidad y afianzar la democracia. Informe pronunciado por Athos Fava ante el Comité Central del PCA el 3 de mayo de 1984," Buenos Aires, 1984, p 2.
11. Ibid.

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RADICALISM'S PLACE IN ARGENTINE POLITICS VIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 17 Sep 84)
pp 29-38

[Article by V. P. Kazakov: "Radicalism: Evolutionary Phases"]

[Excerpts] The radical party has been in power several times during its almost century-long existence, but it has also undergone periods of stagnation and decline. The complexity of its history is due to the distinctive features of the country's capitalist development and the influence of the worldwide liberation process.

The Birth of the Radical Movement

Argentine bourgeois radicalism made its appearance and became a mass socio-political movement in the late 19th century and the early 20th, when economic and political affairs were dominated by the semifeudal landowning oligarchy and foreign capital. It grew out of the protests of the broad popular masses, the intelligentsia, the emerging national bourgeoisie and liberal landowners.

The political organization of the movement took shape as the movement developed. In the atmosphere of the impending bourgeois revolution of 1890-1893, prominent politicians L. Alem (1842-1896) and H. Irigoyen (1852-1933) founded the Civic Union (1890). The founders of the union asserted that the radicals had a "supra-class" role to play and were supposed to express the wishes of the entire nation, and not a specific class, for the purpose of "destroying" the dominance of the landed oligarchy and revitalizing Argentine society. This did not imply, however, the expropriation of large properties, but the eradication of the latifundist monopoly on political power. This led the radicals to put forth the following principles of struggle against the oligarchic regime: intransigence toward the oligarchy--that is, the refusal to cooperate with it in any way, the boycott of elections due to the absence of elementary constitutional liberties, and revolutionary rebellion.¹

The conflicts in the radical camp turned the armed struggle into the elitist bourgeois revolution of 1890-1893, which was a failure. It led to the more precise separation of class forces in the country. In 1891, in response to the conciliation of part of the Civic Union with the government, the majority of organizations still loyal to their leaders formed the Radical Civic Union (UCR), with its mass base consisting primarily of the urban petty bourgeoisie,

broad strata of the intelligentsia and employees, students and some segments of the proletariat and peasantry. Representatives of the national bourgeoisie and liberal landowners assumed positions of leadership in the party.⁴

Membership in the UCR, a permanent political organization, was open to all citizens favoring the progress of the country, the moral renovation of the government, the fulfillment of public wishes and the acknowledgement of provincial and municipal autonomy.⁵ The UCR had a territorial structure: Each province and federal capital had its own organization with its own program and charter, coordinated with the common party charter and program. The supreme party organ was its congress, the National Convention, and the National Committee took charge between congresses.⁶

The failure of the revolution and the intensification of conflicts between the proletariat and bourgeoisie caused the Argentine radicals, headed by Irigoyen,⁷ to reject even this elitist revolution as a means of overthrowing the oligarchic political regime and to transfer to a bourgeois-reformist position at the turn of the century, simultaneously opposing the conservative policy of latifundists and the independent struggle of the working class.

The Radicals in Power (1916-1930)

The heterogeneous social composition of radicalism led to the development of two different currents--the liberal-democratic current, headed by Irigoyen (twice the president of the country: in 1916-1922 and in 1928-1930), and the liberal-conservative current, headed by large landowner M. T. de Alvear (also the elected president of the country in 1922-1928). This diminished the radicals' political influence and moderated the anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic policies of "Irigoyenism."

The Crisis and Split of the UCR

The UCR experienced a severe crisis between the beginning of the 1930's and the middle of the 1950's. All of the radical party's shortcomings as a national movement representing several classes were clearly apparent at this time. The unification of the Irigoyenists and Alvearists in a single party in 1931 and the Alvearists' assumption of leadership positions after Irigoyen's death weakened the influence of the radical movement considerably. At that same time, the development and reinforcement of capitalist relations in Argentina and the exacerbation of the class struggle caused the radical party to lose some of its influence on new strata of the national bourgeoisie and the industrial working class.

The conciliatory, pro-imperialist and pro-oligarchic line of the Alvearist UCR leadership aggravated conflicts within the party and led to its actual disintegration into a multitude of small groups.⁹ The radical rightward shift in UCR policy alienated the leftist-liberal, democratic wing, whose members were striving to uphold the principles of Irigoyenism. At the same time, the organizational weakness of the democratic wing and its inability to make a break with the liberal-conservative wing stabilized the crisis.¹⁰

In 1943 and 1945 the UCR leadership accepted the Communist Party of Argentina's proposal on the creation of a democratic union of progressive forces in the

country.¹¹ In 1945 the radicals approved a party program (the Avellaneda Declaration) containing the following basic demands: agrarian reform, the nationalization of leading industries, the liquidation of national and foreign monopolies, the eradication of class differences and the institution of a national social security system.¹² Disagreements over participation in the democratic union led to the dramatic intensification of differences within the party. It split into a radical-utopian wing, acknowledging the need for democratic forces to unite in a single voting coalition, and the "intransigent" radicals, for whom the principle of intransigence toward the oligarchy extended to relations with progressive forces and led to the refusal to unite with them. The rightwing radical-unionists¹³ also objected to united action with the Communists.

When the crisis in Argentine society became quite severe in the middle of the 1950's, the differences between various groups of radicals reached their peak and split the UCR into two separate parties in 1957--the Intransigent Radical Party (Intransigent UCR), headed by Frondizi, and the People's Radical Party (People's UCR), consisting of the utopian, Sabattinist and Balbinist factions. This did not lead to the separation of the liberal-conservative and liberal-democratic currents. This division was present in both of the new radical parties, serving as the basis for their subsequent political and organizational instability.

Government Activities of the Intransigent UCR and People's UCR

Both of the radical parties, expressing the interests of the national bourgeoisie and middle urban strata, made virtually identical demands for socio-economic reforms. Their political platform was based on the program proposed in the Avellaneda Declaration.

The main premises of the radical campaign platforms coincided. Both the "Intransigents" and the "People's" radicals wanted national control over the main industries, especially the petroleum industry, the balanced economic development of all parts of the country and agrarian reform. In the sphere of social relations, the platforms promised a minimum wage securing a decent standard of living, freedom for labor unions and the right to strike. In foreign policy the radicals advocated adherence to Irigoyen's ideas and promoted self-determination, the defense of democracy and peaceful coexistence and the enhancement of UN authority.¹⁷

The demands for progressive reforms were supported by broad segments of the Argentine population, allowing both radical parties to expand their social base considerably and assume power once again in 1958-1966. An analysis of the radical campaign platform indicates, however, that their specific demands did not transcend the bounds of bourgeois reformism--a social policy with the aim of preventing class upheavals and stabilizing the bourgeois democratic regime.

Most of the national bourgeoisie and middle strata supported the People's Radicals in elections. They continued to take the traditional "supra-class" position, tried to withstand the pressure of the united forces of domestic and foreign reaction and employed bourgeois-reformist methods to modernize

Argentina's socioeconomic structure. The leftist-centrist group of A. Illia, who became the president of the country in 1963, acquired stronger influence in the party.

The Illia government (1963-1966) cancelled contracts with oil monopolies and turned the nationalized enterprises and oil fields over to a state petroleum company. It is true that the government agreed to the compromise of capital guarantees and compensation. The attempts of the "people's" radicals to establish partial control over industry and trade and to limit the size of land holdings failed. Illia's foreign policy was consistent and firm. Against U.S. orders, he refused to send Argentine troops to the Dominican Republic (1965). In 1966 the Illia government was overthrown by the military.

Present-Day Radicalism

After 1966 the UCR retained essentially the same social base, allowing the radicals to receive almost one-fourth of the vote in the 1973 elections and to retain second place, after the Peronists, among the nation's political forces. Just as before, however, the UCR was not a unified entity. In addition to the leftist-centrist wing, there was the moderate wing of Balbin, who headed the party until his death in 1981. In general, the Balbinists took a liberal-democratic, anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist position.

The existence and struggle of various radical groups reflected a search for development alternatives. In 1972 the "movement for renewal and change," headed by Raul Alfonsin, made its appearance within the leftist-centrist wing of the UCR. In July 1983 he became the leader of the radical party and on 30 October 1983 he was elected president of the country. The new leader (and the UCR groups supporting him) is interested in the experience of social democrats in the reinforcement of bourgeois democratic institutions, particularly the "subordination" of the armed forces to the constitutional government.

Just as before, the radicals are taking a "supra-class" position and are trying to organize a broad inter-class movement with the participation of the laboring public around their party on a bourgeois-reformist basis. The current president of the republic regards the absence of a precise social program, capable of winning the support of the working class, as the reason for the failures of previous radical governments. Raul Alfonsin acknowledges the Argentine proletariat's important role in the democratization of society and believes that the tragedy of Argentine democracy consists in the discrepancy between the ideals of political liberty and social justice (they should be indissolubly connected).²¹ His statements, however, have not been developed specifically in the radical party's policy-planning documents to date.

Argentine radicalism has been a liberal-democratic movement during all the phases of its development. Its history testifies that this movement includes forces capable of taking an active part in the struggle for democratic and anti-imperialist changes.

FOOTNOTES

1. H. Irigoyen, "Pueblo i gobierno," Buenos Aires, 1956, vol III, p 9.

4. "Esbozo de historia del Partido comunista de la Argentina," Buenos Aires, 1948, p 28.
5. H. Irigoyen, Op. cit., vol II, p 82.
6. Ibid.
7. Irigoyen became the acknowledged leader of the movement after L. Alem's death (1896).
9. P. Snow, "Radicalismo argentino," Buenos Aires, 1972, pp 82-87, 89.
10. Ibid.
11. "Esbozo de historia del Partido comunista de la Argentina," pp 101, 105.
12. G. Del Maso, "El radicalismo," vols I, II, Buenos Aires, 1952, 1955, vol II, pp 301-302; P. Snow, Op. cit., pp 102-103.
13. This is what Alvear's supporters began to be called after his death in 1942.
17. P. Snow, Op. cit., pp 190-207.
21. CLARIN, Buenos Aires, 12-13 October 1983.

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INTERNATIONAL

PERONISM AND LONG-TERM DEMOCRACY

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pp 39-47

[Article by I. Ye. Shokina]

[Text] In spite of all the various means and methods all post-Peron governments (both after 1955 and after 1976) have used in the pursuit of the policy of "de-Peronization," the Justicialist movement retained its organizational structure, ideological platform and ability to reorganize for the purpose of regaining power until recently. To some degree, even the last transition from military rule to a civilian government was also colored by the opposition of the two main bourgeois parties--the Civic Radical Union (UCR) and the national-reformist Justicialist Party, which is backed up by a massive nationalist movement and is supported mainly by labor unions. This time, however, the conflicts between various Justicialist sectors (bourgeois political, organized labor, mass, women's and youth) appeared much more serious. The party also lacked a leader with undisputed authority. Each sector acted independently. Justicialism split into opposing conservative and renewal currents of a leftist and rightist nature, which tried unsuccessfully to unite around the moderate platform of the movement's leadership.

Under the military regime the ban on political party activity and the Law on Professional Associations isolated the Justicialists from the unions and mass organizations. The Peronist campaign demonstrations with millions of participants were seen no more. The attempt to hold the first mass rally after the 1976 coup on 18 October 1982 in the Atlanta Stadium was a failure.¹ This was a noteworthy event from the standpoint of the interrelations of various sectors of the movement and the Justicialist leadership, headed by party Chairman M. E. Martinez de Peron. When a speech by "Isabelita" (the party pseudonym of M. E. Martinez de Peron) was read in the stadium, members of the youth sector interrupted it by calling out the name "Evita." The name of Eva Peron, Peron's wife who died in 1952 and was the co-founder of his movement, became the battle-cry of the leftist youth wing after its break with the official Justicialist leadership in 1975. This resulted in scuffles in the spectator-stands.² The "Intransigent Peronists," "Peronist Youth" and "Madres de la Plaza de Mayo" (relatives of the so-called "missing") ostentatiously left the stadium.³ This event proved that the Justicialist leadership still could not lead the masses into the streets and that the split between the political, union and youth sectors was constantly growing. According to

Justicialist Party registration records, however, it had 1.5 million members in April 1983, or two-thirds of the number of people registered as members of all other parties.⁴ According to the figures of the Justicialist Party Congress, the membership was 3.25 million in September 1983 (including members of labor unions and mass organizations).⁵ Two Justicialist congresses (in March and September 1983), convened for the determination of campaign strategy and tactics and the nomination of a presidential candidate, again revealed the pronounced differences of opinion between "verticalists" and "antiverticalists" in the party National Council. The former were represented by the supporters of M. E. Martinez de Peron, who have ignored the desire of the Peronist masses and part of the Justicialist leadership for democratization. The rightwing Peronists used the 1973 tactic of delaying the acknowledgement of candidates suggested by various sectors. The purpose of this was to force the movement to demand the political rehabilitation of its main leader, now in exile, as a preliminary condition for participation in the elections. No one seriously believed that M. E. Martinez de Peron actually intended to run for president. Everyone knew that she was trying to impede the nomination of other candidates in order to strengthen her own position as the leader of the movement.⁶

The "antiverticalists" included several groups disagreeing more or less with the tactics of "Isabel's" supporters. But they were united by the desire to retain her as the nominal chairman while depriving her of the power to interfere in intra-party affairs and the interrelations of different sectors. Without risking an open break, in the fear that the party chairman would take retaliatory action, the moderate "antiverticalists" looked for a solution to the problem in broader alliances with other forces. The presence of numerous "antiverticalist" groups, however, attested to ideological differences in the political wing of the movement. The main groups are "Atheneo" (headed by I. Luder, nominated by the moderate wing as the presidential candidate), the "Movement for the Revival of Doctrine," the "Social-Democratic Accord," the "Movement for Unity, Solidarity and Organization" and the movement "For Coordinated Justicialist Action."

There were also various groups in the leftist-centrist Peronist wing: the "Peronist Appeal" (with social-democratic leanings), "Intransigence and Mobilization" (headed by V. Saadi, the ideologist of the 1973 "national socialist" program) and the "Argentine People" (founded by M. Campora, the former president's nephew).

Union circles made an attempt to revive the syndicalist "Labor" (workers') Party.⁷

The many different, sometimes conflicting ideological and political tendencies complicated the drafting of the campaign platform. Further complications were introduced by the active intervention in the intra-Peronist struggle by military leaders striving to neutralize the effects of the "leftward shift" among the union masses and to keep the centrist group from gaining a stronger position in the Justicialist Party leadership. They established contacts with the political and union right wing. When the military government tried to form its own party (in 1979) under the slogan of the "new current of public opinion,"⁸ it urged several leaders of conservative Peronist provincial movements and the rightwing union bureaucrats to participate in it. L. Miguel and

other Peronist union bosses were released from prison for this purpose and were given a chance to regain control over the labor movement of the "62 organizations."

The military government did not abandon its attempts to split Peronist ranks during the campaign. In May 1983, for example, the junta ordered judicial bodies to investigate the activities of the Peronist "Intransigence and Mobilization" group, which was allegedly serving as the legal cover for the banned "subversive" Montonero organization.

In order to surmount external and internal conflicts (in particular, to neutralize the maneuvers of "ultra-verticalists") and to nominate a single set of candidates, the National Council of the Justicialist Party had to announce the presidential candidate before the National Congress met and even before regional conferences were held.⁹ Nevertheless, rightists were able to take some revenge at the congress by "ousting" D. Bittel and "installing" L. Miguel and the party's first vice-chairman.

An equally difficult problem demanding immediate resolution was the need to choose campaign bloc allies. Three points of view were expressed. The supporters of the first believed that the Peronists should overcome their own internal differences before forming these alliances and then act as a united front. This was supposed to lead to Justicialism's "natural" move to the foreground as the main political force. This was the view, for example, of A. Robledo and A. Cafiero, who were among the presidential nominees of various groups prior to the party convention.

Luder and his supporters defended another course of action, consisting in the restoration of the "social pact" between the bourgeoisie and the working class. They felt that this would guarantee the unity of the movement and provide the basis for the establishment of a broad coalition around it.

The third point of view reflected the demands of the Peronist masses for the reinstatement of all movement sectors (including the youth faction) and the creation of a more representative campaign bloc than the Justicialist Liberation Front of 1973.

Peronism's place in the coalitions depended on the wishes of its leaders and on the regrouping of class and political forces in the country just before the elections. Under the conditions of the mounting struggle by the working public, undermining the foundations of the military regime, business organizations preferred political polarization to a social pact and were inclined to support the Radicals as a more "kindred" party and a more homogeneous one from the class standpoint. According to conservative-liberal bourgeois circles, political polarization was supposed to strengthen the system of "representative democracy."

The support the Radicals received from the bloc of conservative bourgeois parties caused a leftward shift in the position of the Peronist leadership, who agreed to form a centrist-leftist election bloc. Three leftist parties (of the four registered organizations) decided to support the Justicialists in the presidential election but to act independently in the parliamentary and local elections. They had different motives for this agreement. The

leader of the Popular Socialist Party, G. E. Boero, for example, said that the support of the Justicialist stemmed from the need to avoid the split of popular forces and from the prospect of creating a national front around Justicialism.¹⁰

The Communist Party decided to vote for Luder and Bittel because "Peronism, as the most representative bourgeois party, has a broader social base (than the Radicals--I. Sh.), including workers, and this will make the creation of a democratic alliance through united action by Peronists and Communists possible."¹¹ Taking different approaches to different Peronist sectors and tendencies, the Communists took several things into account: the movement's multi-class base; the existence of reactionary and reformist bourgeois groups; the vacillation of petty bourgeois strata; the revolutionary potential of various currents in trade unions. The main factor determining the CPA's position was the leftward shift of the broad labor substratum of the movement. Today the Peronist workers are not at all passive in relations with the bourgeois nationalist leadership and are actively demanding the democratization of the party and the country.

During the campaign, both the Peronists and the Radicals withdrew from the Multipatridaria, the coalition formed to force the military government to restore constitutional legality in the country. Both parties tried to win the support of voters not with a specific campaign platform, but with the aid of a propaganda campaign against the political opponent. When the Radicals debated the Peronists, they set themselves up as the defenders of democracy against corporativism. They did this with a view to the fact that the military regime had discredited itself with its mass repression, and the last Peronist government had also been guilty of widespread repressive actions. The Peronists promoted the slogan of "Freedom or dependence," blaming those who would not support it of a lack of patriotism. In essence, these slogans did not contradict one another, but the Radicals had been in power 17 years before, while the Peronist government had advanced the same slogan of "national liberation" just 8 years before and had not been able to solve a single one of the country's socioeconomic problems.

What are the real reasons for the Peronist defeat? The Peronists received almost the same number of votes as in the previous parliamentary elections (March 1973).¹² But the Radicals, who were supported by 7.4 million voters in the last elections, almost tripled their electorate. Where did they get the extra 4.9 million votes? Around 15-20 percent came from conservative blocs--the Popular Federal Alliance and the Federal Republican Alliance. The UCR was supported by some of the workers in the capital, who wanted to "punish" the union bureaucrats E. Iglesias represented. This caused the Peronists to suffer a crushing defeat in this district. Outside of Buenos Aires, however, most of the industrial proletariat voted for Peronists. The absolute majority of Radical supporters come from bourgeois and middle strata and the growing petty bourgeoisie, which represented 19.4 percent of the social structure of society in 1976 and 26 percent in 1981.¹³

Whereas radicalism's ascent can be attributed to the growth of middle strata, Peronism's defeat was due to the diminishing size of its social base and the

loss of part of the semiproletarian and petty bourgeois strata as well as young voters. Some researchers have concluded that the race between the Peronists and Radicals displayed more vivid class features--middle strata vs. working class.

In spite of their victory, the Radicals did not become the majority party in the National Congress (131 Radical deputies and 111 Peronists, but 24 Peronist senators and only 16 Radicals). Besides this, the Peronists won gubernatorial seats in 12 provinces while the Radicals won them in only 7. In an attempt to secure the stability of their unipartite government, the Radicals are trying to seize the political initiative from their rivals, consolidate their successes and penetrate the spheres where Peronism is still stronger. This applies mainly to trade unions.

The policy statements of the new president indicate that his government intends to revive the "social pact" between "democratized" unions and broad segments of the business community. In the president's first message to the National Congress on 10 December 1983, democratization in all spheres was called the general guideline in the resolution of all urgent socioeconomic and political problems in the country. "Democracy," the president said, "is founded on the coexistence of various classes and social strata, various ideologies and various views on life."¹⁴ He interprets "pluralism" as a system of interaction by various factors and political forces, securing "the change of governments, the renewal of parties and the progressive reformation of society."¹⁵

What place has been assigned in this system to the second-ranking party, the Justicialists? According to political analysts who agree with the Radical democratic plan, "the era of confrontation between the two major parties, with its loud victories and crushing defeats, which have such a pernicious effect on democracy and establish favorable conditions for hegemonic impulses, must come to an end."¹⁶ The two-party system should guarantee the creation of a stable democratic order.

What are the arguments supporting this view? Firstly, the concentration of 92 percent of the voting public around the two parties; secondly, the possibility of a move from one party to another by 15-30 percent of the voters; thirdly, and this is most important, the convergence of the Radical and Peronist programs. The specific reforms of representative democracy are being discussed, and the introduction of a two-party system, acting on the basis of majority rule and stronger presidential authority, is being proposed as a means of reinforcing democracy.

Of course, these authors realize that it will be difficult to establish this kind of order in Argentina. In particular, there is the opinion that a two-party system cannot secure political stability under the conditions of a complex social-class structure, the distinctive features of the situation in various provinces and the difficulties of the period of transition from military rule to a civilian government. For example, famous Argentine political analyst M. Mora y Araujo¹⁷ believes that the restoration of representative parliamentary institutions and the creation of a two-party system will not be enough to secure stable democracy in the country. Dozens of corporative organizations that have existed for decades and the other extra-parliamentary

and non-political groups that will have to be represented in the democratic political system must also be taken into account. Under these conditions, the two major parties will have to work out a common platform for different class forces. The first year of the Alfonsin government clearly demonstrated how difficult it is for Radicals and Peronists to perform this task.

The UCR considered two ways of surmounting its traditional confrontations with the Peronists. The first was convergence with Peronism's social base with the aid of the "democratization" of labor unions from above (and this is what the Radicals tried to do when they drafted the Law on Professional Associations). This could have led to the creation of a third national movement, with middle strata playing the leading role. The second way--the creation of a two-party system with alternating Radical and Peronist governments--would have represented another new development in Argentine politics. For the first time in the country's history, the ruling party was supposed to take the trouble to preserve and strengthen the opposition Justicialist Party and its mass base. Obstacles immediately appeared when the UCR considered the first and the second of these options. Furthermore, the main ones were difficulties in surmounting internal conflicts (the same difficulties encountered by the Peronists). M. Mora y Araujo noted in this connection that it would have been difficult for the Radicals to achieve stable democratic rule even if they had been able to gain the support of leftist-centrist forces because this would have turned their allies on the right into active opponents.¹⁸ As for the Peronists, even if the right wing regained its strength in their leadership, their primarily proletarian social base would have precluded a rightward shift, and a further shift to the left would have unavoidably exacerbated internal conflicts.

It is interesting to analyze the internal situation in Justicialism from this standpoint, with a view to its influence on the policies of the Radical government and on the entire democratic process in the country.

In the inevitable post-election reordering of priorities, various approaches have been displayed to the problems of the internal reorganization of the movement and its place in the emerging prospect of Argentina's democratization. It is indicative that even the "ultra-verticalists" have voiced almost unanimous demands for the replacement of the top Justicialist leaders and have suggested that a national congress be convened (or even self-convened). For example, C. S. Menen, who was once closely associated with Isabel's supporters and is the leader of the "Peronist Revival" group, has concluded that the main reason for Peronism's defeat was not the clever tactic of the political opponents who put forth the slogan of "Authoritarianism or democracy," but the abuse of authoritarian methods by the last Peronist government after the death of J. D. Peron and the inability of Justicialist leaders to make positive changes in their style of leadership.¹⁹

In contrast to Menen, who insists on the continuation of the traditional Peronist policy and ideology, A. Cafiero, the leader of the "Movement for Unity, Solidarity and Organization," wants to go even further: to work out a new alternative for the purpose of occupying a fitting place in the emerging democratic order and to revive the Justicialist Liberation Front along with

"natural" allies. According to Cafiero, Peronists should occupy leading positions in the leftist-centrist camp but avoid their previous ultra-leftist excesses. Justicialism, in his words, is not a stage of transition to democratic or Marxist socialism and should not be an obstacle on the road to communism.²⁰ But it must retain its image as a national movement, backed up by labor unions, and must take independent action in the political and ideological spheres, without any merger with the Radicals or other currents. In the belief that the reorganization of the national democratic movement can be accomplished merely through the updating of Justicialist doctrine (regarding the "Justicialist state" as an advance over the "legal state"), Cafiero denies the Radical idea of creating a "third historical movement."

The idea of the two-party system found a warm response primarily among Justicialist parliamentarians. "The Peronists and the Radicals are the only two competent democratic forces," Justicialist Deputy J. Barbaro said, stating that their common goals dated back to H. Irigoyen's policy of "popular participation" and their common goals in present-day politics stem from their common internal enemies--the oligarchy and the military party.²⁰ But Barbaro's views were obstructed.

The "anti-verticalists," united around Luder, are trying to reorganize the movement for the purpose of restoring the representative nature of the Justicialist Party and the labor unions and are taking measures to keep Alfonsin's supporters from crowding them out of their position left of the center. They have countered the Radical program with their own plan for democratization but have avoided more pronounced social differentiation in the movement's mass base. The main difficulty here is still the impossibility of reconciling the extreme right- and left-wing points of view.

The "Peronist Appeal" is trying to draft a platform of democratic Peronism to serve as the basis for a transition from nationalist reformism to social reformism.²² This group is striving to win the support of the moderate union wing, taking advantage of "flaws" in the Radical social program and demanding broader participation by workers in public administration. Members of the group are trying to isolate the ultra-right wing of the movement and to establish broader contacts with the parliamentary minority--the "Intransigents," Christian Democrats and some leaders of provincial Peronist movements. They are employing the same tactic in the provincial legislatures of the capital, Santa Fe, Rio Negro, Santa Cruz and others.

Leftist Peronism is in a state of isolation, but it signals its presence from time to time in union, women's and youth organizations. It is significant that the Radicals are taking a differentiated approach to the leftist Peronists, with a view to their former obsession with "direct" action and ideological instability.

Therefore, a discerning analysis of Peronism's past and the search for a policy line under the new conditions of the democratic process have been conducted independently by various currents and groups. To avert disorder in the movement, the party leadership submitted its political plan for discussion at a conference of the Justicialist Party National Council and representatives of parliamentary blocs (on 20 March this year). As a result, an agreement was reached on basic strategic aims.²³ The most important feature of

the conference was that the slogan of "National alliance," propounded by Peron after he took office in 1973 and supported then by Radical leader R. Balbin, was updated as a counterbalance to the Radical attempt to create a "third historical movement." This policy line presupposes more active and constructive Justicialist opposition in the Congress, particularly the criticism of the Alfonsin government's policy on labor unions.

The official draft of the Law on Professional Associations, envisaging intervention ("for the sake of democratization") in union elections by government representatives, was rejected by the Justicialist opposition in the Congress. The submission of this bill and the retention of the military law on labor unions after its rejection aggravated relations between the Radicals and union leaders. The CGT [General Confederation of Labor], revived primarily on the Justicialist platform, supported the idea of creating a national alliance and reviving the "social pact." The disregard for Congress' opinion during the foreign debt negotiations with international financial centers evoked more active criticism of the government by all parliamentary parties. In the opinion of the Justicialist leaders, this is creating favorable conditions for the recreation of the national liberation front on a broader political basis.

FOOTNOTES

1. LAWR, London, 1982, No 41, p 10.

Each year on this day, the Justicialist Party commemorates the events of 17 October 1945, marking the beginning of the mass Peronist movement.

2. LAWR, 1982, No 42, p 5.
3. Ibid.
4. CLARIN, Buenos Aires, 4 April 1983.
5. UN MAS UNO, Mexico, 1983, No 308.
6. EL ECONOMISTA, Buenos Aires, 23-29 December 1983.
7. CLARIN, 26 February 1983, 3 March 1983, 18 September 1982.
8. EL ECONOMISTA, 25 February 1983.
9. Ibid., 27 July-4 August 1983.
10. CLARIN, 23 March 1983.
11. Ibid.
12. QUE PASA, Buenos Aires, 2 September 1983; NUEVA ERA, Buenos Aires, 1983, No 9, p 6.

13. Ibid., p 17.
14. LA NACION, Buenos Aires, 11 December 1983.
15. Ibid.
16. CLARIN, 11 January 1984.
17. Ibid., 11 April 1984.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 23 March 1984.
20. Ibid., 26 March 1984.
21. Ibid.
22. ALAI, Toronto, 1983, No 47, p 746.
23. CLARIN, 30 March 1984.

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USSR-ARGENTINA TRADE IMBALANCE NOTED BY SOVIET TRADE OFFICIAL

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 17 Sep 84)
pp 99-102

[Interview with N. V. Zinov'yev, chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade Administration for Trade with the American Countries: "For Stronger Trade Relations"]

[Text] Chief N. V. Zinov'yev of the Administration for Trade with the American Countries of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade answered the magazine's questions.

[Question] What is the history of Soviet-Argentine trade and economic relations?

[Answer] Argentina is one of our old trade partners, and at present it is a fairly important one. Trade relations began with isolated commercial transactions in the 1920's, during the first years of Soviet rule. The Yuzhamtorg Joint-Stock Society played a significant role in trade with Argentina in 1927-1933, but the reciprocal trade of that time was still sporadic and was confined to specific contracts. Trade relations between the two countries were more steady after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1946. It is true that they have been complicated at various times since then. At times the Argentine Government has curtailed trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union under pressure from international monopolist capital and internal reaction. This has always been followed by the triumph of the realistic approach and the resumption and development of these relations.

The last decade could be called a new stage in the development of Soviet-Argentine trade and economic relations. A legal-contractual basis for bilateral relations, encompassing the sphere of trade and economic, scientific and technical cooperation, was established and reinforced during this period. For example, in addition to a general agreement on trade envisaging the mutual offer of most-favored-nation terms, an agreement on economic, scientific and technical cooperation, an agreement on shipments of Soviet machinery and equipment to Argentina with payments deferred for 10 years, an agreement on shipping and an agreement on shipments of grain and meat to the USSR were signed with Argentina. During these years an intergovernmental joint Soviet-Argentine commission was formed and became an important instrument in the development of trade and economic relations and scientific and technical cooperation with Argentina.

These relations acquired a dynamic nature when the agreements were signed. Trade turnover was compounded, and Argentina replaced Brazil as the USSR's main trade partner in Latin America in terms of trade volume. Both exports and imports were diversified. Our main exports are machinery and equipment. Exports of these goods totaled 165 million rubles between 1974 and 1983. The largest deliveries were the shipments of power engineering equipment for the Salto Grande hydroelectric power station, one of the largest in Latin America, and the Costanera and Bahia Blanca heat and electric power stations. The opening ceremony for the Salto Grande GES, with 14 turbines and generators from the USSR, was held in May 1983. This year the Costanera power plant should begin operating.

[Question] Please tell us about the current state of trade and economic relations between the two countries. On what kind of foundation are they being developed, and what new features have they acquired?

[Answer] The level of Soviet-Argentine trade relations is currently quite high. In 1983 this trade was equivalent to 1,325,500,000 rubles. Argentina has traditionally supplied the USSR with foodstuffs and agricultural products: grain, meat, vegetable oil, leather, wool and the cuebrajo tanning agent, and has purchased machines and equipment and some chemicals from the USSR.

The signing of long-term intergovernmental agreements on Argentine grain and meat shipments to the USSR provided considerable momentum for the expansion of mutual trade. The growth of our purchases in this country made the Soviet Union the "number-one buyer" of Argentine goods. In 1983 the USSR accounted for 22 percent of all Argentine exports, including 40 percent of its exports of grain, 20 percent of the meat and vegetable oil, 10 percent of the leather goods and 30 percent of the wool.

In connection with the considerable volume of our purchases, the Argentine Government announced its intention to increase its purchases of Soviet products in 1981-1985, especially machinery and equipment, and to develop bilateral economic, scientific and technical cooperation. This was reflected in the documents of joint commission sessions. Last year Argentina bought around 70 million dollars' worth of Soviet equipment--trucks, oil-drilling equipment, material-handling equipment, etc. This year Argentine organizations again expressed an interest in larger purchases from the USSR. The organization of direct relations with Argentine provinces is becoming an important form of cooperation and is giving potential customers from various parts of the country a better idea of our export capabilities. Orders have already been received from the provinces of Formosa, Chaco, La Rioja and Salta for Soviet tractors and road-building equipment--scrapers, bulldozers and graders. An exhibition hall for Soviet goods is being opened this year in Buenos Aires for the same purpose. It will give Argentine businessmen a better idea of Soviet industry's export capabilities.

Comprehensive purchase and sale transactions are a new form of trade with Argentina. The first experimental transaction has already been conducted. The possibility of expanding this form of trade is being considered.

[Question] What are the prospects for the development of Soviet-Argentine trade and economic relations?

[Question] Within the near future the growth of our exports to this country will be the most important field of the development of mutual trade. We expect our larger purchases to stimulate the purchase of Soviet machinery and equipment by Argentine firms and organizations.

Opportunities for larger Soviet exports of power engineering equipment, road-building machinery, tractors, trucks, material-handling equipment and oil-drilling equipment to Argentina are still substantial. In this connection, we must continue working on the introduction of new forms of trade. Industrial cooperation appears to be a promising form. The first steps are already being taken in this area: Soviet and Argentine organizations are negotiating cooperation in the production of power engineering equipment for the Piedra del Aguila GES. Obviously, this kind of cooperation would also be possible in other industries.

Large reciprocal export and import operations will continue to be an important aspect of these relations. We will continue strengthening our contacts with various provinces in Argentina.

There are some unutilized opportunities for larger Soviet exports of raw materials, including fertilizer and chemicals. As for imports, the Soviet Union will continue to buy agricultural and other products our national economy needs from Argentina.

There are considerable opportunities for the expansion of economic and technical cooperation. Soviet and Argentine organizations have expressed an interest in cooperation in the electrification of the Buenos Aires-Rosario railroad, the construction of a pipeline and gas storage tanks in Argentina and the remodeling of the Bahia Blanca sea port and the Puerto Madryn and Ushuaia fishing ports. Cooperation is being developed in fishing and shipping.

These and other aspects of mutual trade and economic cooperation will probably be the main topic of discussion at the coming eighth session of the joint Soviet-Argentine commission, scheduled for the end of this year.

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ROUNDTABLE ON ELECTRIC POWER DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 17 Sep 84)
pp 103-110

[Report on roundtable discussion organized by LATINSKAYA AMERIKA editors:
"For Broader Economic Cooperation"]

[Excerpts] The summit-level economic conference of the CEMA countries in Moscow this June had widespread repercussions in the world. Progressive politicians and statesmen and the mass media stressed that conference participants reaffirmed not only their determination to intensify and improve cooperation and develop socialist economic integration, but also to establish broader trade and economic relations with all countries, regardless of their social order, in the name of peace and the good of all people.

The declaration of the CEMA countries says that conference participants "feel that it would be expedient to expand these relations primarily on the basis of long-term programs and agreements and to employ various mutually beneficial forms of cooperation, including, in particular, assistance in the technical equipping and construction of facilities, industrial cooperation, joint scientific and technical research projects and others."

Each year the USSR's trade and economic relations with one of the largest Latin American countries, Argentina, are expanded. Cooperation in power engineering is the subject of our discussion. There is good reason for this. The Energomasheksport Foreign Trade Organization accounts for 90 percent of all Soviet deliveries of machinery and technical equipment to Argentina.

Soviet specialists directly involved in several large power engineering projects in Argentina gathered for the editors' roundtable discussion: Chief Engineer I. V. Shirikov of the Zagranenergostroyontazh Association, Deputy Chief

A. K. Fink of the Hydraulic Engineering Department of the Gidroporyekt Institute, Deputy Chief V. P. Volyntsev of the Installation Department of the Zagranenergostroyontazh Association, Chief Yu. G. Nikolayev of the Technical Department of the same association, B. S. Volov and the editors of LATINSKAYA AMERIKA.

I. V. Shirikov: The largest facilities Argentina is now building with Soviet aid are the Salto Grande hydrosystem and the Bahia Blanca and Costanera heat and electric power plants. Plans are being drawn up for an extremely large hydrosystem, the "Chapeton," on the Parana River. These facilities are the basis of Argentine power engineering.

Our country has considerable experience in power engineering, particularly on deep rivers and in areas presenting geological problems--the series of GES's on the Volga and Dnepr, for example. Argentina made a careful study of all of the world experience in the erection of such hydrosystems and chose to cooperate with Soviet organizations.

A. K. Fink: In 1978 we pledged to provide technical assistance in the design of a large hydrosystem on the Parana River, 30 kilometers from Santa Fe. The main reason that Soviet organizations were invited to design this facility of unique scales and geological features was the internationally renowned experience in the design and construction of large hydrosystems in the USSR in areas lacking a solid rock substratum--that is, on soft ground. In the 1950's we began building such large hydrosystems on a soft foundation as the Tsimlyanskiy plant on the Don River, the Volga GES imeni XXII s"yezd KPSS, the series of plants on the Dnepr and several other hydrosystems. The basic premises of the theory of building such hydrosystems were postulated and tested during the design, construction and operation of the plants and became famous in world dam engineering.

Soviet experience in the external spanning of rivers such as the Volga, Dnepr and Angara is highly appreciated abroad. The Chapeton is the southern hydrosystem of a two-stage series of power plants scheduled for construction within the near future on the Parana. This hydrosystem will be of comprehensive value: It will allow for the production of 18.6 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity in a power plant with a projected capacity of 3,000 megawatts, and will install a set of locks to extend navigation on the Parana almost 250 kilometers upriver. Besides this, hundreds of thousands of hectares of land on the right bank in intensive agricultural use will be protected against annual floods, hundreds of thousands of hectares of arid land on the right and left banks will be irrigated, and the construction of highways and railways on the hydrosystem will connect the cities and provinces of Santa Fe and Entre Rios. But this is not all. It will also provide opportunities for the development of tourism, recreational areas and sports facilities and, what is most important, will create good opportunities for the socioeconomic development of the entire region surrounding the hydrosystem and reservoir.

During the first stage of the project, the technical and economic specifications of the Argentine Agua i energia electrica enterprise were analyzed by

our experts, and ways of enhancing the reliability of the project were recommended.

B. S. Volov: Hydrosystems like the Chapeton exist in our country and have been operating for a long time.

A. K. Fink: Yes, for more than 25 years. No other country can boast of as many large facilities on soft ground as the Soviet Union. The Argentines are looking into the possibility of buying such hydraulic units from other countries. It is believed that some will be purchased from the USSR.

I. V. Shirikov: In my opinion, the Argentine client is also likely to turn to Soviet organizations because the experience in cooperation with the Soviet Union has cogently demonstrated its great advantages. As we know, the Soviet Union has already assisted in many large power engineering projects abroad, including hydrosystems in Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan and other countries. Strong construction organizations, capable of building such facilities in the future, have been established in all of these countries. Besides this, specialists have remained in the countries to ensure national capabilities for the development of power engineering.

B. S. Volov: This is very important to the developing countries.

I. V. Shirikov: Indisputably. They can put the savings to good use. The developing countries have many problems.

B. S. Volov: Now let us return to the Chapeton. Is there a Soviet river comparable to the Parana?

A. K. Fink: The Parana has a perennial flow twice as great as the Volga's. Whereas the Volga's run-off is 8,000 cubic meters a second, the Parana's is 16,000. This is a mighty river. But whereas the Volga has low-water periods (autumn, when the water level is quite low), which we hydraulic engineers use to span the channel and erect facilities, the Parana has virtually no such periods. This complicates the construction.

B. S. Volov: What is Argentina's power engineering potential?

A. K. Fink: Today 24 percent of Argentina's electricity is produced by hydroelectric power stations. The colossal potential presented by the Parana and Uruguay rivers is the reason for the plans to use them for the construction of large hydrosystems in the near future. The Hiaserita hydrosystem, with a projected capacity of 4 million kilowatts, is being built upriver from the Chapeton on the Parana. The Corpus hydrosystem with approximately the same capacity will be erected farther upriver. Argentine project planning organizations are now investigating the possibility of a series of new hydrosystems with a total capacity of around 6 million kilowatts. The Chapeton is being erected across the middle of the Parana. There is another two-stage hydro-system in the north, the Pati, of approximately the same dimensions as the Chapeton. The Argentines plan to begin building the plant here 3 or 4 years after the Chapeton begins operating. Besides this, rivers flowing from the Andes have great hydraulic potential, particularly in the northeastern and

eastern parts of the country. By the year 2000 Argentina hopes to use this great potential in such a way as to obtain 72 percent of its electrical power from GES's. This is a cheaper and more mobile form of energy, from the standpoint of its use in the economy, than thermal or nuclear power.

B. S. Volov: Therefore, there is every chance that Argentina will continue cooperating with our country.

I. V. Shirikov: Of course. Here we have discussed the specific hydrosystems scheduled for construction in Argentina, and if we compare them to hydrosystems in the Soviet Union we will find several common features. For example, the systems on the upper Parana will resemble our Angara systems, and the systems on the central Parana resemble our massive hydraulic engineering projects on the Volga.

B. S. Volov: The start-up of the large Salto Grande hydroelectric complex, built with the aid of the USSR, received extensive coverage in the press of the Latin American countries and many other states. How was it built, and what will it mean to the economies of Argentina and Uruguay? After all, the complex was erected by both countries on a border river.

V. P. Volyntsev: The dam of the hydroelectric power station spans the Uruguay River, and the boundary between the two states runs down its middle. They built the facility together, on an equitable basis, and the electricity produced there will be used equally by the two countries.

The station's 14 turbines will produce 6.5 billion kilowatt-hours a year. I will cite a few figures to give the reader some idea of what these billions of hours will mean to the economies of the two countries.

The region using the energy of the Salto Grande covers the area in which 80 percent of Argentina's industrial and agricultural potential and 100 percent of Uruguay's economic potential are located. The Salto Grande covers more than 20 percent of Argentina's need for electricity and provides Uruguay with three times as much as it needs. The Salto Grande will save the two countries a total of 1.7 million tons of oil a year, valued at around 200 million dollars.

In addition, the Salto Grande will bring tourists to the Concordia region on the Argentine side and to the Uruguayan city of Salto on the other side of the river. A prospectus issued by the station administration says that "more than a million people visited the region when the complex was being built."

I. V. Shirikov: The USSR's participation in the Salto Grande project was secured through bargaining. We drew up the plans, provided the equipment, supervised assembly and installation work and secured projected operating capacity.

V. P. Volyntsev: Most of the equipment--turbines and generators--came from the Soviet Union.

The installation of the first turbine was completed in June 1979, and the last, the 14th, was installed in May 1983. In December 1982 the turbines had worked

for a total of 240,000 hours. As for the quality of the Soviet turbines, the secretary of the joint Argentine-Uruguayan commission, Viviani Rossi, made an indicative statement to the Uruguayan newspaper EL DIA: "I do not know if any plant in the world could have built better turbines."

Several difficult problems were solved when the equipment was being shipped from the Soviet Union to Argentina. First of all, the delivery of 40,000 tons of equipment necessitated strict adherence to a precise schedule at the plants manufacturing the equipment and on the railroad carrying the freight to the port. After the equipment had been installed, an extremely interesting experiment was conducted at the client's request: The equipment was tested at a higher speed--so-called natural tests. These tests are not conducted in our country or anywhere else in the world because of the risk of working the equipment "to death." The test was conducted on turbine No 5, designed and manufactured at the Kharkov Turbine Plant, delivered to Argentina and installed there by Soviet engineers and technicians.

The speed of the generator rotor is supposed to be 75 rpm. The diameter of the rotor is 13.5 meters. This means that each of its extreme points travels around 180 kilometers an hour. During the test "at full speed" the figure reached 360 kilometers--in other words, it was doubled! The turbine passed the test "with honors." And so did those who designed it, built it, transported it for thousands of kilometers and supervised its installation. Both the Soviet people and the Soviet equipment passed the test "with honors."

B. S. Volov: Tell us, please, about the prevailing atmosphere on the construction site.

V. P. Volyntsev: We had a comprehensive group of advisers, mainly specialists from the Hidroproyekt Institute. The Argentines know little about the Soviet Union. Newspapers print all sorts of lies about us. It was difficult to work at first. Besides this, not all of the advisers could speak Spanish. But gradually, after working with Argentine engineers (there were around 60 of them), they acquired prestige. The local specialists who made up the planning administration in Santa Fe were extremely young (from 28 to 32 on the average). They had graduated from universities in Argentina and other countries. Many had worked in Spain, West Germany and the United States. Their theoretical experience was not bad, but they had virtually no practical training and had never worked on a single construction project. This is why any departure from theory immediately created problems. There were great difficulties connected with the design for a hydroelectric power station combining a GES building and a dam in a single complex. These GES's are built only in the Soviet Union. Our hydraulic engineers have such a wealth of experience. There is no question that the idea of combining a power plant with a spillway is quite new. This has not been done anywhere else in the world. For this reason, the Argentines were skeptical at first. Eventually, however, after calculating the economic impact and studying our experience, they began to support the combination. Furthermore, they will use exactly the same designs in the next hydrosystem, the Pati, which is being planned now.

Yu. G. Nikolayev: The cooperation between Soviet and Argentine power engineers began 10 years ago. It is mutually advantageous and equitable, and I

believe that both of our countries want it to continue. The Soviet Union has equipment, especially large-scale power engineering equipment meeting current world standards. We have skilled hydraulic engineers and project planners who can share their rich experience. The Soviet Union also has experience in cooperation on the broadest possible basis. Our organizations could hire foreign specialists to give them the necessary experience, could send advisers to the client's country and could provide consulting services directly on the site during the process of project planning, construction, installation and operation. Finally, our country has an extensive network of scientific research organizations in the power engineering field. There is no question that our Argentine colleagues will be interested in learning about Soviet experience. We are in favor of economic cooperation.

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U.S. 'NUCLEAR COLONIALISM' IN MICRONESIA ASSAILED

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Oct 84 p 5

[Article by Dmitriy Kosyrev under the rubric, "At Your Request": "Washington's Nuclear Colonialism"]

[Text] F. Munirov from Omsk requests us to tell about the status of the population of the Pacific Islands of Micronesia.

The Pacific Ocean is the ocean of the future, stated U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of the century. However, for some island territories of the Pacific Ocean basin the future has just never come. Even in our time they remain the object of a colonialist policy, providing an example of unscrupulous oppression.

The primary colonizer is Washington, which attaches great strategic importance to the more than 2,000 islands of Micronesia, located in the western section of the Pacific Ocean and occupying 8 million square kilometers of water area. From its point of view, this is a kind of "rear area" of the American military presence in Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia and Australia. A U.S. Ground Forces War College's report, for example, openly indicated that in case of war in East Asia, the only possible strong point would be in Micronesia, where the bases on the islands would remain, they say, under "U.S. control" under any circumstances.

And there are not just bases, there are also depots, including for nuclear warheads, and chemical and bacteriological weapons, proving grounds for testing weapons of mass destruction, and training centers. The Pentagon is in charge of everything and on an illegal basis. Only the United Nations has the right to decide the destiny of these island territories. In accordance with chapter 12 of the UN Charter, in 1947 the United States received only a mandate to administer the biggest share of Micronesia. The charter imposes the obligation to prepare the trust states for self-government and independence. Furthermore, this document states that the trusteeship system should strengthen peace and international security.

At present the United States flagrantly flouts its obligations to the United Nations. Bases, depots, and proving grounds and six islands entirely destroyed

by nuclear explosions--this is their response to the point about peace and security. As for the independence of the islands' 130,000 people, well....

The Australian magazine PIM notes that the Micronesian territories will be the most dependent of all the decolonized Pacific Ocean countries after U.S. plans are carried out. The point is that, in 37 years of administering Micronesia, Washington simply has not "found time" to establish a functioning economy there. They do not have a normal water supply, telephone communications, nor roads. The population, which engaged in fishing before, is forced to live on handouts which sometimes make up 97 percent of its "income." Now that is some independence!

The partitioning and absorption of the trust territory, which the United States should have granted independence to already in 1980-1981 according to its obligations to the United Nations, is now being completed. In the 70's Micronesia was divided into four administrative units, which one by one began to be drawn into "free association" with the United States.

Behind all this disgraceful intrigue there are human tragedies. It seems to Washington's neocolonizers that desolate islands populated by fishermen are a place where it is possible to do anything without fearing the consequences. But you cannot conceal the truth. Recently the inhabitants of Bikini Atoll, who still cannot return home almost 40 years after the American nuclear tests turned their homeland into a radioactive wasteland, appealed to the International Court and to the United Nations. The inhabitants of Kwajalein, which is used as a target for launchings of the MX missile carriers, are on strike. The struggle of the unfortunate and oppressed Micronesians is growing....

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CSO: 1807/72

USA INSTITUTE AIDE ON HISTORY OF U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 16 Oct 84 p 3

[Article by R. Bogdanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States and Canada Institute: "Unrealizable Plans: How a Nuclear War Against the USSR Was Prepared"]

[Text] On 23 September 1949 U.S. President H. Truman made an announcement that had a bombshell effect. He announced the successful testing of a nuclear device in the Soviet Union to the cabinet members and to the American people.

This was the USSR's response to the policy of threat and blackmail on the part of the United States, which was working out plans for an atomic attack on our country. The subject to be considered below is what kinds of plans they were and what goals they were pursuing.

The Sources of Reagan's Vocabulary

Speaking on the occasion of U.S. Navy Day in October 1945, President Truman stated, "We consider the fact that we have this new destructive force a sacred destiny." President Truman proceeded from the idea that it is necessary to employ the threat of decisive actions accompanied by "firm language" in regard to the USSR. "Until Russia meets the iron fist and firm language, the next war seems inevitable.... I do not think we should compromise within the future...." He wrote this in a letter to Secretary of State Byrnes 5 January 1946.

Investigations on the possibility of carrying out a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union had begun in the United States only 2 months after Japan's surrender. A project, which was called "The Strategic Vulnerability of Russia with Regard to a Limited to a Limited Aerial Attack," was worked out in the United States. Starting from the idea that the same kind of atom bombs that were used against Japan would be used against the USSR, the document singled out 20 Soviet cities, "suitable" for an atomic strike.

At the crest of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism, the military and political leaders of the United States focused their attention on the strategic significance of the atom bomb. They thought that the USSR could not equal or even challenge American nuclear superiority in the following decade.

In June 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed the working out of the first plan for war with the Soviet Union; it had the code name "Pincher."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Intelligence Committee recommended putting the "Pincher" plan into effect if the Soviet Union acquired the potential for a "probably attack on the United States or for defense against our attack." The carrying-out of a strike on 20 Soviet cities was planned as a "warning" against a Soviet "attack."

In June 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a study "The Evolution of the Atomic Bomb as a Weapon," which stated: "If atom bombs are used in a large number, they cannot only nullify the military forces of any state, but also destroy its social and economic structure and prevent its reconstruction for a long period of time." In the section concerning "atomic policy" it was pointed out that "restraint can turn into a catastrophe in the future, if not into the destruction of the country. Offensive measures are the only effective means of defense, and obviously the United States should be prepared to use these measures before a potential adversary can inflict substantial losses on us." The new Joint Chiefs of Staff study was based on the March (1947) directive from Secretary of War Patterson to General D. Eisenhower, "to follow a policy, which foresees unlimited use of nuclear energy in conducting war."

The increased confidence of the military leaders that the bomb was a demonstration of the "decisive" advantage which the United States would have in the event of war against the USSR also followed from this decision.

Policy Based on the Atom Bomb

In late August 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff's planners reviewed the "Pincher" plan and drew-up a new one called "Broiler." Like the previous plan, it envisioned a strategic atomic aerial attack against the USSR. However, whereas in the "Pincher" plan the question was that of the measured destruction of the USSR's military potential, the "Broiler" plan went considerably further. It proceeded from the possibility of "freeing" Eastern Europe and the surrender of the Soviet Union, which would follow immediately after the first stage of a campaign using the atom bomb.

The "Broiler" plan differed from the "Pincher" plan in that the choice of targets in the Soviet Union was determined to a significant extent by political considerations. The targets designated in the appendix showed that henceforth the United States planned to subject primarily "key governmental and administrative bodies in the cities of the USSR" and not industrial and military facilities to atomic bombing.

Thus, the "Broiler" plan showed that the process of establishing nuclear arms as the primary means of waging war against the USSR had been completed in the thinking of the country's military and political leadership.

The "Broiler" plan, as the American planners themselves acknowledged, had one fundamental shortcoming: It could not answer the question which had

interested all levels of political and military leadership in the United States since 1945: When would the USSR produce its own atomic bomb? The "Pincher" plan proceeded from the idea that the American monopoly would be preserved at any rate until 1956 "or even longer."

In the winter of 1947-1948 an optimistic mood concerning the realization of plans for establishing American hegemonism in the world reigned in the ruling circles of the United States. A number of circumstances contributed to this. The Truman doctrine had been proclaimed in March 1947, as a result of which the strategy of "containment" acquired a clearly expressed militaristic ring. The "Marshall Plan," which was aimed at strengthening Western Europe as an outpost in the struggle with the USSR, was adopted in May 1947.

Early in 1948 the military and political leadership of the United States, planning to increase the pressure on the socialist part of the world and searching for various means to "throw back" communism, adopted the decision to increase nuclear arms production twofold.

A "short-term extraordinary plan" of war against the USSR with the code name of "Grabber" was approved in January 1948 in the United States.

This plan differed from the previous ones in that it proceeded from the possibility of beginning the war at any instant with a factor of surprise--the warning time would be very short or there would not be one at all. It was emphasized in the preamble to the plan that the "basic support of the United States is the use of the atomic bomb." It was planned to begin the atomic aerial offense as early as possible, and no later than 2 weeks after the start of the war. It was planned to strike from bases in England, Pakistan, India and on Okinawa.

In March 1948, on its own initiative, the National Security Council with the assistance of the army, navy and air force commands as well as of the State Department and CIA proceeded to re-evaluate America's strategy. The document, known as NSC-7 "U.S. Policy Regarding World Communism Led by the USSR," was the administration's first document that used the term "cold war."

"Eight Bombs--on Moscow, Seven--on Leningrad..."

A new extraordinary war plan called "Fleetwood" was worked out in the United States in May and June of 1948. It envisioned a significantly larger role for naval forces in the aerial strike on Soviet cities and in blockading the Soviet coasts. However, the most important thing in it was the direct acknowledgement of the decisive significance of a surprise nuclear attack on the USSR, which would make it possible to avoid a prolonged conventional war. "Fleetwood" even envisioned the annihilation of 70 Soviet cities with the aid of a single massive strike by 133 bombs.

The plan also contained a variation of an "atomic blitzkrieg." In the course of it, it was intended to annihilate Moscow with 8 bombs and Leningrad with 7. If the war dragged on, approximately 200 bombs would be used, which would annihilate 40 percent of Soviet industry and 7 million Soviet citizens would perish.

In early 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted for consideration the latest plan for war with the Soviet Union, which was supposed to begin in 1957. The plan was called "Dropshot" and proceeded from the idea that the United States would win the war after 2-4 weeks of intensive nuclear strikes. This was a plan for a global coalition war, whose goal was the complete annihilation of real socialism. Its priorities showed that the United States planned a preventative, disarming strike.

In the fall of 1949 the United States began to develop a new extraordinary plan for war with the USSR, which had the code name "Off Tackle." "Off Tackle," which replaced "Fleetwood," was the first basic military plan coordinated with the long-term goals of overall U.S. foreign policy strategy formulated in the 24 November 1948 directive NSC-20/4, which envisioned "a decrease in the power and influence of the USSR "along with a fundamental change in the approach of the government holding power in Russia toward international relations."

After President Eisenhower came to power in the United States, the question of whether the United States should start a preventive war against the USSR was again discussed. In the spring of 1953 the governing committee of the "Solarium" project proposed to allow the Soviet Union 2 years "for reflection," having given it to understand that refusal to meet the United States halfway would lead to all-out war.

In Two Years--The Nuclear Arsenal Tripled

President Eisenhower officially endorsed the proposal of the secretary of defense to form a staff under the strategic air command to prepare a list of national strategic goals and a unified integrated plan of operations (UIPO) on 11 August 1960. On 2 December 1961 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the UIPO and Eisenhower passed the operational plan for a nuclear war in 1962 to his successor. It is necessary to note that the U.S. nuclear arsenal had tripled, from 6,000 to 18,000 units, between 1958 and 1960.

In further modifications of the UIPO, made under presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford, the goal remained the same--to win a nuclear war against the Soviet Union.

Reagan's administration, which has been entrenched in the White House since January 1981, is a continuation of the traditions in the United States of planning a nuclear war against the USSR.

President Reagan signed Directive No 32 in May 1982. It ordered the armed forces to prepare the plans and necessary forces that would insure victory for them in both a protracted global conflict with the aid of conventional weapons and in a prolonged nuclear war. The president himself actively participated in the discussion of each section of it. The working out of the directive was preceded by President Reagan's participation in a 5-day war game in the White House with the code name "Ivy League." The situation of a fullscale nuclear war with the USSR was played out during the game. R. Reagan was the first president in the last 25 years that participated in such a measure.

During all these years the essence of U.S. nuclear strategy has been to achieve superiority over the USSR in strategic nuclear arms and to use this superiority to exert military and political pressure on the USSR. The failure of the plans of the transoceanic lovers of military adventures has been just as constant. As USSR minister of defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov noted, "they have counted on a surprise attack on the USSR using nuclear weapons. And only the great military might of the Soviet Armed Forces and the creation in our country of our own nuclear weapons in response to U.S. blackmail has restrained the United States from aggression."

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INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPING STATES' MEANS TO CONTROL NATURAL RESOURCES SHOWN

Alma-Ata IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK KAZAKHSKOY SSR: SERIYA OBSHCHESTVENNYKH NAUK in Russian No 5, 1984 pp 48-53

[Article by Yerlen Toktagaliyevich Zhangal'din, graduate student of USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute, in "Social Sciences Series No 5, 1984" presented in the "Economics" section: "International Monopolies and the Struggle of Developing Countries for Sovereignty over Natural Resources"]

[Text] The mining industry of developing countries is the traditional expansion sphere of international monopolies, the penetration of which into this sector of industry had begun already in the period of colonialism. However, substantial changes have taken place in relations between developing countries and international raw-materials monopolies during the last 20 years. In the present article, we shall dwell upon policy matters of the developing countries in regard to international monopolies connected with the mining and processing of nonenergy-mineral raw materials, and also upon the monopolies' forms and methods of adaptation to changing terms of operation.

Exercising legal rights to sovereignty over natural resources, developing countries have taken a number of steps for limiting the operation of international monopolies. Following the successes achieved by oil-exporting countries in the 1960's and 1970's, a wave of foreign property nationalization swept over the developing countries exporting nonenergy-mineral raw materials. For the period from 1960 to 1976, 80 instances of nationalization of the property of international monopolies were recorded in the mining industry of developing countries.¹ Laws regulating the operation of international monopolies were enacted in many developing countries. Thus in India, according to the "Resolution on Industrial Policy" (1956), the state has a monopoly on organization of enterprises in the mining industry. Participation of foreign investors is permitted only in joint enterprises in the role of junior partner or through agreements on technical cooperation. In the mining industry of Malaysia, in accordance with the "Act for Coordinating Industry" (1975), the participation of international monopolies is limited to joint enterprises in which the share of the local partner must constitute no less than 60-70 percent. In the Philippines, in accordance with enacted legislation, no less than 60 percent of the capital in joint enterprises of the mining industry must belong to Philippine citizens.²

The governments of developing countries have begun to present increased demands for the exercise of control over enterprises. They are trying to limit the high degree of management, technical and administrative control concentrated in the hands of international monopolies. The basic method for attaining this goal is introducing government representatives into the membership of the board of directors (or the executive committees). The governments of developing countries often demand that all programs and important decisions in developing a given project receive preliminary state approval or be submitted for thorough study. For example, according to terms of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Papua New Guinea and the international monopoly "BHP Company, Limited" on working the (OK Tedi) copper mine, the latter's labor proposals must receive government approval at various stages of the project's development. In the agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the "P. T. Rio-Tinto Indonesia " Company (Indonesia), stock shares in which are owned by "(Konink) Rio-Tinto of Australia, Limited" (Australia) and "Rio-Tinto Zinc Corporation" (Great Britain), there are specified a development program for the project, consisting of five parts, and the amount of funds the company must spend at each stage.³

In agreements with international monopolies, the number of foreign specialists employed at an enterprise, their gradual replacement with local personnel and the like are stipulated. Thus in the agreement between the Indonesian Government and the international monopoly "Rio-Tinto Zinc", a clause on replacement of foreign specialists by the local labor force in the "P. T. Rio-Tinto Indonesia " Company is stipulated,⁴ under which the share of local personnel employed in the "P. T. Rio-Tinto Indonesia " Company will constitute the following in percentages:

<u>Type of Personnel</u>	<u>In 3 Years</u>	<u>In 5 Years</u>	<u>In 8 Years</u>
Unskilled laborers	100	100	100
Skilled laborers	75	75	100
Office personnel	75	90	100
Technicians and supervisors	50	75	85
Management workers, etc.	50	75	85

The tax payments made by international monopolies have grown considerably. For example, in Malaysia the tax on monopoly profits amounts to 40 percent, in Indonesia 20-45 percent and, in Ghana, it reaches 65 percent. Moreover, in some developing countries the profits of international monopolies are subject to additional taxation. Thus in Malaysia international monopolies mining tin pay an additional tax.⁵

The measures adopted by developing countries have compelled international monopolies to change their tactics. In the 1970's, the share of international monopoly investments going into the mining industry of developing countries declined, despite the fact that growth rates of the overall flow of direct foreign investments in developing countries were higher than in industrially

developed capitalistic states--16.7 percent and 14.6 percent respectively.⁶ Whereas by the end of the 1960's over a fourth of the volume of industrially developed capitalistic states' direct investments in developing countries went into the mining industry, a fourth into the services sphere and about a half into the manufacturing industry, in the 1970's investments in the services sphere and manufacturing industry were considered much more preferable than those in the mining industry. For such countries as Japan, Holland, Great Britain and the United States, the increase in portion of direct investments in the services sphere was approximately equal to the reduction in share of direct investments in the mining industry.⁷ Let us introduce data on the direct investments in the working of mineral resources by mining monopolies of the United States, Western Europe, Canada, Australia and the Republic [Union] of South Africa by years:⁸

<u>Factors Considered</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
Direct Investments, billions of dollars (1977 values)	7.1	8.0	7.0	7.1	8.5	9.5	8.3	8.0
Developing Countries' Share in Investments, percentages	20.0	13.0	9.0	10.0	11.0	10.0	11.0	6.0

Since the mining industry is associated with long-term capital investments, international monopolies are interested in the maintenance of political and economic stability in developing countries. However, the constant change in balance of forces between developing countries and international monopolies leads to revision of previously concluded agreements, which the monopolies consider extremely undesirable. They have begun to step up their operations in the stable, from their point of view, industrially developed capitalistic countries: Canada, Australia, the United States and the Republic of South Africa. This process may be illustrated by the following examples. "Kennecott Copper Corporation" (USA) was a large producer of copper ore in developing countries through its branch firm "Braden Copper Company" (Chile). After the nationalization of its mines in Chile in 1971, the monopoly undertook a general transfer of funds out of operations in developing countries, abandoning conclusion of advantageous agreements with the Government of the Republic of Papua New Guinea and the Government of Puerto Rico. Instead, "Kennecott" invested the majority of its funds in operations in North America and the Republic of South Africa. In exactly the same way, "Rio-Tinto Zinc", which became a large producer of copper in the 1970's through capital investments in the Republic of Papua New Guinea, has concentrated its investment activity in Australia, Canada and the Republic of South Africa.⁹

Concentration of capital in the higher stages of metal production has become another important trend in the investment activity of international monopolies. The international monopolies operating in the mining industry basically have a vertically integrated production structure; that is, they control the successive stages of metal production: Mining and refining of raw material, smelting of metal, the shipping network and sales.

In the 1970's, developing countries began to participate more actively in the development of projects in the mining industry and the processing of the raw material, although the picture is not the same for separate kinds of raw material. In the tin industry, developing countries have achieved the most significant successes in broadening their control over the mining and processing of the raw material. In 1981, developing countries produced 83 percent of the tin concentrate in the capitalistic world, compared to 66 percent in 1975. The participation of international monopolies is limited here by joint enterprises with smaller portions of stock shares and by non-joint stock agreements. The leading producers of tin are Indonesia, Thailand and Bolivia, which accounted for 77 percent of the production of tin concentrate and 78 percent of the production of the metal in the capitalistic world in 1981.¹⁰ In the copper industry, developing countries also have achieved impressive successes. The operation of international monopolies has been limited by their participation in joint enterprises in the role of junior partner, and by non-joint stock forms of participation. Developing countries concentrate over half of the mined copper, although the figure varies by individual countries. For example, while in such countries as Zambia almost all of the mined copper was subject to initial processing, in Chile about 80 percent, in Peru 64 percent and in Zaire 30 percent, such countries as Indonesia, the Republic of Papua New Guinea and the Philippines have practically no capability for processing copper locally.¹¹ In the aluminum industry, state enterprises of developing countries, in 1982, accounted for 19 percent of the capitalistic world's capacity for mining bauxite, 6 percent of that for producing alumina and 5 percent of that for producing aluminum.¹²

Another important factor is the strengthening of competition on the part of "outsider" companies which make more concessions to developing countries than the leading monopolies in a given sector of industry.

It is necessary to call attention, also, to two phenomena which have influenced balance of forces change in the mining industry. Firstly, the oil-exporting developing countries have begun to play a more active role in this sector of the economy by means of creating processing capabilities (construction of aluminum smelting enterprises in Bahrain and Dubai), financing construction of new plants for mining raw materials in a number of developing countries and acquiring stock shares in certain existing enterprises (A company created by the 12 Arab States has acquired stock shares in a number of enterprises, in iron ore mining in Mauritania specifically).¹³ Secondly, the international oil monopolies, "Exxon", "British Petroleum", "Atlantic Richfield" and others, have acquired stock shares in mining companies.¹⁴ In result of the entry of oil-exporting countries and oil monopolies into the mining sector, countries which conduct mineral resources mining have obtained alternative partners for negotiations.

In spite of the losses sustained in developing countries, international monopolies, as before, have tremendous influence in this sector of industry. Four of the largest international monopolies continue to play an important role in the tin industry: "The (Patino) Group", "Preussag A. G.", "Overseas Chinese Banking Group of Singapore" and "Royal Dutch Shell" (through the "(Billiton)"

branch company). Together they control half of the world's smelting capacity and retain their influence in the marketing and financing areas. Besides them, "Rio-Tinto Zinc" (Great Britain), "Gulf Chemicals" (USA) and "Metallurgique-Hoboken-Oberpelt" (Belgium) are connected with tin smelting. Just as in the tin industry, the share of international monopolies connected with copper mining has been notably reduced. In 1948 six leading monopolies--"Kennecott", "Anaconda", "Phelps Dodge", "(Roan)-AMC-Group" (all USA), "Union Minier" (Belgium) and "International Nickel" (Canada) controlled about 70 percent of copper mining capacity in the capitalistic world. While the share of these monopolies in copper production constituted 60 percent in 1960 and 34 percent in 1970, it had fallen to 23 percent in 1981. In bauxite and aluminum production, six of the largest international monopolies continue to dominate as before, although even here certain shifts have taken place. The three oldest members of the sextet are "Alcoa" (USA), "(Pechine-Usine-Culman)", (France) and "Aluswiss" (Switzerland). The monopolies "Alcan" (Canada), "Reynolds" (USA) and "Kaiser" (USA) joined them later. In 1982 these companies controlled 46 percent of capacities in bauxite mining, 50 percent in alumina production and 44 percent in aluminum production. Other large, but more diversified, international monopolies, "Rio-Tinto Zinc", "Noranda" and "(Billiton)" account for 20 percent of capacities in bauxite mining, 22 percent in alumina production and 21 percent in aluminum production.¹⁵

If one goes only by the data on direct capital investment in the mining industry of developing countries, a one-sided idea can be formed of the role of developing countries in world raw-materials production and the operation of international monopolies in this economic sector. A number of economists, the Western economist R. Mikesell in particular, expresses the opinion that the decline in international monopolies' share of direct investments in the mining industry of developing countries has entailed a sharp curtailment of the latter's share in world mineral resources prospecting and mining.¹⁶ However, it seems to us that this point of view is incorrect. According to calculations of the Swedish economist M. Radetski, the share of developing countries in mining the seven basic mineral resources (bauxite, copper, iron ore, lead, nickel, tin and zinc) in the capitalistic world is growing: In 1960 it constituted 41 percent; in 1970, 45 percent; in 1978, 48 percent, and in 1981 it was maintained at that level.¹⁷ In regard to the operation of international monopolies in the mining industry of developing countries, the data on direct foreign investments, considered in isolation from other expansion forms of the monopolies, do not give a complete picture of their expansion.

In the 1970's, international monopolies began to shift to new, more involved forms of operation in developing countries. In the Center on Transnational Corporations' study, "Basic Features and Development Trends of Agreements in the Oil and Mining Industries," it is noted: "Although not without resistance, the raw-materials monopolies accepted these changes (in investment climate--Ye. Zh. [author's initials]) and arrived at the conclusion that they can function successfully and profitably, using various kinds of operations and types of agreements."¹⁸ International monopolies modify their practices both within the limits of stock-share forms of participation and in using the new non-joint stock methods.

Prior to the 1970's the basic form of international monopolies' operation in the mining industry of developing countries was conclusion of concessionary agreements. The traditional concessionary agreements usually had exceptionally long terms--from 50 to 100 years. Territories surrendered under concession were enormous, and the concessionaire was sovereign master there. All control over the decision-making process and operations was under the authority of the foreign investor. Taxes and royalties paid to the government of the developing country amounted to an insignificant sum. Along with this, the monopolies were granted great financial privileges. An opportunity for revising the inequitable agreement and government participation in the project was out of the question. Practically no measures for environmental and labor protection were adopted at the enterprises. The problem of employing the local labor force, especially at the management and technical level, was acute. Slight attention was accorded to the development of an infrastructure. Monopolies were subject to some regulation only in regard to acquisition of local materials and use of local services.

Under the pressure of developing countries, international monopolies were compelled to abandon the most odious forms of natural resources exploitation. Agreements on creating joint enterprises, with the participation of state enterprises and private monopolies of developing countries, began to be used instead of concessionary agreements. Japanese monopolies functioned most actively in this direction. However, even the American monopolies most conservative in this regard began to create joint enterprises in developing countries on large scales. Participation of an international monopoly in a joint enterprise enables it to lower the risk of nationalization, to gain access to the local capital market and enjoy the privileges granted to state enterprises. In order to have the means to develop large projects in the mining industry, international monopolies, in some cases, create consortia with participation of companies from other industrially developed states, in which the partners divide the end product in proportion to their share of participation. The (OK Tedi) copper mine in the Republic of Papua New Guinea may serve as an example of such a type of enterprise. Stock shares of the given enterprise are owned as follows: "BHP Company, Limited", 30 percent; "Amoco Minerals", through its branch firm "(MT Fabilan) Development Company, Ltd.", 30 percent; a consortium of West German firms, 20 percent; and, also, the Government of the Republic of Papua New Guinea, 20 percent.¹⁹

The raw-materials monopolies are using the non-joint stock forms of participation ever more actively. So-called division-of-products contracts, contracts for services, labor contracts, "turnkey" construction of plants and so forth have been widely used recently. The new forms of international monopolies' expansion have both positive and negative aspects for developing countries. On the one hand, they permit developing countries to maintain legal ownership of an enterprise, to fit its operation to national economy development purposes better and to have access to advanced technology and the necessary know-how. But, on the other hand, the deficiency in technological and managerial experience which developing countries have, the lack of qualified personnel and the deficiency in financial resources give international monopolies an opportunity to maintain their control, even when a minimum of stock shares is in their ownership.

It would be incorrect to think that the transition from certain forms of agreement to others is being accomplished as a simple progression. Many agreements concluded recently preserve elements of the earlier forms, and some agreements on mineral raw materials do not lend themselves to strict classification and have a convenient contractual form.

Thus, young states are struggling more and more aggressively and rightly for the establishment of equitable economic relations with international monopolies in raw materials management. This has compelled international monopolies to change their tactics and resort to seeking new forms and methods of operation. The control over natural resources which developing countries have partially achieved does not yet signify their full sovereignty over them.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-examination," E/S. ¹⁰/₃₈, New York, United Nations, 1978, tab. III-29, p 233.
2. "National Legislation and Regulations Relating to Transnational Corporations," ST/CTC/26, New York, United Nations, 1983, pp 59-60, 84, 97.
3. "Main Features and Trends in Petroleum and Mining Agreements: A Technical Paper," ST/CTC/29, New York, United Nations, 1983, p 75.
4. Ibid., p 121.
5. "National Legislation..." op. cit., pp 35, 90.
6. "Transnational Corporations in World Development: Third Survey," ST/CTC/46, New York, United Nations, 1983, tab. II-1, p 18.
7. Ibid., p 44.
8. WORLD DEVELOPMENT, Oxford, 1982, vol 10, No 1, p 40.
9. M. Radetski and S. Zorn, "Financing Mining Projects in Developing Countries," L., 1979, pp 80-81.
10. Op. cit., ST/CTC/46, p 207.
11. Ibid., p 207.
12. Ibid., p 208.
13. "Transnatsional'nyye korporatsii v mirovom razvitii: Tretiy obzor" [Transnational Corporations in World Development: Third Survey], ST/CTC/46, New York, United Nations, 1983, p 368.

14. "Postoyanny suverenitet nad prirodnymi resursami: doklad General'nogo sekretarya" [Perpetual Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Report of the Secretary-General], (E/c, 7/119), New York, United Nations, May 1981, p 20.

15. Op. cit., ST/CTC/46, pp 207-209.

16. R. F. Mikesell, "New Patterns of World Mineral Development," L., 1979.

17. M. Radetski, "Has Political Risk Scared Mineral Investment Away from the Deposits in Developing Countries," WORLD DEVELOPMENT, Oxford, 1982, vol 10, No 1, p 40; ST/CTC/46, pp 211-212.

18. Op. cit., ST/CTC/29, p 63.

19. WORLD MINING, San Francisco, 1982, vol 35, No 4, pp 79-80.

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INTERNATIONAL

JPRS-UPS-85-007
30 JANUARY 1985

OCTOBER 1984 ASSIGNMENTS ABROAD FOR CORRESPONDENTS

Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 10, Oct 84 p 5/

[Unattributed article]

[Text] Nikita Vladimirovich Yermakov has been appointed TASS correspondent in France.

He was born in 1955 and graduated from the Moscow Institute of International Relations. He has worked for TASS since 1977. He has been a reviewer for the Department of Political Analysis, an editor, and then a senior editor of the European Countries Editorial Board of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information.

Sergey Georgiyevich Kamenskiy has been appointed TASS correspondent in the republics of Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, and Namibia.

He was born in 1953 and graduated from the Moscow Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages imeni M. Thorez. He has worked for TASS since 1976. He was an editor and then a senior editor of the African Countries Editorial Board of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information.

Aleksandr Danilovich Kraminov has been appointed chief station correspondent for Soviet Television and Radio Broadcasting in Ethiopia.

He was born in 1941 and graduated from Moscow University and the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences. From 1964 until 1972 he was a reporter for the newspaper IZVESTIYA. From 1973 until 1977 he headed a department of the magazine STUDENCHESKIY MERIDIAN published by the Central Committee of the Leninist Young Communist League of the Soviet Union. Since 1980 he has worked for the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting as a commentator. He is a candidate of philological sciences.

Aleksey Vasil'yevich Mel'nikov has been appointed chief station correspondent for Soviet Television and Radio Broadcasting in Canada.

He was born in 1941 and graduated from Moscow University. He has worked for the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting since 1967. He has been an editor of the Foreign Life Department of Central Television's

Main Editorial Board for Information, and an editor and deputy to the editor-in-chief of Central Television's International Information Department. Since 1980 he has been chief station correspondent for Soviet Television and Radio Broadcasting in Ethiopia.

Ratmir Olegovich Orestov has been appointed TASS correspondent in Jordan.

He was born in 1953 and graduated from the Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow University. He has worked for TASS since 1979. He was an editor of the Eastern Countries Editorial Board of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information and worked for TASS in Syria and Lebanon. Since 1982 he has been an editor of the Eastern Countries Editorial Board of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information.

Valeriy Ivanovich Rzhevskiy has been appointed TASS correspondent in Czechoslovakia.

He was born in 1946 and graduated from Warsaw University (Polish People's Republic). He has worked for TASS since 1974. He was an editor of the Main Editorial Board for Socialist Countries of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information and was an editor-translator for TASS in Poland. Since 1983 he has been a senior editor of the Main Editorial Board for Socialist Countries of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information.

Yevgeniy Petrovich Rybin has been appointed bureau chief for APN in Kampuchea.

He was born in 1950 and graduated from the Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow University. He has worked for APN since 1974. He has been a reviewer, editor, and senior editor of the APN Main Editorial Board for Centralized Materials. Since 1982 he has been executive secretary of the Combined Magazine Editorial Board for Socialist Countries of the APN Main Editorial Board for Periodicals.

Yuriy Aleksandrovich Fedutinov has been appointed TASS correspondent in Burkina-Fasso.

He was born in 1927 and graduated from the Moscow Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages imeni M. Thorez. From 1956 until 1968 he worked for the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting as a correspondent and then as chief station correspondent in Guinea. He has worked for TASS since 1968. He has been an editor, deputy to the editor-in-chief, and editor-in-chief of the African Countries Editorial Board of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information and has been a TASS correspondent in Senegal, Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau. Since 1981 he has been an editor-consultant to the Information Processing Group of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information.

Yaleriy Alekseyevich Fesenko has been appointed TASS division chief in Mexico.

He was born in 1940 and graduated from the Moscow Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages imeni M. Thorez. He has worked for TASS since 1968.

He has been a translator-editor of the Main Editorial Board for Foreign Broadcasts, a senior editor of the Latin American Countries Editorial Board of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information, and TASS correspondent in the Republic of Cuba. Since 1983 he has been a senior editor of the American Countries Editorial Board of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information.

Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Yakovlev has been appointed TASS correspondent in Czechoslovakia.

He was born in 1944 and graduated from the Department of Journalism of Moscow State University. He has worked for TASS since 1971. He has been editor of the European Socialist Countries Editorial Board of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information, an editor-translator, a senior editor for TASS in Bulgaria, a senior editor of the Main Editorial Board for Socialist Countries of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information, and TASS correspondent in Czechoslovakia. From 1979 until 1981 he was a senior editor of the Press Agency Editorial Board of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information, and since 1981 he has been the chief person responsible for the main issuance for the press of the TASS Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information.

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK REFUTES WEST ON NATIONALITIES POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA

Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 26 Oct 84 p 3

[Article by L. Krylova, postgraduate student of the Department of Philosophy and Law, Academy of Sciences of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic:
"The Ideological Struggle and Questions of Counterpropaganda"]

[Text] Propaganda expounding the advantages of the socialist way of life and exposure of the myths created by Sovietologists in the West in their attempt to denigrate socialist reality acquire ever greater significance under conditions of the intensification of the ideological struggle. For this reason, the contents of the anthology "The Perfection of the Socialist Way of Life and the Criticism of Anti-Communism," published at the end of 1983 by the Ylym Publishing House, strike an especially relevant note. Its authors are scholars of the Department of Philosophy and Law of the TuSSR Academy of Sciences. The anthology was edited by A. A. Roslyakov, doctor of Historical Sciences and Academician of the TuSSR Academy of Sciences.

The article authored by K. A. Bagdasarov, candidate in the Philosophical Sciences, discloses the concept, content, and structure of the socialist way of life from the viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism. The author places special emphasis on the specific features which characterize the formation of the way of life under the conditions which exist in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. The Sovietologists are persistent in their attempts to represent our republics as colonial backwaters, while at the same time declaring that the socialist way of life is unacceptable for "oriental man," and drag into the light the model of a "national socialism." Nevertheless, the fact regarding the actual life of the peoples of the Central Asian republics cited by the author convincingly refute the fantasies fabricated by the anti-communists.

Bourgeois ideologues, whose unsuccessful attempts to paint a distorted picture of the economic and political life of our state are becoming ever more evident, have recently shifted their interest to the field of socialism's spiritual culture. Culture is of interest to them because here national characteristics are manifested especially clearly. Contemporary anti-communism, pinning its hopes on nationalism, is making every effort to transform national characteristics into national barriers. Such tendencies

are subjected to well-reasoned criticism in the article "The Dialectic of the National and International in the Spiritual Culture of Socialism and the Soviet Way of Life," written by O. Redzhepova, candidate of Philosophical Sciences. Based on an analysis of the works of "leading Sovietologists" in the countries of the West, the article's author provides a fitting rebuff to their attempts to breathe new life into the rather threadbare myths concerning "Russification," "oppressions of the Islamic peoples," and also the old ideas of Pan-Islamism.

The article of L. A. Kovaleva is devoted to the social-psychological aspects of life. It includes a dialectical-materialistic analysis of the relationship between society and the individual under conditions of developed socialism. Special attention is focused on the differing relationship between people and their labor in the systems opposed to one another--the capitalist system and the socialist. For the Soviet man, labor is a means for discovering one's spiritual potential, whereas under capitalism the working man is in fact a slave to labor and a slave to things. The author devotes considerable attention to the problem of the formation of reasonable needs as one of the aspects of the indoctrination of the new man.

In the concluding article of the anthology, G. Atadzhanova examines the part played by the working class in the formation and perfection of the cultural sphere of the socialist way of life.

Yet another fitting response to the intensifying anti-Soviet propaganda is the anthology entitled "Methodology and Methods of the Criticism of Bourgeois Ideology," which was published quite recently by the Academy of Sciences Publishing House and which was prepared by the Council on Foreign Ideological Developments in conjunction with the Turkmen department of the All-Union Philosophical Society. It includes articles by the scholars T. Kh. Khydyrov, K. A. Bagdasarov, K. A. Akmuradov, G. I. Saurova, N. Kulizyev, and A. A. Yes'kov.

The current state of ideological confrontation requires that counterpropaganda become a component of all forms of ideological and indoctrinational work with the masses. For this reason, the anthology examines issues related to the struggle against anti-communist ideology within the context of the political, international-patriotic, atheistic, moral, and esthetic indoctrination of the workers.

The anthology sheds light on Leninist methodological principles for the criticism of anti-communism, the most important requirement of which is the organic unity of party spirit and scientific character. The anthology's authors pay heed to the fact that our propaganda and counterpropaganda must acquire an ever more aggressive character because going over to the defensive on the given front would mean handing over the initiative to bourgeois ideology. On the basis of materials taken from the Turkmen SSR, the anthology provides a well-reasoned expose of the attempts to denigrate the historical experience of real socialism, to falsify Marxist-Leninist theory, and to impose on us a consumerist psychology and an apolitical attitude.

Foreign centers of propaganda, in their dissemination of misinformation concerning the socialist way of life, are carrying on a shameless propagandizing of nationalism, Pan-Turkism, and Pan-Islamism, and are attempting to distort the real accomplishments attained by the Turkmen SSR in the field of political, social-economic, and cultural development. For this reason, the anthology's material is intended to reveal the great advantage of socialism in a clear and convincing manner and to expose the anti-human, anti-national essence of contemporary capitalism.

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BELORUSSIAN DEPUTIES SPEAK AT SUPREME SOVIET

Council of Ministers' Kovalev

Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 29 Nov 84 p 2

[Speech by Deputy M.V. Kovalev, Bobruiskiy Electoral District, Belorussian SSR]

[Excerpts] In the time which has elapsed since the 26th Party Congress the Belorussian SSR has risen to new and greater heights while developing in our country's unified national-economic complex.

During the four years of the 11th Five Year Plan the gross social product has increased by approximately 20 per cent in comparison with the same period in the 10th Five Year Plan, whereas the growth rate assigned by the five-year plan was 16.9 per cent. The national income will increase by almost 26 per cent, as opposed to the planned 18.4 per cent. And the volume of industrial and agricultural production will increase. The obligation accepted for the above-planned one per cent increase in labor productivity and reduction of production costs is being overfulfilled. Capital construction for the years 1981-1984 will ensure introduction of fixed assets in volumes which somewhat exceed the five-year plan assignment for this period.

This year measures are being taken jointly with the union ministries for ensuring that all planned capacities of first-priority significance to the state are put into operation. Five-year plan assignments are being carried out for putting into operation housing, schools, pre-school child-care centers, and other projects of a socio-cultural nature, as well as projects in the agro-industrial complex.

The proportion of unfinished construction was significantly reduced. By 1 January 1985 it will amount to 60 per cent, which is lower than the estimated standard.

While giving these achievements their due, we recognize that not all reserves have been utilized in the republic for intensification of the national economy. Unfortunately, we still have significant shortcomings. In a number of cases production capacities, as well as material and labor resources are not being utilized to the fullest extent. The number of enterprises and organizations not fulfilling their planned assignments is declining slowly--especially in consideration of contractual obligations.

The republic is lagging behind in fulfilling the five-year plan's assignment for agricultural production. A great deal of complicated work must be done to eliminate these and other shortcomings in developing agriculture.

The Central Committee of the Belorussian CP and the republic government, guided by the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee, is presently devoting special attention to questions of improving supervision of the economy, and are taking measures to more fully utilize available reserves and capacities. The party's appeal for working two days in the coming year on economized supplies, raw materials and fuel is perceived as a top priority task in the republic.

Assignments stipulated in the plan for economic and social development of the republic for 1985, for putting into operation fixed assets, capital investment volumes and construction-installation work will ensure over-fulfilling the five-year plan for capital construction on the whole.

Certain successes in capital construction have become a possibility because the republic's construction workers are constantly seeking ways to further improve the organization of the construction industry.

Not resting on our laurels, we are applying all our efforts to fulfill the five-year task both for volume of capital construction, and for putting capacities and projects into operation. However we would request that USSR Gosplan, USSR Gosstrib, the USSR Ministry of Industrial Construction and USSR Ministry of Rural Construction allocate to the appropriate republic construction ministries the full amount of materials and technical resources for the 1985 work program.

In order to intensify construction work it would be desirable for the appropriate union organs to speed up solution of questions of providing the construction organizations the latest, most improved means for mechanizing construction and installation work, since the ratio of mechanical equipment and power tools to construction workers is entirely too low. There is an especially acute need to improve the supply of mechanical instruments and hand power tools. Furthermore, the basic pool of construction machinery is far inferior to many foreign models of a similar type in terms of its technical parameters.

There is also a persistent need for a special decision to create new capacities for production of effective construction designs, articles and materials.

And there is still another question. The existing planning system stipulates allocation of capital investments for development of enterprises in the agroindustrial complex by branches of the union republic ministries. We consider that capital investments for these purposes should be allocated to the union republics as a whole for the agroindustrial complex. Then they would be distributed in the localities by the appropriate branches of the complex. This would support increasing the effectiveness of capital investments, since the localities are aware of those problems which should be solved first.

Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIA in Russian 29 Nov 84 p 2

[Speech by Deputy S.S. Malofeyev, Mozyr Electoral District, Gomel Oblast]

[Excerpts] The workers of Gomel Oblast, as do all the Soviet people, warmly approve and support the domestic and foreign policy of our party, and express their determination to devote all their efforts to further strengthening the might of the Motherland.

All sectors of the economy are developing dynamically, and the standard of living of the populace is rising. Industry is successfully completing the plans of the current year, and for the four years of the five-year plan on the whole. Socialist obligations are being fulfilled for increasing labor productivity one per cent above the plan and additional reduction of production costs by one-half per cent.

The effectiveness of construction work is increasing. Tasks for the four years of the five-year plan will be fulfilled for construction projects in the agroindustrial complex, for housing, schools, pre-school centers, hospitals and polyclinics.

Implementing the decisions of the May (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, creating administrative organs with full rights on behalf of agro-industrial associations, and the increasing level of organizational work have led to fundamental changes in the rural sector.

Well-appointed settlements and houses with subsidiary farm plots are being established on the kolkhozes and sovkhoses in the oblast, and working conditions for the rural populace are improving. As a result, the outflow of people from the countryside has been checked somewhat.

The changes taking place are accelerating the development of agricultural production. Grain production for the years 1983-84 has increased by 19 per cent on the average, in comparison with the first two years of the five-year plan; potatoes by 26 per cent; milk and meat, by 17 and 19 per cent.

On the whole the results achieved in the current year are not bad. From each hectare of sown land, 25 centners of grain and grain-legume crops, 186 centners of potatoes, and 400 centners of root crops were received. This permits fulfilling established plans in the current year for procurement of all kinds of products from horticulture and animal husbandry.

On the whole planned measures for strengthening fodder production have been realized. The volume of procurement of fodder for the current winter season has increased by 41 per cent. Systematic work is under way on the farms and complexes for carrying out the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee for successfully caring for the cattle in the winter, and for increasing production and procurement of animal products. Socialist obligations envisaged for this period are increasing procurement of milk by 9 and cattle and poultry by 5.3 per cent. The results achieved in the first wintering period will create the preconditions for achieving the established goals.

But we must give account of ourselves with respect to the fact that we did not manage to solve all we hoped to. Certain enterprises are not coping with their plans and contractual obligations. Serious difficulties have arisen in the work of the 30,000-person collective of combine builders in connection with the fact that under conditions of complete reconstruction of the enterprise, there is rapid growth in harvesting machinery output, but also shortcomings in the activity of the "Gomsel'mash" association itself. At present, everything is being done to correct matters here. But there are still questions which Minzhivmash [Ministry of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Fodder Production] must solve.

Not everything is going well in capital construction. Part of the kolkhozes and sovkhoses have low production indicators. Presently we are working on making a lot of corrections in the current year, in order to create conditions for further development in the years to follow.

In accordance with the decisions of the May (1966) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, a great deal of work is going on in the oblast to improve the land. Every third hectare has been improved in our oblast. Land reclamation has changed the life style of the people in the wooded boggy area. New sovkhoses have sprung up on the reclaimed lands, conditions have been established for high labor productivity, and the people's way of life has been improved.

Increased crop yields on reclaimed lands depends to a great extent on the condition of the wetlands drainage system. There is a great deal to be done here in the immediate future. However, not everything can be done by our own efforts. Eighty per cent of the maintenance work on the system in the oblast is done by hand. Growth of the volume of land reclamation will require a further increase in service personnel. However, it does not seem possible to attract additional people because of the severe labor shortage.

Increasing the level of mechanization is the solution to the existing situation. However, the operational organizations do not have enough excavators, ditch cleaners or machines for mowing around the ditches, nor other kinds of machinery.

Procurement of milk, cattle and poultry is increasing in the oblast. However, the capacities of the meat-packing enterprises are practically exhausted. We request that Gosplan and the USSR Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry make plans to build a meat packing plant in the 12th five-year plan.

The indicators of the State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Country for the Decisive Year of the Five-Year Plan present us with more complex tasks in all directions of economic and cultural construction. A search is going on in the labor collectives for capacities and reserves, for not only fulfilling but also overfulfilling the established tasks. All organizational and political work is directed toward achieving this goal.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF HYDROELECTRIC DAMS DEBATED

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 Oct 84 p 11

[Survey by M. Podgorodnikov: "Man-Made Seas: A Time of Results"]

[Text] At the just-concluded CPSU Central Committee Plenum devoted to the Long-Range Program of Land Reclamation, it was noted that an important factor in increasing the effectiveness of rational use of water and land resources is the acceleration of scientific-technical progress and adoption of advanced experience. In the final analysis, it was emphasized, all scientific research should be aimed at rational use of water and land resources, and increasing the productivity and stability of agricultural production.

The development of our country's economy can no longer be imagined without the mighty hydrostations on the Dnepr, Volga, Angara, and Central Asian rivers. Artificial reservoirs--"man-made seas"--have significantly altered landscapes centuries old, and had a marked influence on the environment. This influence was not immediately amenable to estimation by scientists. Time was needed. The several decades which have passed since the beginning of hydroconstruction now enable us to sum up definite results.

How do you evaluate the state of artificial reservoirs in our kray? Are the banks changing? What's happening with the water flora? How are the fishing industry and navigation developing? Surely the "man-made seas" have not caused damage to nature and the economy! What positive experience has been obtained by the society which creates them? What needs to be undertaken to eliminate the negative aspects of creating "man-made seas"?

The LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Problems Laboratory presented these questions to readers on 9 February of this year. The letters and reports of correspondents and the opinions of specialists make it possible to discuss today an interesting, topical, and, as it turns out, very controversial problem.

How capricious our "man-made sea" is! "Depletion" is now under way, as the specialists express it, at the Rybinsk Reservoir, its level is falling, broad shallow places are revealed, sometimes as long as 5 kilometers, with rotting flora, silt, and stumps. And later the water rises again, and sharp waves, gathering speed in the 100-kilometer expanse of sea, beat mercilessly on the sandy shore. The bleached skeletons of fallen trees lie in the water, like breakwaters, trying to stop further destruction.

"Hydrologists have promised that in 50 years the bank will recede another 80 meters or so, right up to the buildings of the preserve," observed M. L. Kaletskaya, deputy science director of Darvinskiy Preserve, with a sigh.

The preserve was created on the northwest bank in order to observe the evolution of the "man-made sea."

It grew up during the war, and the electrical energy of its hydrostation fed Moscow during that time which was so difficult for the country. The reservoir carried heavily loaded vessels and replenished the Volga when this was necessary. Its history is marked with rises and falls. The first years presented a biological spurt: in the exposed tips of flooded forests, colonies of birds nested; shallow waters, protected from the assault of waves, rapidly grew over and turned into dwelling places. But the flooded forests gradually deteriorated, the sheltered bays vanished, covered with sand. The period of biological activity ended, the sea became poor.

The world of life on the banks also changed: the marsh birds disappeared, the otter and hedgehog went away, the coastal forests were abandoned by bats and flying squirrels. The bear adapted to new conditions, finding his subsistence in the bare shallows. Wild boars multiplied rapidly, and are now creating a nuisance on kolkhoz lands.

Many birds were preserved or re-established only through the efforts of preserve workers: woodgrouses filled the neighboring forests, in little hollows on the shores of the reservoir, the black-headed white duck and golden-eye settled, the white-tailed eagle confidently occupied the protected surrounding areas. The herring gull, which only settles on seas, came in, and thus conclusively applied the title of sea to Rybinsk Reservoir.

Some strange oddity caused peat islands to surface--wandering, capricious, constantly destroyed. Some are even now strolling about the expanse of sea, others have become attached to the shores, bogged down in the shallows, become overgrown with birch. Preserve workers broke off one of these crazy islands, dragged it to the shore with boats, and secured it with wire.

The shallows distributed along the level shores, exposed to the waves' assault, turned out to be poor cover for animals. Hope for enriching the fauna was born with the appearance of ivy in zones of temporary flooding, and people are steadily, persistently creating this green barrier--a cover for small and large beasts.

The further welfare of this and similar "man-made seas" depends on man. He commands a system which cannot be related to nature in any way, but can only be called, somewhat broadly, "natural-technical." What problems does it pose for society? How do we evaluate the contribution made to the economy by the creation of new seas?

Readers' Assembly

A. Belyakov, member of the scientific-technical council of the Ministry of Energy: "The contribution of hydroenergy? It's 180 billion kilowatt-hours per year! That's cheap energy, which can cover peak loads instantaneously!"

V. Zamakhayev, department head of the Gidroproyekt Institute: "The creation of major reservoirs makes it possible to provide water to 12 million hectares of irrigated land, and also give water to industrial regions: Donbass, the Krivoy Rog area, Moscow and its surrounding regions..."

K. Orlovich, deputy head of the RSFSR Ministry of the River Fleet's Main Administration of Water Ways: "A single deep-water system has been created, which has connected the White, Baltic, Azov, Caspian, and Black seas."

P. Korotkevich, doctor of biological sciences (Kiev): "Regulating the flow of rivers prevents catastrophic spring floods."

P. Solov'yev, a reader from the town of Yuryevets: "I am 77 years old. Before the Great Volga people lived with kerosene lamps, and in darker places, a torch as well. Now there is a sea of electric light not only in the city but also in a spreading circle of villages."

I. Osadchaya, scientific associate of the Laboratory of Reservoir Use (Tashkent): "The creation of regulated reservoirs is a radical, essentially natural method for managing water resources. The shores of individual reservoirs (Kayrakkum, Charvak, Tashkent, Kattasay) are being built up with vacation homes, boarding schools, health establishments, and tourist bases."

But hydroconstruction, while giving a great impetus to the development of the economy, has placed a number of problems in front of society, which require immediate solution. Our mail testifies to this as well.

One of the specialists, on becoming acquainted with readers' mail with critical observations concerning "man-made seas," condescendingly flung out: "Naive." But we value the directness and openness of our readers' impressions. We will try, based on the letters, to give just a list of the basic problems.

Banks

Most reports testify that stabilization of reservoirs has not occurred.

"The Kakhovka Sea is inexorably approaching my village. In recent decades, the water has taken away hundreds of hectares of fertile land in the local kolkhoz alone. I look at the cliffs hanging over the reservoir, and I see what is like a living wound. A meter-thick layer of black earth waits its turn to collapse, to pour mud into the already shallow Kakhovka Sea." (V. Ganotskiy, Kirovograd.)

Silt and Algae

"In Transcaucasus reservoirs, the volume of sediment can reach 2-5 million cubic meters during a year. In 10-15 years of use, small reservoirs (up to approximately 100 million cubic meters) become filled up to 80-90 percent with sediments." (N. Varazishvili, doctor of technical sciences.)

Disturbing news has come from Dushanbe. Our correspondent Kh. Sayfullayev writes that the Kayrakkum Reservoir has practically disappeared as a result of sedimentation and siltification. Its volume has dropped significantly. S. Yul'chiyev (Dushanbe) even proposes a radical measure: since this reservoir has lost its energy role, it should be drained, freeing 50,000 hectares of land.

Acting on instructions from a brigade of fishermen in Kanev Reservoir, A. Bordunov reports: "The sea is so overgrown with algae that it is only clean in single channels. It is difficult to travel on a motor boat. And the nets cannot be raised after a storm: they are choked with algae."

"The depth of 'man-made seas' in the Ukraine is small, the water by the banks is stagnant, they are overgrown with algae, they are decaying. Isn't it time for us to turn to the experience of the Dutch and start constructing dams, in order to recapture the land around our 'man-made seas'?" asks Muscovite Yu. Yakovenko.

Vegetation

It is both a friend and an enemy. On the one hand, it promotes cleansing of the water from consumer and industrial pollution and keeps the banks from washing away, but on the other hand, it leads to processes of swampification and has a negative influence on the sanitary state of the reservoir. How can the evil be turned into good? How to make use of the plant biomass? Is it suitable as feed for livestock? Can it be considered an energy potential? Questions to which our mail does not give a clear answer.

Strangely, the problem of planting the banks with trees and shrubs has proved difficult. It is still not resolved, thinks V. Bayev, deputy chief of the North Caucasian Administration for Hydrometeorology and Controlling Nature. In Tsimlyansk Reservoir, experimental plantings of forest strips to secure the banks were carried out. "The rooting of the plantings was satisfactory: 60-

70 percent," write S. Lopukhin and V. Lysakov, "but by autumn 1983, about 1 percent of them remained: washed away by waves, loaded down with sediment...."

As a result of regulation of river flow, the natural floodplain forests frequently get into an unhappy state. According to the opinion of forestry specialists A. Akint'yeva and V. Shul'gi, "the most fertile oak soils of the Volga-Akhtuba Floodplain are becoming salty."

Fish

M. Kononenko (Astrakhan Oblast): "In the winter, when electrical energy is needed most, such a quantity of water goes across the turbines that on the Volga delta there begins...a winter flood! Spawning areas are flooded. As it gets warmer, the water level drops sharply, and the fish, left in the "shrunk" shallows, perish from lack of oxygen. The spring flood has little water and is fast-flowing, as a result of which the roe stay on the plants and dry up...."

The interests of energy specialists and fishermen do not mesh very well. The inhabitants of Siberia wrote about this, telling of similar phenomena in the Angara cascade.

How are reservoirs being used by organizations of the fishing industry? A report from our correspondent E. Agayev (Baku): "Fishing in reservoirs is turning out to be quite useless. There has not been any serious work in fish breeding and feeding...."

...Readers also write to us about many other things--the changes in climate due to the impact of reservoirs, the unsatisfactory use of "man-made seas" for recreational needs, and the fact that far from all hydroelectric power stations are working at full capacity.... The avalanche of letters and questions burst out of the file, and we decided to invite the specialists into the editorial office.

Argument of Specialists

In the meeting in the office, the tone was set by the economists.

M. Lemeshev, doctor of economic sciences (USSR Academy of Sciences Central Economic-Mathematical Institute--CEMI): "They say that on the basis of reservoirs livestock raising and its feed base are strengthened. On the contrary! Livestock raising has historically developed in spacious floodplains land. Now we have lost the most valuable lands and resorted to raising feed crops in fields. This is 3-4 times more expensive than getting feeds from natural meadows. Sown areas of feed crops have increased by a number of times. Processing of a plowed field requires a vast amount of equipment, fuel and lubrication materials, and fertilizers. And the feed is inferior in quality to the natural. As a result, there is an enormous expenditure of material resources and a simultaneous drop in yields."

S. Zhukov, CEMI scientific associate: "Reservoirs must be constructed, but not at the cost of damage. I made some simple calculations. I took the total area of two reservoirs on the Volga and postulated that the land which they now submerge had been sown with varieties of durum wheat having, let's say, a yield of 15 quintals per hectare. If the total harvest is assessed according to prices of the world market, then it turns out that the value of the harvest is equivalent to the value of the oil which, when burned in a thermal electric power station, would yield the quantity of electrical energy now produced in the Volga cascade."

Similar calculations are being made by other specialists. N. Luk'yanov (Volgodonsk) calculated the ratio of gains and damages as a result of the creation of Tsimlyansk Hydroelectric Station.

Opponent's reply: The authors of such calculations are in error. Far from everything can be based on elementary economic weights. There are problems which are strategically important for the economy, which cannot be assessed by the ruble.

V. Zamakhayev: "Think what you like, but here is a fact for you: we will not be able to provide water for the economy without regulating the flow of rivers. Irrigated lands now yield about 40 percent of agricultural production. The long-range program calls for increasing the area of irrigation to 30 million hectares in the European part of the country, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Siberia. We must convert to reservoirs of long-term regulation in the basin of the Dnestr, Amudarya, Syrdarya, Irtysh, and others--that is, replenish them in high-water years and draw from them in dry years. And rapidly growing Moscow also must be provided with water--construct a new Rzhev hydrosystem. The transmission of water to many industrial centers will have to be increased. No, I'm sorry, all this is not a whim of the power engineers. The main point is supplying the economy with water."

S. Zhukov: "There is no point in presenting the question as though we economists and ecologists are demanding that the regulation of rivers cease. This is an obvious impossibility. None of us object to reservoirs as elements of the infrastructure. None of us propose eliminating them. But we are against the way hydroeconomic demands have been artificially boosted. We are confirming that the balance of water use is now being determined by outdated norms of irrigation which have not proved correct. They are having an injurious effect on our soils. The chernozems are losing their fertility through current methods of irrigation and poor management. Examination of the irrigated chernozems of the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, and central-chernozem areas testifies that 20-25 percent of their area has become flooded, salinated, and swampy. The richest soils are losing their structure. But if the norms of irrigation are not correct, then there also arise completely different demands on reservoirs."

Yu. Svirezhev (USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center): "Last year in Hungary there was a very serious, almost catastrophic drought. It would seem completely natural to resort to the services of artificial irrigation. But this is very expensive there, and practically no industry set out on this

path, instead using other agrotechnical methods. As a result, the average yield, of wheat in particular, dropped only 12 percent in all. Perhaps we too should think about alternative agrotechnical means of fighting the consequences of droughts. I think we should create reservoirs in the mountains. Lowland reservoirs give rise to the problem of shallows, where aquatic vegetation rapidly develops."

A. Avakyan, doctor of geographical sciences (Institute of Water Problems): "I ask you this: are our opponents inclined to take world experience into account at all? It testifies that the construction of reservoirs not only has not decreased but has sharply increased. The volume of reservoirs in the countries of Latin America has increased in the last 40 years by a factor of 35, in Africa by a factor of 60, and in the countries of Asia by a factor of 75. Perhaps it is necessary to argue about the correctness of constructing one reservoir or another, but on the whole, the objectivity and global scale of this process cannot be doubted. In my view, only its emphasis is changing: in the future it will be placed not on large reservoirs but on small and medium-sized ones.... At first, power engineering had priority in hydroconstruction; now the demands of water supply, irrigation, fighting floods, and recreation are coming to the forefront. Recreation, perhaps, is particularly noteworthy. We conducted painstaking statistical work and were surprised ourselves--it turned out that many more people now vacation on reservoirs than on seas. Yes, reservoirs are very complex and contradictory objects, and it is no accident that ecologists are making completely valid complaints about them. There also arise a number of contradictions dictated by sectorial interests--the fishing industry, agriculture, power engineering, and water supply. The positive and negative consequences of hydroconstruction can be discussed endlessly. But one thing is clear--the birth of a reservoir is the start of an unstable natural-technical system which must be controlled. Earlier we thought that the affair would be finished with the erection of a dam and reservoir. This turned out to be far from true. The expenses for raising the effectiveness of reservoirs can be very great. In Kremenchug Reservoir, judging by the project studies, they will be higher than the expenses to construct the hydroelectric station itself. Not enough scientific, and in particular popular-scientific, literature is being published, so nonspecialists frequently get wrong impressions."

Local reply: "Yes, that's right! In these matters you should listen to the readers less. They talk nonsense...."

A. Levikov, editor of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's department "The Individual and the Economy": "Let me, as the chairman of our discussion, point out that these demands are undemocratic and not at all safe. People write to us who live on these banks. It is their home, their piece of nature. And they are not indifferent observers, not simply consumers or whatever is given to them from above, but citizens of our country who are worried about its problems. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA has always held this point of view in regard to our readers, on many questions appealing to their knowledge, experience, and the judgment of their consciences. And the matter is not reduced to readers' evaluations. Don't certain ministries and design organizations sometimes resort to dictatorial ways and obstruction in regard to their opponents? Don't we encounter cases where designers, including some in the system of

hydroconstruction, try to keep their business away from public discussion? I think that the principles of open, many-sided, and especially timely discussion must be unconditional in working out projects which are so expensive and important for the entire society."

Yu. Odintsov, deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources Main Administration of Water Resources: "Incidentally, untrue notions also arise among specialists. They advise, for example, draining Kayrakkum Reservoir because it is full of silt. This is absolutely untrue! Its useful volume was and remained 2.5 cubic kilometers. Drain it? On the contrary! It is advisable even to raise the level of this reservoir 1.5 meters, which of course is already difficult to do."

V. Sapronenkov, chief engineer of the Giprokommunistroy Institute: "In the question of expenditures for engineering protection and fighting flooding, the departmental approach is being clearly manifested on the part of the ministry--a striving to exclude many aspects of jobs and thus lower the cost of a kilowatt-hour. So, in constructing reservoirs, much is not taken into account, the cup is beginning to fill up, and now it is becoming clear that the work is much greater than was assumed. A very disturbing situation is arising, especially in cities. The cost of protective measures has multiplied several times. The flooding of banks, their destruction, landslides--we must precisely face the picture of these phenomena long before the work of the excavator begins. Engineering protection of the banks must be finished before the reservoir is filled. In order to improve the quality of the corresponding prognoses, it is necessary to expand the network of observations on reformation of the banks in existing reservoirs. And, of course, if an artificial basin is created, we must use it well. The city of Yuryevets on the Volga barely escaped suffering from the disrepair of the dam. Once 350,000 rubles was sufficient to repair the dam; now expenses have reached 3 million."

G. Gangardt, deputy chief engineer of Gidroproyekt: "Is it right to attribute to power engineering all the expenses which have nothing to do with the Ministry of Energy? Under a hydroelectric station a whole city is frequently raised, moreover a well-equipped one. And everything due to the hydroelectric station--railroads, industrial bases, residential space. Is it right? Why do other sectors stay on the sidelines? As a result, hydrostations are very expensive. But if you recalculate considering our specific outlays, it turns out that hydrostations are effective and pay for themselves in a short period.... They talk about mismanagement. But is it good management when we hand over funds to local organizations for cleaning forests from the beds of reservoirs, protecting the banks, and so forth, but they do nothing? Many jobs of engineering protection in the Cheboksary Reservoir have been neglected--who is to blame? Power engineering is guilty again! Towns, it appears, have nothing to do with it. But a reservoir is an economic object, and various departments must participate in its creation.... It is strange to me to hear that the construction of plains reservoirs in the past was all but a gross error. No, it was not an error! The times required it. It is good to pass judgment now, at the end of the century. And it is possible that now we would find a different solution, more inexpensive. But at that time nobody could find these solutions. And nevertheless, after the war the economy got

what it was waiting for. Tsimlyansk Hydroelectric Station provided electrical energy to the restored Donbass, Volga stations provided it to many industrial regions. This must not be forgotten."

Points of Contact

The polemical nature of the opinions do not prevent us from discerning also the fact that the specialists are unified. All agree that the natural-technical system must be controlled. How is this to be done?

In 1980-1982 the long-awaited administrations of reservoir use began to form. Let us get to know a few of them.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Siberian Correspondent Z. Ibragimova reports: "In the filling of Krasnoyarsk Reservoir, 23,400 hectares of forest were flooded. The volume of floating timber is now estimated at 700,000 cubic meters, and on the bank there is still more than a million cubic meters. It would seem that everything is clear: there is the administration--clean it up! Alas, the work is standing, and the paper correspondence drags on with an attempt to explain who is to undertake the cleaning of the reservoir."

We were left with a somewhat more favorable impression by a visit to Rybinsk Reservoir. The administration of use is clearing the banks of timber, controlling the water protecting zone, and trying to create a strict management regime. But all the same, the broad expansion of activity of the administration is not yet foreseen even here. They are planning something for the future, but everything that has been thought of (dams, zones for spawning, and so forth), frankly speaking, is only "cosmetic" work. Well, the main thing is: are they controlling the conditions of the sea? "No, we have not been given that right," V. Voronin, head of the administration, sadly replies. The "depletion" of the reservoir, its raising and lowering--everything is in the hands of the power engineers. The administration is like an observer on the sidelines, it is prevented from its basic function--to administer.

I. Nikonorov, head of the Glavrybvod: "In the spring it is necessary to maintain a constant level in the reservoirs or gradually increase it, in order to prevent the drying and death of roe and larvae. But in the summer, conversely, the level of water must be lowered by 50 to 70 centimeters so that the spawning substrate is formed in the shore areas. In the winter the level of the reservoir should be "depleted" very slowly to markers which eliminate phenomena of sea regions. That is how it must be, but the fish are little taken into account...."

The conflicts between sectors are so great that even yearly interdepartmental commissions can by no means come to an agreement and make the schedule favorable. But perhaps there is a way out, judging by the reassuring speech given at a meeting in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA by Ye. Podol'skiy (Council for the Study of Production Forces, under the USSR Gosplan): "Reservoirs of the Volga cascade contain 90 cubic kilometers of water. By the rules of use, hydrostations are instructed to "deplete" 60 cubic kilometers before the start of spring flooding, no matter how much water has flowed in the Volga. This winter "depletion" of the Volga reservoirs does not leave any hopes for the

fishing industry. In practice we supply its needs once in 3 years. In the meantime, calculations show that there is no necessity for the mandatory pre-flood "depletion." A hydroelectric station can and must operate in a guaranteed regime with minimal expenditure of water, maintaining the set return of energy and providing for the needs of transport in the summer and winter. Then the hydroelectric station will approach the beginning of the spring floods with a large reserve, and it will be less necessary to "catch" the spring floods and easier to divide the water with the fishing industry, improving the conditions of spawning, drenching and washing the floodplain. This is clear, and the calculations testify that we can provide for the needs of the fishermen twice in 3 years. Almost without damage to power engineering we will significantly increase the fishing riches of the Volga and the Caspian. Alas, this is not being done. The regulations direct the obligatory and unwarranted "depletion" of the reservoirs. The Ministry of Energy knows in advance that in distributing the water during the floods it will be given preference. Our endless "maybe" also influences the decision: maybe the floods will be great. No, the Volga cascade needs a new, well thought-out schedule."

This means there is a way out! This means that man is not powerless, sometimes left in perplexity before the doing of his own hands!

...We began our survey with the old Rybinsk Reservoir. It came about unwarranted by much and its filling was not prepared for. The recent Cheboksary is being born under our eyes and is apparently being cured of the old hydrotechnical diseases. In any case, the designers are proud of the well thought-out complex of structures of engineering protection: where else, they say, in our "man-made seas" is so much attention devoted to the protection of lands from flooding? And at first glance it appears that there are no grounds for reproach: dams are being raised which fence in the fertile plains lands, sediment stations are being erected, and drainage pipes are being laid down.

But look how difficult even this modest victory has been. At the stage of design, part of the flood plains were returned to the power of the water, and it cost agriculture great efforts to prove that protection of the land was necessary, while the striving of the power engineers to lower the budget cost of Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station by eliminating work for engineering protection was a self-deception for which all society will have to pay. Furious arguments went on, and gradually, in the course of a number of years, some floodplain lands were spared. This required measures which actually lay outside the channel of economics: various petitions, "supplications," appeals to high instances--apparently the fate of the land depends not on strict scientific calculations but on how charitably the will of someone responsible will decide the matter.

And now the work to protect the land is going on extremely sluggishly--that is how an unloved, repellent job is performed. At the same time, the river area of the city of Gorkiy is flooded, along with buildings of the automobile plant, and Kozmodemyansk and the settlement of Yurino are suffering from the moisture which has crept in. All forces have been thrown at the machines of the station. The land is in neglect again.

What signifies the word "complex," which appears in the design? Isn't it more honest to remove it from the business papers as a beautiful slogan which is inappropriate to the activity, a slogan which covers up an ugly situation? The new Cheboksary Reservoir must become new as well in its style of work.

The time of results, the time of maturity suggests a special responsibility of the creators of reservoirs.

The exchange of opinions by specialists has proved that the process of hydroconstruction, which is so important for the country, demands a many-sided examination of the problem. It is this approach which will make it possible to draw a historically regulated and, most importantly, differentiated conclusion concerning the state of each sea.

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NATIONAL

WESTERN 'FALSIFICATIONS' OF RELIGION IN USSR SCORED

Moscow NAUKA I RELIGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 30 Aug 84)
pp 26-30

[Article by Candidate of Philosophy M. Gol'denberg: "Against the Falsification of Religion's Situation in the USSR"]

[Excerpts] The Lecturer's University

A public statement on the falsification of religion's situation in our nation should cover such basic problems as freedom of conscience and its clerical interpreters, uninvited "defenders" of the rights of the church and believers in the Soviet State, and fantasies about a religious "revival" and the "decline" of atheism in the USSR.

In his introduction the lecturer should cite materials from the 26th CPSU Congress which stress the need to promptly rebuff hostile acts of ideological diversion, as well as the position formulated at the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee to the effect that imperialism's numerous ideological centers are attempting not only to support, but actually to instill religiousness, to give it an anti-Soviet, nationalistic orientation.

Despite the acute crisis being experienced by religion, it continues to be one of the most massive forms of public consciousness in the West, while in the Soviet Union it is the only legally existing ideology alien to Marxism-Leninism. In this situation our foes are persistently attempting to erect bridges between foreign anti-Soviet clerical centers and believers in the USSR, on the one hand, while believing that many religious-minded people in the capitalist world will not remain indifferent to importunate suggestions which allege that the adherents of religion in the Soviet Union have become the object of cruel persecution.

It has become vitally important today for believers and nonbelievers on all continents to take joint action against the threat of a nuclear missile cataclysm. We know that certain extremely influential clerical circles have joined in, a fact appreciated by peace-loving forces.¹ The involvement of an ever increasing number of foreign hierarchs in the struggle to preserve peace and human civilization is a positive and important development. This does not mean, however, as they acknowledge and support such action by a significant part of the Western clergy, the Marxists-Leninists will close their eyes out of "tactical" considerations to the anti-communist prejudices retained by many of its members.

It should be stated that for church figures freedom of conscience is no more than an adjunct, if not a synonym for freedom of religion. "The church," states the material from one of the synods of Catholic bishops, "is fighting for a fundamental right of man when it defends the right to catechize."

It would be appropriate to recall that not a single contemporary document--neither the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, nor the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights or the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, which was also signed by the Vatican--even hints that religious rights and liberties should be regarded as supreme. And so, the clerical interpretation of freedom of belief is incompatible with the sense of justice of even that part of mankind which lives under the capitalist system. Furthermore, freedom of atheism most frequently simply does not exist for most clerical ideologists. In this situation, the purely verbal acknowledgement of freedom of conscience is only a forced tribute to the spirit of the time.

In the West even freedom of religion is frequently all but ignored or thought of in purely Christian terms ("the right to catechize," and so forth), and does not apply to other faiths.

Catholicism, which sometimes infringes upon the freedom of conscience of the Catholics themselves, can be cited as an example of such narrow-mindedness. In recent years the Vatican has deprived a number of theologians and priests, including the well known H. Kung,² E. Schillebeeckx and (Zh. Poye), of the right to serve mass, to teach theology and so forth. They "were guilty" of holding unorthodox views on the divine birth of Christ and his resurrection, they reject the doctrines of the Pope's infallibility and of celibacy, advocate permitting women to minister, allowing divorces, birth control, and so forth.

One could tell about how the Curia Romana is stubbornly attempting to transfer certain church hierarchs in Latin America who hold progressive political positions and to replace them with conservative ones, not considering it necessary to coordinate its actions with the national bishops' conferences. We see that the elementary rights and dignity of even the episcopate of such a large Catholic nation as Brazil are violated on the basis of this kind of "freedom." In such a situation freedom in the broad sense of the word proves to be a mirage, and it depends to a crucial degree upon political motives and not upon one's devotion to religion as such.

The situation in the bosom of Protestantism is no better. The lecturer could acquaint the readers with the fate of two British citizens, Anglican pastors Michael Bourdeau and O. Fielding Clark. The doors of BBC and other Western radio stations, like those of the bourgeois publishing houses and editorial boards, are opened wide to the former but tightly shut to the latter. Just why is this so? They have the same faith and the same rank, after all. "It is entirely a matter" of a sharp difference in their political views: The first is an inveterate anti-Soviet, while the latter is a true friend of our nation. It is precisely this, and not the degree of their piety at all, which has determined their lot.

The limits of freedom are not a bit more extensive in the non-Christian beliefs. The general impossibility of proclaiming freedom of conscience, even verbally is

actually accepted by the zealots of Judaism. As one of the bourgeois writers has written, whether one belongs to this faith "is totally a matter of the flesh: Everyone born to a Jewish mother is considered a Jew. This is the only criterion ." Everyone whose mother is a Jew thus "becomes unalterably" at the same time both a Jew and a Judaist, which is the "theoretical basis" for the identification of the ethnic aspect with the faith. Out of these worthless premises stems cruel coercion of the conscience of Israelies who are "born Judaists" but do not accept the anti-scientific theory of their fated, "biological" linkage with Judaism.

Since the new Constitution of the USSR was adopted, there has been never-ceasing attacks on the true guarantees of freedom of conscience contained in it (p. 52). Furthermore, there has developed a solidly entrenched trend to depict the situation as though the Fundamental Law strictly limits the functioning of the church to the boundaries of the cult and imposes a ban on religious propaganda. Some "defenders" go so far as to assert that it is regarded as a crime in the USSR. If we accept what they say, it would appear that every sermon in a temple and every article published in ZHURNAL MOSKOVSKOY PATRIARKHII or BRATSKIY VESTNIK are actually criminal acts, because all of this is obviously religious propaganda.

Even the freedom to perform religious rites is the object of biased interpretation, however. Addressing one of the anti-Soviet crowds, the not-unknown A. Levitin-Krasnov, who was among the "different-minded" in the USSR and then turned up in the West, devoted himself to serving the darkest forces of reaction and began expounding upon the "real terror unleashed against believers in the Soviet Union." The slanderer cited certain "irrefutable facts" in the process. A child is born to a believing couple, and the problem of christening immediately arises. If they "dare" to do it, the "punishment" will not be long in coming. The parents will either be discharged from their jobs or declared to be "anti-social elements," and their christened child... will be sent to a shelter. In short, Soviet authorities, it would be made to appear, regard each believer as nothing other than an object of persecution. And the persecution, they say, begins at the diaper stage!

These "revelations" supplement the French weekly PARIS MATCH, as it were. According to its "information," the law passed in the Soviet Union in 1974 requires that parents give their children atheistic indoctrination under the threat of having the children removed from the mother and father and sent to a shelter if this is not done. "Under Soviet law," they would have us believe, even priests no longer have the right to bring up their children in a religious spirit.

Perhaps the exposers would take the trouble to figure out from the number of believers cited by them to roughly calculate how many shelters would be needed to house all of the children "removed under court order." And why have those foreign "defenders" not taken the trouble to cite even one specific example of the reprisals vividly described by them?

The champions of "religious freedom" report with feigned indignation that the appropriate laws must be observed in religious practices in the USSR. Such "disclosures" are clearly hypocrisy. Not only because behind them lies a poorly concealed attempt to justify all arbitrary actions by those few church and

sectarian extremists who, while demanding infinite religious freedom, feel that they have the right to flout legal norms in effect in the USSR, but for the reason that in the bourgeois nations there are laws governing the activities of religious organizations.

It is the treacherous design of bourgeois clerical propaganda to create friction between believers and atheists, to depict the situation to make it appear that the former openly or with some degree of concealment do not accept the socialist system and are opposed to it.

At this point the lecturer should discuss the subversive activities of the Zionists and the Judaic clericalists. What is Z. Gitelman, one of the ideologists of Zionism trying to do, for example, when he accuses NAUKA I RELIGIYA and G. Bakanurskiy and the author of this article, who have published articles in that magazine, of seeing a definite link between Judaism and Zionism? Gitelman's verbose accusations, which are carried in the American magazine PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, published by the CIA, and which amount primarily to statements that Jews, Zionists and Judaists are regarded as the same in Soviet publications, and push the Western reader toward the provocative conclusion that if Zionism (like any bourgeois nationalism) in the USSR is outside the law, then Judaism and the Jews themselves must be outside the law.

While resolutely rejecting this identification of the one with the other as anti-scientific and fallacious, we can still not fail to notice that the Zionist ideologists exploit not religion "in general," but precisely Judaism, for their vile purposes, using its dogma to back up their political doctrine.³

The lecture can be improved by including in it facts about the life of the rayon or city in which it is delivered. Seventh-Day Adventists from the village of Kolibash in Vulkaneshtskiy Rayon, Moldavian SSR, for example, were repeatedly warned that religious processions along the streets of populated areas may only be made with the permission of the rayispolkom. They chose not to heed the warnings. Finally, local authorities were forced to take steps: They fined the organizers of the next illegal procession 5(!) rubles each. Feeling that they had been unjustly punished, those individuals appealed to the people's court.

How would it have reacted to the suit, if that "terror" about which the Western "champions" of freedom of conscience are so distressed actually reigned here. The Soviet court accepted the suit of the Adventists and, after considering it by the established procedure, went no further than to reject it as unsubstantiated.

After explaining that relations between local agencies of Soviet authority and the religious societies are developing perfectly normally on the whole, the lecturer still does not have the right to deny that certain misunderstandings do exist. We have not yet eliminated all instances of failure to observe the existing laws on cults by individual officials. Such things are occurring increasingly rarely, however, and unquestionably, those guilty of discriminating against believers must be strictly punished in accordance with articles in the Criminal Code.

As a rule, however, it is the religious extremists themselves who violate the laws on cults. Even with respect to them, though, the agencies of justice

demonstrate maximum restraint, only intervening when dangerous acts are committed and previous attempts by local authorities to reason with the violators have been unsuccessful.

There should be some discussion also of improper actions by those religious extremists who provide foreign clerical centers with juggled information on certain "persecuted" dissenters. Specifically, the lecturer could cite cases of contacts between the leaders of the Baptists-"initiators" as well as the not-known "father" G. Yakunin and certain other Orthodox Church figures and others close to the church, with those subversive centers. According to the circumstances of the region in which the lecture is being presented, it would be appropriate for the lecture also to discuss extremists of the Catholic, Muslim or some other doctrine. In absolutely all cases, however, it can easily be demonstrated that they are handled with the maximum permissible patience.

The myth of an imaginary "birth of religion" in the USSR which the anti-Soviet falsifiers are predicting so zealously today, should be exposed. It is best to explain to the audience that this fabrication is closely linked with the "concept" of the suppression of believers which we have already discussed. In the "logic" of our enemies, however, the imaginary attempts to eradicate religion by administrative measures have merely strengthened its positions and led to a "rebirth of religion."

What is the fabricated "rebirth of religion" based on? Practically nothing, when we consider the passionate desire of the falsifiers of the Soviet way of living to detect in it what does not exist. Large crowds in the churches? So what? One sometimes sees this, but certainly not universally, and only on the most important religious holidays.

What else? The Kremlin cathedrals crowned with crosses, which, they would say, indicate that the "Godless regime" has been forced to reckon with the wave of religious "renaissance" which has swept over the popular masses? Or the concern for preserving the monuments of antiquity, including the churches? All of these things constitute irrefutable signs of a "spiritual rebirth" for the clerical "restorers of sacred Russ." For us, however, it is the Leninist approach to the cultural treasure of the peoples of the USSR.

Our ideological enemies search with special persistence for "proof" of that "renaissance" among the youth, which is easily explainable: The future spiritual climate in the Soviet society depends upon what ideology dominates the minds of the youth today.

The West German magazine OSTEUROPA ("Eastern Europe") concludes that while the "old generation of Bolsheviks hated the Orthodox Church with conviction and fanaticism," a large part of today's youth is drawn to it, and it ostensibly proceeds hand in glove with "disappointment in the communist ideals." The lecturer can debunk these fabrications by turning to the believers themselves, who, should there be any in the audience, will undoubtedly confirm the fact that the vast majority of those praying in the Orthodox temples (and not just the Orthodox ones) are elderly people. There is no increase to be seen in the portion represented by the youth. Furthermore, young men and women are most frequently motivated to visit

the houses of worship not by religious feelings but by a desire to get a look at church "exoticism," which is fading into the past.

It is especially important to explain that should a sincerely believing young person violate the law, the atheists will not permit themselves to respond with words of condemnation. We do not reproach anyone for that. It is quite another matter when we encounter a lack of ideological discrimination or promotion. It is precisely such young nonbelievers, who give in to pressure from their elders and observe religious rites at their orders, who provide the "grounds for argument" for the foreign proclaimers of a religious "renaissance" to a considerably greater extent than the true believers.

The attraction of certain young men and women to the attributes of religion should be pointed out.

It is especially essential to stress the fact that the myth of a "rebirth of religion" is coupled with fabrications about yet another "renaissance," a rebirth of nationalistic prejudice allegedly being experienced by our nation.

With respect to this, the lecturer should briefly discuss the preparations by anti-Soviet emigres for commemorating the 1,000th anniversary of the "christening of Russ," which allegedly signifies a return of the Russian people to the bosom "of their" religion and their discovery of a "lost national originality." By the latter the "foreign Russian church" has in mind a combination of the "truly Orthodox spirit" and great-power chauvinism. These false patriots and hypocritical Orthodox believers look for any opportunity to put on display the allegedly unequivocally positive role of the church in Russia's history. Taking advantage of the fact that the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo was extensively commemorated in our nation, for example, bourgeois propagandists of various shades set about puffing up the proposition that it would have been precisely the church's divine intercession which determined the victorious outcome of that battle.

It would be appropriate at this point to explain to the audience that Soviet scientists and journalists are not about to assess the church's role in our nation's fate from a nihilist position and do not cross off the definite influence which it has exerted upon certain historical events. Nor do they deny the fact that the clergy has made a certain contribution to the spread of literacy, the development of the chronicle, architecture, painting and so forth. At the same time, the Marxist scholars explain in complete conformity with the historical facts that the church was always a loyal bulwark of feudalism, autocracy and serfdom, that it was the suppressor of progressive culture, science and enlightenment, and that by tormenting and persecuting the "heterodox" and "non-Russians" it showed itself to be the enemy of harmony and mutual understanding among peoples.

The same "renaissance processes," as assessed by the clerical observers, have ostensibly assumed impressive scope also in those areas in which there is a certain spread of Islam. When Swedish Islamic scholar (M. Buazar) sets the number of Muslims in the USSR at 50 million, he includes in the number all the residents, large and small, of those republics to which the clericalists refer in no other way than as "Muslim." With this approach, even the communists, Komsomol members and propagandists of scientific atheism are entered in the register of Allah's true believers.

Such "luminaries" of anti-Sovietism as A. Bennigsen and H. Carrère d'Encausse for example, compose odes of praise to remnants of feudalism linked to Islam and strive to include the peoples of a number of our republics in a mythical "world Muslim nation." One does not need to be highly perceptive to comprehend that the far-fetched idea of a "renaissance" of Islam was invented for purposes, as provocative as they are hopeless, of planting nationalistic and confessional isolationism and inciting hostility toward the Russian and other "Christian" peoples.

In fact, the clerical ideologists have concocted something similar with respect to Orthodoxy. They maintain that there is a "togetherness" (spiritual unity) which unites all followers of this faith--both citizens of the USSR and anti-Soviets from the "foreign Russian church."

Western ideologists of Judaism use the same "principle" for putting into play the concept "homeland of the Jews," the clerical equivalent of the mythical "world Jewish nation," by means of which citizens of Jewish origin are "cut away" from the Soviet people and sent to become inhabitants of this homeland.

This is just another aspect of the fantasy about some sort of wave of a victoriously advancing religious outlook, on the crest of which the class enemies are poisoning the atmosphere and attempting to induce peoples of the USSR not just to hide in their little national and religious corner, but also to become imbued with a sense of false unity with the most evil forces of world reaction acting under cover of the concept of a "common faith."

Along with the myth about some sort of religious upswing in our nation, in the West they are vigorously spreading a related "concept" of an imaginary collapse of atheism and of the scientific-materialistic view of the world as a whole. Despite all the efforts of the communists, they would have us believe, the communists have not been able to achieve their proclaimed goal of crushing the church and destroying religion.

As early as the second half of the 30's, according to Yem. Yaroslavskiy, more than a third of the population in the rural area and at least two thirds of the urban population broke with religion. By the end of the 70's, according to sociological studies, the number of active believers did not exceed 10 percent of our nation's adult citizens.⁴ The qualitative advances are even more important. The religiosity encountered today is most frequently a formal tribute to tradition, and in most cases the agents are elderly people.

It is a good thing to indicate in the lecture not only the socially mercenary aims, the class limitedness and unscrupulousness of the foreign falsifiers of the status of religion and the church in our nation, but also their lack of competence, which frequently borders on semi-literacy.⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. Read N. Koval'skiy's article, "Expansion of the Anti-War Struggle," and V. Bogdanov's article, "Dialogue for Peace," in NAUKA I RELIGIYA, No. 7, 1983, p. 11.

2. Read, for example, I. Kryvelev's article, "Father Kung Engages in Free-Thinking," in NAUKA I RELIGIYA, No. 3, 1977.
3. Read G. Bakanurskiy's article, "Speculating in Old Testament Dogmas," NAUKA I RELIGIYA, No. 8, 1983.
4. PRAVDA, 30 March 1979.
5. Read M. Abramov's article in the collection, "Argumenty" [Arguments], Moscow, 1983.

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CATHOLIC CHURCH'S INFLUENCE ON YOUTH SCORED

Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 1 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by K. Koyta, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Catchers of Young Souls: Readings in Atheism"]

/Excerpts/ Who will the youth follow, which ideals will they accept, how will their social views form?

The clergy sees one of its basic tasks in attracting the attention of the young people to theological problems and instilling in them the authority of the faith, while influencing them in all respects. Previously, this was achieved by profiteering on the negative aspects of human life or kindling religious fanaticism and hysteria in the struggle with "delusions" of any kind. Now, the clergy has to look for more sophisticated methods of influencing the youth's consciousness.

The major part of the articles in popular Catholic publications, in which the truth of the Christian doctrine is "substantiated," the atheist views are "refuted," and the absence of faith is condemned, are addressed to the youth. As a rule, such articles begin with a word to the young reader, a word which is meant to capture his attention. This is followed by a monologue by a priest, who proves that only the belief in God and the observation of Christian religious canons can give one's life a higher sense of human existence, filling his earthly life with values of eternal significance, protect the man from seduction and temptation which lead to the loss of one's own ideals and, in the final count, one's individuality and the loss of "everything."

The acknowledgement of the value of the earthly life, the legitimate character of man's concern with the "temporary" welfare of a fleeting existence, and the denial, at least in words, of the absolute opposition of earthly to heavenly and temporary to eternal, are new aspects in the Catholic theology. Such aspects are particularly promoted by clergy in their conversations and discussions with the youth.

As is known, all religious confessions, including Catholicism, apply their utmost effort to retain and strengthen the religious influence on morals. Particularly, they willingly use the morals theme both in sermons and personnel conversations. This, in particular, permits clergy to structure various

theological concepts of morals, so as to not only cover the true essence of moral interrelations but, on the contrary, to tangle and pervert them.

The clergy primarily addresses the youth, calling on them to strengthen one's faith so as to find "the moral strength," and concluding that moral vices are exclusively the result of weak faith or the disbelief in God. They try to scare one into believing that family problems, adultery between spouses and divorces are, in essence, a result of the fact that one of the spouses is not a devout supporter of Catholicism.

Priests cannot help but know that even in the families of "good" Catholics, everything is far from being well. This means that to attribute everything to the strength of one's faith in Christ is, at least, illogical.

Their "care" for the family has one more reason. The Catholic clergy is looking for its chance in strengthening the patriarchal basis of family-marital ties, and these attempts clearly uncover themselves when they try to "convert" a family into a "household" church. Clergy has to look for new methods of "evangelizing" the future generations, and they bank on the increasing role of the religious family in this process which is, precisely, one of the aspects of this search. According to the opinion of the clergy, an increase in the parents' responsibility for the "evangelization" of their children should assist in the clericalization of all family relationships.

Such postulations by the clergy are based on the propositions and instructions of the higher church leadership. The family attracts the attention of the clergy because interfering with its function will give them the chance to strengthen the ideological influence on children, teenagers and the youth which, in the final count, comes down to strengthening people's religiousness.

For the sake of strengthening religious influence, the clergy is prepared to activate "all powers" and use all means and methods within their reach. Among these methods, a central place is occupied by the attempt to subject the personal life of the believers, child rearing and family traditions, to rigorous church control.

As a bait of sorts for some people and as a preventative moral admonition to others, articles often appear on the pages of Catholic publications, in which the problems of love and interrelationships between people are discussed.

The Catholic clergy even attempts to use tourism and sports so as to attract the youth into churches. In the Vatican, a special committee, dealing with tourism and sports, was created for this purpose. And all this is calculated on the fact that the youth will not limit their lives to earthly affairs, but will combine these with the concern for saving their souls, in accordance to the prompting from "the mediators between God and people."

The Catholic clergy does not tire nor spare any effort in inventing means to attract and retain the maximum number of young souls under the influence of the church. The main obstacle on their path to this goal is the world Communist movement and Marxist-Leninist ideology.

REGIONAL

VAYNO ADDRESS AT PLENUM

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 21 Oct 84 pp 1-3

[Address of member of the CPSU Central Committee, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia K.G. Vayno: "On Tasks of the Republic's Party Organizations Stemming from the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee 'On Further Improving Party Guidance of the Komsomol and Increasing Its Role in Communist Education of Youth' and Speeches of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade K.U. Chernenko on Questions of Party Work with Youth"]

[Text] [Speech has been abridged]

In all spheres of our life, a profound and unceasing process of improving the style and methods of guidance of our society is now going on, and very deep reserves of developed socialism are drawn into operation. The June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee raised questions of improving the style of ideological work and the April (1984) Plenum--questions of further development of socialist democracy and improvement of the work of soviets and the school reform. In the speech of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations, problems were posed of improving Komsomol work and increasing its role in education of communist youth. His speech at the jubilee plenum of the board of the USSR Writers Union was devoted to increasing the role of the creative intelligentsia in developing the spiritual culture of society and the speech at the All-Union Conference of People's Controllers--to questions of involving the broad masses of workers in management of society and production, further development of socialist self-government and affirmation of norms of social justice. Among these problems, which the party is now so profoundly, systematically and comprehensively solving, a leading place is occupied by questions of improving education of the youth.

On this level, major importance is to be attached to the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Party Guidance of the Komsomol and Increasing Its Role in Communist Education of Youth."

In this document, as in the speech of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko at the All-Army Conferences of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations, a long-range program is set forth of forming the young generation. The Leninist idea of work with youth and of the role and place of the Komsomol in reference to contemporary conditions received further creative development. Clear guidelines and concrete recommendations were given for improving party guidance of the Komsomol and increasing the ideological-political, labor and moral education of the rising generation.

In the republic party organization much has been done recently on improving the guidance of Komsomol organizations. Questions of Komsomol work have been repeatedly discussed at the Buro and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia. These questions are also being examined at party gorkoms and raykoms. Personnel of party committees have begun to meet more often with Komsomols and to speak before youth. Public organizations, party and labor veterans and production pacemakers are actively taking part in the education of the rising generation. All questions of ideology, economics, culture and strengthening of order and discipline--in a word, everything that we discuss and what we have been engaged in recently--in one way or another pass through the Komsomol and apply to the youth, inasmuch as without their active participation we cannot successfully solve these tasks.

But questions of guidance of the Komsomol and education of the youth require significantly more consideration. This work must have a planned, systematic character. This is lacking in the work of many city and rayon party committees. Such a systematic character is not always achieved even at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia.

On the whole, our young people are literate, labor-loving and we have the right to be proud of them. The republic's Komsomol has extremely rich revolutionary and labor traditions on which we can and must rely in all our work with youth.

It is perfectly clear that our principal tasks, both economic and social, are solved on the labor front. The fact that the republic basically fulfills plan targets of the five-year plan involves a substantial contribution of the youth and Komsomols of the republic. Remarkable results in labor have been shown, for example, by Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet Vera Prudnikova, who has fulfilled since the beginning of the five-year plan the food targets of 6 years, by the combine operators Tynu Almre and Yuri Vyaen, the milkmaids, Lenin Prize winners, Anna Kholdblom and Marika Kristman and many others. About 200,000 young men and women are actively taking part in the patriotic movement "For the 11th Five-Year Plan--shock labor, knowledge, initiative and work of youth." The republic's Komsomol patronizes many important facilities that are under construction. As we know, the Novotallinskiy Sea Trade Port was recently declared an All-Union Shock Komsomol Construction Project. Every city and rayon Komsomol organization has its own sponsored shock facilities. Envoys of the Estonian Komsomol are participating in developing the wealth of Western Siberia and the Far East and in transforming the Nonchernozem Region. In a word, the Komsomol has many concrete addresses for the application of its energies. But the contribution of youth to the republic's economy could be more significant. About one and a half thousand young workers are still not coping with output norms. They are responsible for a significant portion of violations of labor and production discipline. Qualifications are slow in growing; many young workers are satisfied with low categories and are not accumulating occupational skills.

Party committees need to constantly hold in the field of their vision questions of boosting the labor activity of young people and increasing their contribution to the solution of production tasks at each enterprise, on each farm and strengthening the vanguard role of the Komsomol in these matters.

It should be said in this connection that we have many unresolved problems in work with youth. One of them is keeping young people in the sphere of material production.

Those young people who are now working at plants and factories will in the near future make up the main body of cadre workers. Mature leaders of production will have to come from them. The entirety of responsibility for ensuring the further development of our industry will be placed on their

shoulders. This is why it is important today to be concerned with strengthening the ranks of young workers. At the same time, their size has been shrinking in recent years. Our industry, if one can so put it, "is aging." Particularly alarming is the fact that the number of young workers is diminishing namely in basic shops and in leading vocations.

Why is this happening? Of course, the reasons here vary. But to a considerable extent this is to be explained by poor working and living conditions that exist at some of our enterprises for young workers, by lack of attention to them and absence of necessary concern. The young people do not want to work at enterprises where there is poor labor organization, where because of spasmodic production it is frequently necessary to work overtime, where there is much low-skilled manual labor, where, finally, one can get an apartment only in 10-15 years. Cases are frequent where young workers are assigned manifestly obsolete equipment and are given most unattractive work. Of course, this does not contribute to holding young people at enterprises.

In this sense, the position created at Estremrybflot is indicative. There, solely in the years of this five-year plan, the number of young workers has shrunk by almost one-fourth. The association's Komsomol organization previously well known in the republic, which formerly had the rights of a raykom, has now lost these rights because of the sharp reduction in the number of Komsomol members. And the enterprise is experiencing an acute shortage of workers. The association gets very few specialists from educational institutions--VUZ's tekhnikums and vocational and technical schools, inasmuch as its managers have shown poor concern for additional staff, have not displayed due initiative and determination and have not thought of the morrow of the collectives and its worker replacement. In recent years, the association has not been fulfilling plans, and this is principally due to shortage of personnel. Other enterprises could also be named where work with young replacements is being unsatisfactorily conducted--the Lina and Noorus production associations, the factories imeni 1 Dekabr' and others. All these enterprises are fulfilling plans with difficulty, with low organization of labor. Here personnel matters are in a poor state.

Ministries and departments should devote most serious attention to working conditions of young workers, and Komsomol committees need to raise these questions more acutely and work for their solution. It would be proper for republic trade-union committees and their legal labor inspectorates with Komsomol participation to analyze carefully and in depth the conditions under which young people work at each enterprise and require of their operational managers the elimination of defects. This year the AUCCTU has worked out and sent to the localities recommendations for the compilation of collective contracts in which much attention is devoted specifically to the youth section. Trade-union committees need to follow through so that these recommendations are fully carried out at all enterprises.

It would be useful for ispolkoms with the participation of Komsomol organizations to analyze at this time the result of recruitment of young people for enterprises. Have all school graduates been provided with employment, do workers master their specialties, do they have prospects for

vocational growth? What are the causes of certain young workers dropping out? It is also important now to bring to light all youngsters without employment and to provide them with travel authorizations to enterprises.

Keeping young people in production is an important problem that is of major state importance. It needs to be solved. And the tone here should be provided by party committees. Clearly it would be useful at party committees and party buros to listen more frequently to economic managers on problems of work with youth. A great deal could be done here, say, by commissions for control of the work of management and by people's control groups. Trade-union organizations should also be directed to this.

Our task is to help young people find their place in life and select the correct road in it and to inculcate in them the feeling of an inheritor enjoying full rights of all the material and moral wealth of their country and the need in case of necessity to move out ahead, to be there where it is more difficult. All these qualities are formed solely in the process of concrete affairs. They must undergo testing and be tempered in production activity.

In this connection I would like to particularly speak of trust in youth. Do not we ourselves, the older generation, at times give rise to the mood of dependency with which we reproach young people? Namely by the fact that at times we excessively watch over them and keep them away from serious matters. Trust combined with strictness constitutes a most important means of bringing up youth.

We often complain about inadequate activity and initiative of young people. But let us think where and at what stage this initiative, this desire to work better, to be ahead is extinguished. Possibly at the time when questions raised by young people and Komsomols are suspended in the air solely because representatives of management or the party organization did not find it necessary to examine them in time, to provide appropriate answers or did not find the time to visit a young brigade or a Komsomol meeting and to listen to the opinions of Komsomols.

The contact of management of an enterprise or of the Komsomol committee--what should it be like? How should it be developed and strengthened? The fact is that at some enterprises the Komsomol organizer cannot bring himself to pass through the doorway of the director's office, while at others all he does is go to management with requests--to authorize payments. I believe that there is something here for representatives of management and party personnel to think about and to help the Komsomol committee to find its place. How often it happens that for the solution of complex problems in the life of the collective the so-called triangle is convoked of director, secretary of the party organization and chairman of the trade-union committee, while it is not considered necessary to invite the Komsomol organizer, who is backed up by a whole organization. He is recalled more often in those cases where his signature is required on a holiday report or in carrying out some mass measure.

Obviously it would be useful for members of the Komsomol committee to participate, for example, in working out long-range plans of production

development and, where necessary, in examining controversial labor questions pertaining to young people and to take part in allocation of apartments, vacation trips and in compiling vacation schedules.

In admitting a young person to the party, recommendations are required, as we know, from his primary Komsomol organization. Why not ask the opinion of the Komsomol committee and take an interest in its recommendation on promoting a young person, a Komsomol member to more responsible work? And is it often that the Komsomol committee displays an initiative in recommending this or that young worker for promotion? Unfortunately, such cases are not frequent. And the guilt lies here not only with Komsomol organizations but also with certain party committees of enterprises.

The republic contains examples of good, stable and, what is important, useful connections and of cooperation between the management of an enterprise, party and Komsomol committees. Such ties, having already become a good tradition, exist at the Krengolmskaya Manufaktura Combine. Here the practice is to be found of holding joint party-Komsomol meetings. The party and the Komsomol organization jointly resolve most important questions as organization of socialist competition and growth of vocational skill. The Komsomol on an equal footing with everyone else participates in such a complex and major matter as modernization of the combine. It is no accident that the Krengolm party organization is constantly growing due to young people, the best young workers and the Komsomol aktiv. Incidentally, the present secretary and deputy secretary of the combine's party committee recently passed here through good Komsomol schooling and were Komsomol leaders.

We need to raise the prestige and role of Komsomol committees. Of course, this applies not only to industrial enterprises but also to those in construction, transport and agriculture.

It is no accident that it is recommended in the CPSU Central Committee decree on the Komsomol to select secretaries of Komsomol organizations for membership in party committees and buros. Now, in the period of the reporting and election campaign, we are doing such work at party organizations. But it is necessary to make sure that these are real leaders of young people, people with initiative and that they truly actively participate in the work of party committees and buros and feel themselves to be full members of election organs.

A most important constituent of the party economic strategy for the immediate decade ahead is the food program. And here we count on young people, on their strength, energy and ability. At the present time, about 30,000 young machine operators, animal-husbandry workers and representatives of other agricultural occupations are at work in the republic's agriculture. But this is not enough. In the countryside, a shortage of workhands is still felt.

It should be said that in recent years, the outflow of young people from the countryside has somewhat been stopped. Furthermore, in the past 3 years, the young population of our villages has even grown by a 1,000 persons, and there are 700 more Komsomol members. Nonetheless the work of retaining youth in the countryside needs to be conducted very energetically and thoughtfully. We

need to overcome a certain "cooling" that has occurred of late with respect to the earth, to the labor of the plowman and the animal-husbandry worker and to create conditions to completely renew the prestige of these occupations. Keeping cadres in the countryside is one of the chief directions of work of party, soviet and, yes, Komsomol organs. Today this work is considered as one of the most important factors in the solution of economic and social problems in the countryside.

We have many examples of the successful solution of these problems. At Valtu Kolkhoz in Raplaskiy rayon, about one-third of all the kolkhoz farmers consist of young people under 30 years of age. The farm's management is constantly thinking of raising the skills of the young kolkhoz farmers and improving their working and living conditions. At the farm, a plan of measures relating to these questions has been worked out. It does not simply exist on paper but is being rigorously carried out. The kolkhoz has its own kindergarten, school, sports complex and club. Questions of work with youth are being well solved at Ranna Sovkhoz in Kharyuskiy and at Edazi Kolkhoz in Pyarnuskiy Rayon. And this yields its fruits.

The practice has now for a long time existed among us of sending young people to agriculture on Komsomol assignments. Each year more than 5000 young men and women arrive at animal-husbandry farms on such assignments. This is useful, necessary work. But has anyone from among Komsomol personnel, members of RAPO and Agroprom councils shown an interest in how these young men and women work and whether they have remained in general in the countryside, on those farms to which they were sent? Why, for example, do young people, who have received Komsomol assignments, leave sovkhozes Takhe In Valgaskiy and Martna in Khaapsaluskiy Rayon and a number of others? They say: a low level of mechanization, absence of a "dual shift," insufficient concern for the living and recreational conditions of young people. One cannot but help agree with these conclusions. Party and trade-union organizations, heads of farms and RAPO must in this regard support the Komsomol and help it.

But Komsomol organizations themselves could do much here. The fact is that Komsomol members of Svadyeyarve Farm in Iutevaskiy Rayon, with the support of management, were able to rebuild the old animal-husbandry farm into a modern, well-lit and comfortable production building in which it really is pleasant for the young milkmaids to work. Such examples deserve support and dissemination to other kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the republic. Why should not, let us say, the rayon Komsomol organization take under its patronage several lagging, weak animal-husbandry farms and help restore order there? The fact is that such everyday, minor affairs go to form a real, concrete contribution by rural Komsomol organizations in the development of animal husbandry.

In speaking of problems of education of youth, it is impossible not to dwell on socialist competition and the development of the movement of Komsomol-young people collectives. In the organization of competition, formalism and bureaucratism, as we know, are intolerable. But this is particularly intolerable in regard to young people because it kills everything vital,

creative. Very frequently there is no control over the course of a competition, results are totaled hurriedly, in a closed circle, without due publicity, without deep analysis.

The system of motivating young participants in a competition is in need of improvement. At many enterprises and on farms, very little attention is paid to the emotional side in the use of visual methods of encouragement. But for young people, this is very important, prestigious, if you wish.

It is necessary to think, for example, of such forms of rewarding young workers as the awarding of inscribed equipment and tools or sending letters of gratitude to parents. And why not reward young winners of a competition to subscription tickets to the theater or cinema or a subscription to belle-lettres, periodical literature? There are many kinds of rewards, it is only necessary to think and look. And the initiative here could proceed from Komsomol committees, and party organizations must support it in every way.

An important aspect of Komsomol work is development of brigade methods of labor. As yet the number of Komsomol-youth brigades is growing slowly. Today there are in operation 966 such collectives. They unite about 8,000 persons, that is only 9 percent of working youth. This is considerably below the all-union level. In recent years, the number of Komsomol-youth collectives has been reduced in the cities of Kokhtla-Yarve, Tartu, Pyarnu, Narva and in Leninskiy Rayon of Tallinn. They do not exist at all at many large enterprises.

The movement of Komsomol-youth collectives is developing poorly in agriculture. In Raplaskiy, Paydeskiy and Kingiseppskiy rayons, not a single such collective is to be found in animal husbandry--the sector of agriculture of greatest importance to us. Thus, in Kikhtnaskiy Support and Demonstration Sovkhoz-Tekhnikum, a new large animal-husbandry farm is being constructed for piglet production. It is basically staffed with young animal-husbandry workers comprising 16 persons. It would appear that all the preconditions exist for the creation of a Komsomol-youth collective. But no one is showing initiative in this regard. Yet practice shows that there where Komsomol-youth collectives have been created and there where attention is paid to them with consideration and at the same time with strictness, they attain major successes. It is possible to cite by way of example Komsomol-youth collectives of milkmaids at kolkhozes Vyayke-Maar'ya, Pylva, Vykhma, of swinetenders at Adavere Sovkhoz and of heifer attendants at Laatre Sovkhoz. I would like especially to emphasize that it is necessary to work with Komsomol-youth collectives. A person in such a collective must grow both as a personality and as a citizen. This is the main thing! Party organizations should approach more strictly proposals concerning creation of Komsomol-youth brigades, and if they are created, to display a real interest in their work.

Of course, we all understand that young people work better, study better when they have next to them a reliable older friend. Among the people, it has been said from way back that a man is to be praised for becoming a master of his craft but the one who has made a master of his pupile is to be thrice praised.

This proverb splendidly shows the very nature of preceptorship. In the rise of this movement and in its further development we see one of the most important tasks of party organizations.

Today the republic has 18,000 preceptors. But, of course, it is not a matter of quantity. It is important that all who carry the high calling of preceptor be truly real working pedagogs (able to pass on to youth their rich production, life and civic experience. It would not be right if their cooperation with those they sponsor were to be reduced solely to occupational training. Practice shows that far from all preceptors discuss with young workers the importance of participating in public life, education and the policy of our party and state. At present less than half of the preceptors discuss with them how to spend earned money and a few more--the family and their interests. The preceptor is not a nurse, he is a kind of ideological supervisor of the novice. This has to be taken into consideration when selecting people for such a responsible task.

Next Comrade K. Vayno dwelt on questions of the forming in young men and women of a Marxist-Leninist world view and class awareness. It is no accident that Vladimir Ilich Lenin saw in class conditioning and inculcation of ideological conviction a resistant immunity to any kind of bourgeois ideological rot regardless of the dress it might be wearing. This is all the more important today when a bitter class struggle is going on in the world, when there has been launched a genuine ideological war against our country and the countries of socialism. In the course of this struggle, our ideological adversaries have been applying many efforts in trying to influence the minds of young people. They are endeavoring to ensnare in their nets politically unstable, inexperienced young people and to find those who by virtue of their unpreparedness wrongly assess isolated facts or incorrectly understand processes and phenomena as well as to cast doubt in isolated individuals on the convictions of large groups--such is the meaning and aim of enemy manipulations. Our ideological adversary is trying to foment nationalist moods and searches for those who are looking for an "easy life." We should decisively repulse ideological sabotage regardless of in what form it might be manifested.

We must bring up and educate patriots of their country, real internationalists. The whole system of political training of the youth must contribute to this. It is specifically for this reason that demands on them are especially high.

How is political training of the youth organized among us? Of those who study the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism in the schools, only 3.5 percent study the history of the party. Only 3.5 percent! But we know that study of history is a most important tool of inculcation of civic spirit, Soviet patriotism and internationalism. There are very few such schools in Kokhtla-Yarveskiy, Paydeskiy and Pyarnuskiy rayons or in the city of Sillamyae. The Komsomol organizations here have not directed the youth to study appropriate programs, while party committees have not exerted control, have not indicated that such a situation needs to be rectified.

Only in Kalininskiy Rayon of the city of Tallinn do young people take the course "Current Problems of Developed Socialism." How can we possibly teach young people to find in theory and in documents of the party the basis, the key to the solution of those questions which our life today brings to the fore?

The results of a survey conducted at Tallinn Electrical Equipment Plant imeni M.I. Kalinin Association showed that political studies do not exert a perceptible influence on growth of labor and public activity of working youth. They are frequently found isolated from life, from the tasks facing the labor collective and from the questions with which it lives. It has been found, for example, that the majority of young students taking part in political study knew nothing about the fact that an economic experiment was being conducted at the association nor what problems and difficulties arise in this connection or how they are overcome.

Of course, the chief figure in the organization of political training of youth is that of the propagandist. It is essential to approach especially thoughtfully and carefully the selection of Komsomol propagandists.

After the July (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the following task was set before party committees--to send for work with youth the most mature, experienced and well-trained people. And it should be said that something in this regard has already been done. They acted correctly, for example, in Narva where many propagandist-supervisors from the party system of political education were transferred to the Komsomol system. The same thoughtful approach was made this year in the selection of propagandists at several Tallinn enterprises. Nonetheless the problem of Komsomol propagandists and their selection and training continues to be with us as before an acute one.

There are few communists among propagandists of the Komsomol political education network in Kingiseppskiy, Khiumaaskiy, Raplaskiy and Valgaskiy rayons. Their educational level is low in Pyarnu and at the Estonian Maritime Steamship Company and at Estrybprom. Such a situation needs to be corrected. At many enterprises, Komsomol propagandists are changed too frequently. Practically every fourth one of them is a novice in this work. Is it possible in such a situation to say that the propagandist has successfully studied his audience, knows the moods and thoughts of the youth and acquired experience in mixing with them?

The conclusion suggests itself: it is necessary to study Komsomol propagandists, to grow with them, to educate them and not to be sparing of time or of energies for this. Political education offices of party raykoms and gorkoms need to give special consideration to this. And why not have--at least one to a rayon--a support model group and without fail to take propagandists there: to observe and learn how the work should be organized!

Poor use is still being made of the possibilities of training Komsomol propagandists and their reserve at the University of Marxism-Leninism, in courses at the House of Political Education and at special seminars at party raykoms and gorkoms. Party committees must more strictly control the

education of Komsomol cadres and make demands of them. Up to now, as practice shows, there is a great deal of liberalism and laxness here.

Incidentally, is it not for the reason that they feel themselves to be insufficiently prepared that some Komsomol personnel fear to speak before young people? The fact is that in order to lead young people, a Komsomol worker needs to be able to convince, to agitate and to mobilize with his words, and this requires knowledge.

It is necessary to say outright that party personnel and economic managers are still rare guests in the youth milieu. As we know, in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee relating to our republic we are criticized in particular for this. We spoke in detail concerning this at the last plenum of the Central Committee. But I would like today to emphasize once more that for a leader of any rank, economic or party, mixing with young people is obligatory. and here I do not only have in mind appearances at the podium. It is necessary to more frequently pay visits to shops, animal-husbandry farms, dormitories and to more frequently have talks with young people and to know their moods, needs and questions.

An acute need is felt for young lecturing personnel. There are especially not enough internationalist lecturers for young audiences and specialists on the socialist way of life. At the same time we have a republic school for the young lecturer attached to the republic's Komsomol Central Committee and the Znaniye Society. In 5 years, according to the records, 300 persons studied in it. But only 50 completed the school. Of these, only 25 are taking an active part in lecturing work. As for the rest, Komsomol committees know nothing about them. Is this a serious approach to the matter, a solicitous attitude toward lecturing personnel? I believe this is a serious oversight on the part of the lecture group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia.

In improvement of educational work with youth, we have the right to count on more effective assistance on the part of the mass information media, creative unions and cultural institutions.

In the schools, at clubs and at young people's evenings, you frequently hear only trivial variety jazz music and you can't help being surprised on meeting pupils, and not just pupils at that, who either know nothing at all about music or are infatuated with some passing "king of rock." But it has long been known that underestimation of esthetic upbringing of youth frequently results in flaws in their moral and ideological education. In this connection I would like once more to return to the question of discotheques. It is necessary to say outright that measures for increasing supervision over the disco matter in the republic and control over it are so far being carried out slowly and indecisively. Moreover, the Komsomol has been as it were on the sidelines in regard to this important matter. It controls only disco evenings which it organizes itself. Disco evenings, regardless of who may hold them, are first of all measures for young people, which means they should not be held without the Komsomol. As before, control is inadequate on the part of cultural institutions and Komsomol organization over appearances of various kinds of ensembles, both amateur and professional. Today daring, courage, if

you wish, are to be found in openly raising one's voice, in speaking against vulgarity, trash and base tastes, against imitation of far from the best examples of bourgeois culture and in interfering in what is going on. This is also a front where a struggle is ongoing for the minds and souls of people, for the Soviet man. And Komsomol members must constantly, determinedly and aggressively conduct this struggle. And party organizations must support the Komsomol in this important matter in every possible way.

All this, I repeat, is not simply talk about art, music or literature---it is talk about one's life position, about the inculcation of a world view.

Comrade K. Vayno next dwelt on the work of the creative unions and their party organizations in guiding creative youth. Young writers, artists, composers, actors and cinematographers are that part of the young generation which exerts a significant influence on the ideological climate in the young people's milieu. As Lenin taught, it is necessary to always take this into consideration in party policy and in its ideological and organizational work. But this is especially important in periods when society finds itself face to face with qualitatively new problems whose solution naturally requires a new level of social consciousness. Comrade K.U. Chernenko spoke of this on appearing at the jubilee plenum of the board of the USSR Writers Union. Demands on the young creative generation, on the creativity of the young and on their civic, life position are especially high today.

Our Komsomol has good traditions in the education of highly ideological masters of the arts. Let us recall the names of many of our literary figures and artists whose works are distinguished by great social vibration and high artistix mastery. Most of them have a remarkable Komsomol biography and have undergone formative schooling in the Komsomol.

The influence of the Komsomol and of public organizations is all the more important in the education of the young creative generation today. At the same time, it must be pointed out that many of those defects in artistic culture to which the June plenum of our party drew attention are inherent in a number of works created by the young authors of our republic. I think that the Central Committee of the republic's Komsomol and its council of creative youth should most attentively and demandingly treat the work of young people and their philosophical position and work more with young writers and artists, involving them in active public life and providing them with social aims.

Of course, the Komsomol cannot solve all problems. As in anything else, here are needed the united, purposeful efforts of party committees, communists of creative unions, the Ministry of Culture and the State Committee for Cinematography.

In solving problems of work with creative youth, it is always necessary to remember that the contemporary ideological struggle is a struggle of ideas not only in politics but also in the sphere of art, morale and morality.

Serious tasks face party and soviet organs and, of course, the Komsomol in connection with the realization of the basic positions of the reform of the general educational and vocational school, Comrade K. Vayno pointed out.

First of all, a very critical and searching analysis is required of all forms and methods of work with Komsomol organizations of schools, vocational and technical schools and higher educational institutions. It must not be forgotten that the school Komsomol is the first step in a person's political biography. It is here that the rising generation receives lessons in social and civic activity.

Unfortunately, as practice shows, abuses are carried out through excessive surveillance and regulation. It is clear that underestimation of the role of Komsomol organizations of schools and the view of the school Komsomol as a collective of children who must without fail be watched over and for whom decisions must be made have their impact here. Wittingly or unwittingly, we push aside in this way young people from public work and deprive them of a useful and necessary activity.

Komsomol school children, particularly those in senior classes must have a good perception of the tasks facing the school and take part in their solution. Then they will feel themselves to be responsible people. At Valga First Secondary School, for example, pupils' repair brigades, made up of seniors, work the whole year around. It is interesting the Komsomol work proceeds with initiative. Behind all this is to be found the able pedagogic supervision of the school party organization and of the entire pedagogic collective headed by Estonian SSR Honored Teacher Valter Malmom. But, unfortunately, there are not so many such schools.

At every step, we have enough of the most diverse public work: improvement of cities and villages, concern for the aged, preservation of public order, subscription to the press and much else. A big portion of this work can and must be done by young people. It is only necessary to be able to organize children and to provide them with such an opportunity. But this is what frequently is lacking. For example, questions have been brought up over a long time of involving school children in work during the summer directly in cities. But so far they are being solved slowly.

Moral education of the youth requires special attention. We know that a part of the youngsters is now maturing more quickly as consumers and more slowly as conscientious citizens and workers. The forming of reasonable needs--this is what we should devote attention to and direct our educational efforts. To let the forming of needs drift, to not be concerned with educating standards of consumption would mean a retreat before the pressure of vulgar, petty-bourgeois psychology. These are first of all tasks of the family.

It is necessary to increase the responsibility of parents for the upbringing of their children. I think that party and public organizations and labor collectives must occupy here a more principled position. In conformity with the decisions of the 14th plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, meetings must be held toward the end of the year at the republic's party organizations involving discussion of the role of communists in the upbringing of their own children. It is necessary that at such meetings a serious, strict discussion be held. Obviously, it would be helpful to introduce into practice reports of member of labor collectives at trade-union meetings concerning how they bring up their children. As of now this is

being done extremely rarely. It is not always considered necessary for heads of enterprises to ask of their subordinates concerning this "sector of work." We shall not see today at plants and kolkhoz stands where workers would be singled out who not only work in production at a high tempo but also do a good job of bringing up their children.

Of course, such work will be effective only in the case where it is not conducted from case to case but in a purposeful, systematic manner and where party, soviet and Komsomol organizations assume control over it. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia is increasing demands on supervisory personnel for children's upbringing. Recently, for example, the republic's deputy minister of trade was released from the position he occupied for an irresponsible attitude toward the upbringing of his own son, who had been brought to account in court. Such a principled policy will be carried out in the future.

Some parents try to create special conditions for their children, considering this as a question of family prestige. They engage in changing apartments for them, buy them cars and sign over to them their summer homes. And not one of them thinks in this connection that, say, a 17-20 year old child has as yet not come to deserve this, has not earned this car or this summer home and that this in its way corrupts young people.

Unfortunate families, as life shows, is a term that is broader than it is assumed to be. An unfortunate family is not only one where parents drink and where as a consequence there is a material shortage. Not much better is the family where they are concerned only for the material needs of the children, where they spoil and cripple them with unlimited permissiveness.

We are also concerned with the large number of law violations and drunkenness among youth. We spoke of this in detail at the meeting of the republic meeting of the aktiv held in August of this year and the last plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the republic.

It should be said outright; despite the detailed plans we have worked out on these questions and numerous commissions, the situation so far has been very slow to improve. What is lacking is concrete, organizational and, most important, systematic work. As yet we have not started on individual work with each difficult youngster or young person to obtain the desired results. One does not sense a change for the better following adoption of decisions in the cities of Tallinn and Kokhtla-Yarve and in Vilyandiskiy and Rakvereskiy rayons. The dormitories where a significant portion of the youth lives require more attention. It is namely most often here that public order is violated. There are now 700 dormitories in the republic, but many of them are, putting it plainly, in a run-down condition. Showers, storage lockers do not work, kitchens and living quarters are poorly equipped. Lodgers frequently complain about poor organization of feeding, trade and personal services.

The heads of many enterprises rarely visit the dormitories. They do not see and do not know in what conditions their workers live. Up to now many ministries with the tacit agreement of sectorial trade-union committees have

not been fulfilling long-term plans of modernization and capital repair of existing dormitories, while some have not even worked them out. It is necessary to correct such a situation. We need to increase demands on heads of enterprises, educational institutions and the appropriate ministries and departments in regard to the condition of young people's dormitories. Here there are no questions of secondary importance.

The problem of young people's free time requires a more thoughtful and current approach. Questions brought to the forefront deal with qualitative reorganization of the work of houses of culture and clubs and their loads as well as with the ideological content of mass cultural work. Many clubs rarely organize measures for youth. The young people have no place to go to. They in essence are not being sought nor are they attracted to our cultural and educational institutions. It is enough to say that on the whole at houses of culture and clubs for young people half as many theatrical presentations and two-thirds fewer young-people's dances and recreation evenings are given than as for the country as a whole. The proper conclusions ought to be made from this fact by the republic's Ministry of Culture and the Trade-Union Council.

Primary Komsomol organizations themselves rarely, very rarely, hold young people's evenings. Plant and school facilities are practically not used for this purpose. After a work shift or lessons and particularly on days off when young people do have free time, many school doors and plant gates are closed under lock and key. Incidentally, some good examples of organization of young people's free time are to be found in our republic. Thus at Kokhtla-Yarve 1st Secondary School recreation evenings are frequently held. The youngsters themselves organize them and themselves maintain order there. At this school, the Komsomol committee and the pupils' committee work actively, and pupil self-government has been created. More attention should be paid to the military and patriotic education of young people. In general, little is done among us in this direction. Through the joint efforts of the Komsomol, educational organs and DOSAAF organizations at enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes and at educational institutions, museums, rooms and corners of military glory are being established. Veterans of the Great Patriotic War and labor pacemakers have begun to be involved more actively in propagandizing revolutionary, military and labor traditions. Many measures of a military and patriotic character are conducted within the framework of the All-Union Tour of Komsomols and Youth to Places of Revolutionary, Military and Labor Glory and the "Chronicle of the Great Patriotic" expedition. Meetings of draftees with officers and soldiers of the Soviet Army and competitions in sports of applied military application are being practiced more often. All this is great and very important work, and it yields its results.

But today, in the difficult international situation, when imperialism ever more undisguisedly brandishes its arms, military and patriotic education must be of a more active and purposeful character. It is necessary to better propagandize the vocation of Soviet officers, especially among young people of indigenous nationality. Here we have definite improvement. A great deal of practical aid in propaganda among young people of military educational institutions is provided by Tallinn Higher Military and Political Construction School. We need to strengthen the positive tendencies and to further develop the work.

The Komsomol aktiv and DOSAAF committees must work more with draftees and help them to master military craft.

The necessity of raising the level of party guidance of the Komsomol obliges us first of all to direct attention to work with Komsomol cadres, Comrade K. Vayno said. Cadres and control--these are the chief, key elements on which we must now concentrate our efforts.

Today it can be confidently said that on the whole a literate, businesslike aktiv has been gathered together in the republic Komsomol organization. And it is capable of solving the set tasks. At the same time, it must be pointed out that certain party gorkom and raykoms have relaxed their attention in regard to questions of selection and education of personnel working in the Komsomol organization.

First of all, we are concerned with their high level of replacement, especially at the city and rayon level.

Some party gorkoms and raykoms approach superficially the study of political, work and moral qualities of young people recommended for Komsomol work. They frequently regard only questionnaire data, which sometimes results in serious blunders. Frequently casual people are promoted to Komsomol work who have no special desire or calling for it. Recently, it was found necessary to get rid of certain Komsomol personnel who were unable to handle their duties, having compromised themselves.

The serious lapses in cadre work are largely to be explained by inattention to the reserve.

Practice shows that most frequently those who are unable to handle their work are ones who have never been involved in local Komsomol work and have not undergone the schooling of the labor collective. Nonetheless we frequently have cases where people are promoted to supervisory Komsomol work straight from the school or student bench. People need to be cultivated and prepared ahead of time for supervisory Komsomol work and be inculcated with the necessary skills.

Guiding youth is not a simple thing. Here a mass of the most varied and frequently very complex problems arises--political, social and moral. It is necessary to be able to solve them and to defend party positions in any situation. For this reason, special attention should be paid to training of Komsomol cadres. But the possibilities for this are still being used inadequately.

Communists make up the backbone of supervisory Komsomol cadres. And a special demand is made on them. The work of communists in the Komsomol organization is an honorable and responsible party assignment, and it must be carried out with honor.

Many communists work in our Komsomol. They now head 80 percent of primary and about 30 percent of shop Komsomol organizations and every fourth Komsomol

group and through them party guidance of Komsomol organizations is in large measure practically carried out. It is namely they who must bring to Komsomol work more organization, efficiency and a searching spirit. Party committees must be more demanding in regard to these communists and to see to it that each one of them is an example for young people in labor, ideological conviction and behavior.

The chief causes of unfinished Komsomol work are disclosed in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee. They are to be found in the form and methods and in the style of Komsomol work. This also fully applies to our republic. There is still a great deal of formalism, speechifying and paper pushing in the work of Komsomol organs.

We need to teach young people and Komsomol personnel to bring a started undertaking to completion, not to scatter themselves and to be consistent and purposeful in their work. In recent years, the republic's Komsomol organization has held numerous special efforts, work projects, trips, reviews. At the same time, Komsomol committees frequently do a poor job of providing for them organizationally and politically. They often work in a stereotyped manner. Is not this the reason why some of our actual Komsomol workers often cannot make out where each such measure ends and where it differs from another.

At the plenum a large group of Komsomol communists is present. Turning to them, Comrade K. Vayno emphasized the need for a basic reorganization of the work of komsomol organizations as is required by the CPSU Central Committee's decree. You need to break away from the table and the telephone and be more often present there where young people work, study and rest and not just be present, but to know well how the young people live and what concerns them, and the main thing is to lead them, that is, to be real leaders of youth, the speaker said.

I would like to see more lively initiative from the Central Committee of Estonia's Komsomol. In recent years, it has not submitted even once to the Central Committee of the republic's Communist Party serious, meaningful proposals on questions relating to young people that could serve as the subject of discussion at the Bureau or Secretariat of the party's Central Committee. But the Komsomol Central Committee is the militant headquarters of the youth organization. It expresses and represents interests of young people and such initiatives should specifically proceed from it. Here are needed determination, consistency and a certain daring. This is a question of the authority of the republic's Komsomol. There should be no waiting for suggestions, for some kind of push from the side. It is necessary to decisively assume for oneself the solution of questions while remembering that the Komsomol is an independent organization which in everything displays its own initiative.

I would like to remind our party committees that guidance of the Komsomol requires tact and respect for the independence of the youth organization. The Komsomol is in no need of petty everyday concern. Guidance means attention to the big picture, the able direction of its work in the main.

Party committees should thoroughly know the situation at Komsomol organizations, more critically and more strictly assess it and meet more often with the Komsomol aktiv. Right now reports and elections are going on at Komsomol organizations. This is a most favorable time for meetings with the youth. But it is necessary to note: during the entire past month only 18 responsible party officials attended Komsomol reporting and election meetings. Of course, we all are busy people. But still the affairs and concerns of youth and the Komsomol should be in the forefront of the work of party committees. Neither energy nor time should be spared for this.

In the solution of the pressing questions of study, living and recreation of young people, it is necessary to significantly elevate the role of soviets of people's deputies and their permanent commissions for work with youth. Trade-union organizations must also be more actively included in this work.

Education of the rising generation is our common task, our common concern. And this is how it should be dealt with.

Our plenum is taking place at a responsible stage of the struggle for the five-year plan, when the party and the country have embarked on a period of immediate preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress, Comrade K. Vayno said. You know what difficult tasks face us in the field of the economy and in the solution of social questions. This requires of all of us further strengthening of organization, discipline and heightening of party responsibility for the fate of our plans.

Recently we triumphally marked the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Soviet Estonia from the fascist invaders. Ahead there is an even more noteworthy event--the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Our republic together with the whole country is preparing to commemorate this date with new labor achievements. There is no doubt that Komsomol members and all our youth will also work creatively and outstandingly.

In conclusion, Comrade K. Vayno assured the Central Committee of our party, its Politburo and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade Chernenko that the party organization and the labor collectives of the republic will do everything to elevate still more the role and activity of the Komsomol and all the youth of Soviet Estonia and to bring up and educate such a youth which would not only successfully assimilate the experience of the older generation but also enrich it with new achievements and new labor victories.

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REGIONAL

REBUTTAL TO 'BALTIMORE SUN' ON MUUGA HARBOR

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 9 Aug 84 pp 3, 4

[Article by Rikhard Must and Yaroslav Tolstikov: "In an Atmosphere of Secrecy? Some 'Revelations' of One American Newspaper"]

[Text] THE BALTIMORE SUN, published in a seaport near the U.S. capital, recently published an article devoted to the construction of Tallinn's new merchant seaport in Muuga Bay. The Western reader's interest in the construction project (including the American's) is understandable. Indeed this will be a huge enterprise "with numerous berths, grain conveyors, elevators, and warehouses," as the transoceanic newspaper writes. The construction project is so big, THE BALTIMORE SUN accurately notes, that it is expected to be completed "sometime in 2015" and then the port in Muuga Bay will be Europe's largest "grain" port.

Having informed its reader of this generally accurate information, the newspaper then upsets him with such lines as: "In the port's construction the Soviet Union is widely using convict labor, which is being done under cover of great secrecy." And it continues, "The size and secrecy of the construction of the harbor in Muuga is causing concern in neighboring Finland... After all, at one time Muuga was a naval base of Czarist Russia..."

Having "frightened" our northern neighbors, the paper then tries to frighten the population of Estonia as well: A large number of workers of Russian nationality are being imported into Tallinn for the harbor's construction, and this, they say, will disturb the "ethnic and language ratio in Estonia..."

To tell the truth, at first it seemed to us that THE BALTIMORE SUN's article did not deserve special attention. It is a standard trick: grains of truth mixed with a solid dose of lies and misinformation. Does it really deserve a response? The same thing has repeatedly occurred before. "Reports" of the use of convict labor at our country's large-scale construction project

one might say, already set their teeth on edge in connection with the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod export gas pipeline and the Baikal-Amur Trunk Line. However, the same Western journalists who at one time invented this story reported the complete absence of "forced labor" there as they were given the opportunity for the broadest familiarization with both the gas pipeline and the trunk line. They were forced to admit the falsehood and absurdity of the far-fetched inventions. It should be that way this time too.

And yet we decided it would be useful to THE BALTIMORE SUN newsmen to hear the commentaries about their "revelation" made by the very builders of the harbor. Let us take the Estonian Rudolph Bauman's brigade, which is laying the pipelines in Muuga, or even the machine operators brigade headed by the Russian Yevgeniy Astaf'yev. Having ridiculed it sufficiently, the workers added their unflattering comments and epithets to their statements directed at the transoceanic penpushers, and their indignation with this slander is well understood. There never were any convicts at the construction site and there never could be. This is totally clear.

But we have decided in any case to elaborate on some elements. For example, there is THE BALTIMORE SUN's report about the "import" of a large number of workers from outside Estonia. We turned to the construction administration No 423 of the Baltmorgidrostroy Trust, the main contract organization building the New Tallinn Port, as well as to the Central Committee of the Komsomol of Estonia; after all, the construction project has been declared an All-Union Shock Komsomol Project.

And so the first two official documents appeared.

No 1. "STATEMENT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL OF THE CONSTRUCTION ADMINISTRATION No 423: During the period since March 1982 when construction on the new harbor was begun until the present time the administration has received 115 new men from outside the republic, and many of them have been assigned to work at Muuga."

No 2. "STATEMENT FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE KOMSOMOL OF ESTONIA: It has been decided to send 300 young workers to the republic's construction organizations involved in the new port's construction on Komsomol passes. Mainly they will be Komsomol members and young people from Tallinn and other Estonian cities."

So who is mainly working at the construction site in Muuga? Several hundred workers arrived from neighboring Maardu, who were building units of the local chemical plant here before, and from the Iru area where they were building the local district heating plant which serves the inhabitants of Tallinn, which certainly you pass heading for the new port, and, of course, from the "old" port (it is now already old!), where the Baltmorgidrostroy workers expanded and reconstructed the existing berths and piers for many years. To put it plainly, the overwhelming majority of the new port's builders are their own local people who have worked in Tallinn 15-20 years or more.

We are talking about this in such detail because we feel that the spiteful critics abroad clearly do not understand Soviet internationalism, that spirit of friendship and mutual understanding which prevails in labor collectives, which as a rule are multinational.

For example, here are the opinions of some Estonian workers themselves on that score: of Tiyto Seysler, honored transport worker of the Estonian SSR, holder of the Order of Labor Glory, and brigade leader of construction-installation train No 675 which is building the railroad lines to the port's berths; of Khel'dur Vyal'ba, a driver from Construction Administration No 423, and of Robert Kaleva and Kheyno Anderson, workers who are also employed at this construction site.

Now, perhaps it would be interesting not only to listen, but to see as well. At first there was bewilderment on their faces, then indignation (when we referred to the "theses" taken from THE BALTIMORE SUN). "No, we simply must reply," announced T. Seysler decisively, "and in all seriousness." And our interlocutors analyzed the absurdity of such statements in fine detail.

First, the fact was recalled that all the largest construction projects of postwar Estonia were built with the most active participation of the country's specialized construction-installation organizations, from many fraternal republics. Take for example, the Estonia mine, both GRES [Regional Electric Power Station] in Narva, the restoration and now the reconstruction as well as Krengolm and the Olympic facilities in Tallinn. And can you imagine any other construction project of all-union scale which would be mastered by exclusively local resources? Whether it be Estonia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, or even Armenia? Of course not, just as it is impossible to imagine the construction of the BAM [Baikal Amur Trunk Line] or the highway in northern Tyumen Oblast without detachments from all the USSR republics, including from Estonia. And our interlocutors went on, let us at least recall the settlement of Kichera on the shores of Lake Baikal, which was planned in Estonia and constructed with the participation of representatives of our republic. And the trust with the remarkable name of Estsurgutdorstroy [Estonian Surgut Road Construction Organization] whose collective is building roads through the taiga to the mineral storehouses of Siberia.

All that has been said also applies to the construction of the New Tallinn port, which in terms of its importance and the expenditure of labor and capital is one of the country's leading construction projects in the last few and even in the coming decades.

So that, our interlocutors summed up, in this area THE BALTIMORE SUN's allegation, at a minimum, forces one to doubt the authors' economic competence.

As far as their political competence is concerned, it is clearly at odds with reality in the opinion of the Estonian workers.

Both Estonians and Russians as well as Ukrainians work side by side in R. Bauman's brigade and it is the same among the drivers and road workers. And never under any circumstances did the question of "ethnic" or "language"

ratio or of the predominance of this or that nationality in the collective even arise here. Each person here is evaluated exclusively by his contribution to the common cause. And perhaps the main thing that has united them here in Muuga is the scope of the construction of the new harbor which is unparalleled in the Baltic area and the exceptional importance of the new harbor for the country and for the Estonian republic.

"Neither I nor my comrades have ever had the opportunity to build something like this up to now. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the deep-sea harbor in Muuga. And we are glad that we are participating in its construction. It is a great honor." Both T. Seysler and Kh. Vyal'ba and work superintendents N. Kutsebolov and V. Yesakov as well as many other of our interlocutors unanimously held this opinion.

Such opinions were expressed and if anxiety appeared in them, in the best sense of the word, it is only for one reason; how to further increase the pace and raise productivity more in order to keep within the strict schedule.

We also met with Finnish construction workers working at the New Tallinn Port. We wanted to hear "from the horse's mouth" the opinion about THE BALTIMORE SUN's statements from the citizens of the country which is the Soviet Union's northern neighbor.

From the Finnish side Anssi Pikkaraynen, project officer; Kalle Frantti, sector chief; Yukhani Kari, agent for the workers; and Teuvo Peltonen, a carpenter, participated in a meeting which took place in the administration building of the Portal-Grupp firm at the port.

We will cite a short record of this conversation. Of course, not each one of the four Finnish interlocutors answered all our questions; as a rule, one of them did. But judging from the approving reaction of the rest, all four were unanimous in the answers and opinions directed to us, the Soviet party.

At first we again hear the absolute confirmation: of course they did not see and could not see any convicts at the construction site nor anyone under escort there. Then came answers to our specific questions.

How do you rate your job in the USSR, in particular, at the construction site of the new port here in Tallinn?

It is known that several firms, not just in Finland itself, but also in other countries, aspired to the contract with the Soviet side, and we are glad that we proved to be the victors in this competitive struggle. Finnish builders are participating in the implementation of various projects in approximately 30 countries, including the United States. I would like to emphasize, however, that the Soviet Union always offers mutually beneficial terms to its partners. That is how it was in Kostomuksha in the Karelian ASSR and in Tosno near Leningrad where large industrial projects are being constructed with Finnish participation. That is how it was and is with you in Tallinn; after all, our workers have already built several large buildings here; hotels, stores,

and shops. And everywhere in the USSR, as far as we know, the attitude toward us, toward Finns, is exceptionally cordial, one could say friendly.

As for the jobs in Estonia in particular, they have a special attractiveness for us. Close to home, one can see his family more often and it is easy to call Helsinki on the telephone. There is hardly a language barrier between Finns and Estonians, so there are wide opportunities for direct relations; we have the opportunity to watch television from Helsinki, and we receive Finnish newspapers. We like your city very much and we are trying to take advantage of all its cultural assets. Excellent living standards have been created for us here.

Yukhani Kari's reply:

I would say that many of us are not nearly as well set up domestically-speaking at home in Finland as we are here as guests.

Do you or your fellow citizens in Finland itself feel any kind of anxiety concerning the new harbor's construction.

I have not heard even a hint of that.

We will interrupt the Finnish interlocutors for a minute and cite:

Document No 3. "STATEMENT FROM THE MUSEUM OF THE TWICE RED BANNER BALTIC FLEET: The museum has exhaustive data about the history of the Russian Baltic Fleet at its disposal. The Russian fleet never at any time had a naval base in Muuga Bay near Tallinn (Revel)."

But still, what is the Finnish side anxious about today?

Our only concern or anxiety, if you like, but it is more precisely a sincere desire, is how it is possible to better cope with the work on this extraordinarily important contract.

No 4. "STATEMENT FROM THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE PORT UNDER CONSTRUCTION: The two Finnish firms, Portal-Grupp and EKE, who are participating in the construction of the New Tallinn Port, are obligated by contract to put two basic complexes into operation in Muuga in 1986; one for the transshipment of grain and one for refrigerator cargoes.

Yukhani Kari's reply:

I will retire on a pension in 2003. I would gladly work the whole remaining time in your country. And then I would try to send my children to work in the USSR.

As our interlocutors emphasized, approximately five percent of the able-bodied population are now unemployed in Finland, and the contracts concluded with the Soviet Union of course make it possible to reduce this level. It is not just a matter of the workers or specialists employed directly at the construction

site; Finland is delivering materials and equipment here to Muuga which means additional work places in the enterprises of its own country. Interest in the construction site is high in Finland. A great deal is written about it.

Were correspondents from Finland here in Tallinn at the construction site?

Yes, for example, journalists from KANSAN UUTiset, from MAILM YA ME, and from Finnish television were here. We are expecting correspondents from RAKENNUSLEHTI in a few days; this is something like your STROITELNAYA GAZETA.

Perhaps, I can bring it to an end here. THE BALTIMORE SUN's lies are refuted again and again from various sides. However, in conclusion we would like to add a few, this time, deeply personal impressions of our own to what has already been said.

Having passed through the suburban settlement of Muuga overflowing with the verdure of gardens, which is rightfully called Tallinn's green necklace by its inhabitants, our car approached the construction site. The red and white indicator at the bus stop along the roadside flashed by. We scrutinized it: the city route's last stop, No 42 "Sadama" (Port).

It would be logical to write the following when noting down the last meters of our trip: "Having passed through the checkpoint, we entered the port's area..." But strange as it may seem nothing like a checkpoint with a system of passes was found at the entrance, not even the barrier in such cases arbitrarily guarding the territory of the project under construction.

"Disorder!" it occurred to us. In the first place the city bus fleet by the very name of the route would seem to be directing the "cloak and dagger knights" to their sought-for, although also "extremely secret", goal, the port. And in the port itself? There is real freedom for intelligence agents here. Why would a scout or spy need knight's armor! Even without it he will be able to successfully handle obtaining "secret" information with his bare hands. For example, go to the superintendent's office during the dinner break, take any of the volumes of work specifications from the shelf, read through it, and photograph it.

No, say what you like, but all the same we would suggest that a barrier be placed at the port's entrance. At least that!

But our very chief objection directed at THE BALTIMORE SUN is still associated with the fact that American reporters could have successfully obtained objective information about the size of the construction site, its problems and prospects, and the deep-sea port's technical data from Soviet mass information media: radio and television broadcasts and the republic press. And in particular, from SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA where, for example, on 24 April, 5 July, and 25 July of this year articles about the New Tallinn Port were published in prominent places. We will go further: in the future one editorial board intends to "declassify" all the details of the construction's progress, to tell about the foremost people, and to criticize shortcomings.

In essence, it was exactly this thought that led us to present the latest material, which according to editorial statistics also will be added to the publications under our permanent rubric: "SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA at the Construction of the New Tallinn Port."

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REGIONAL

INFORMATION REPORT ON 16TH ESTONIAN CC PLENUM

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 21 Oct 84 p 1

[ETA article: "Information Report Concerning the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] On 20 October, the 16th plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia was held in Tallinn.

Participants in this work included the first secretaries of party raykoms, chairmen of city and rayon ispolkoms, heads of ministries and departments not belonging to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, secretaries of Komsomol gorkoms and raykoms, leading personnel of republic Komsomol and trade-union organs and ideological institutions, responsible apparatus officials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, the Presidium of the ESSR Supreme Soviet, the republic Council of Ministers and the mass information media and a number of heads and secretaries of party organizations of enterprises, organizations, farms and educational institutions.

The plenum examined the following issues:

1. Concerning the tasks of republic party organizations stemming from the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Party Guidance of the Komsomol and Enhancing its Role in Communist Education of Youth" and speeches of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade K.U. Chernenko on questions of party work with youth.

2. Concerning the draft of the information report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia on fulfillment of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Estonia.

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party K. Vayno gave an address on the first question of the agenda.

Discussion of the address included the participation of First Secretary of the Tallinn Party Gorkom M. Pedak, a mine worker of Estoniya Mine of Estonslanets Production Association, preceptor of youth E. Paap, First Secretary of Rakverskiy Party Raykom Yu. Niysuke, chairman of the ESSR State Committee for

Vocational and Technical Education E. Cherevashko, First Secretary of Tartu Party Gorkom E.A. Sillari, director of Tallinn Sewing Production Association imeni V. Klementi L. Allik, First Secretary of the Estonian Komsomol Central Committee A. Almann, First Secretary of Narva Party Gorkom V. Chetvergov, party-committee secretary of the Support and Demonstration Fishing Kolkhoz imeni S.M. Kirov of Kharyuskiy Rayon U. Sikkenberg, chairman of the board of the ESSR Writers Union V. Beekman, chief of Tallinn Higher Military-Political Construction School V. Gnezdilov, female worker of Vilyandi Experimental Factory of Tallinn Scientific-Production Association A. Needer, director of the Tallinn 40th Secondary School L. Kalinina, First Secretary of Raplaskiy Party Raykom A. Luukas and party-committee secretary of Tartu State University A. Kiris.

The deputy chief of the Department of Party Organization Work of the CPSU Central Committee V. Nikiforov presented a speech at the plenum.

The plenum adopted a comprehensive decree on the discussed question.

Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia A. Kudryavtsev made an announcement on the draft of the information report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia. The plenum approved the information report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia on fulfillment of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of Estonia and instructed members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia to appear with it at city, rayon and primary party organizations.

The buro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia was instructed to generalize the comments and proposals made by communists in the course of discussion of the report.

Organizational questions were also examined.

The plenum released D. Visnapuu from the duties of candidate member of the Buro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia in connection with being sent to study.

The plenum approved as chief of the Department of Construction and Municipal Services of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia N. Ivanov and released L. Ananich from this position in connection with transfer to other work.

On this, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia completed its work.

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REGIONAL

SLYUN'KOV ON LAND RECLAMATION AT BELORUSSIAN CC CP PLENUM

Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 17 Nov 84 pp 1-3

[Article by N. N. Slyun'kov: "Results of the October (1984) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Goals of the Republic's Party Organizations Arising From Its Decisions and From the Speech at the Plenum of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade K. U. Chernenko"]

[Excerpts] Communists and republic workers, like all Soviet people, accepted the results of the October 1984 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee with great satisfaction.

Our party's central committee is giving constant attention to improving agriculture and to improving its stability as an essential condition for progress within the entire economy. An important place in this work is occupied by the implementation of the country's Food Program, which was accepted at the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Only 2 years have passed but a considerable amount has already been done. This can be seen if we use our republic as an example.

In comparison to the first two years of the five-year plan, gross agricultural production output in 1983-1984 increased by 11 percent. On the average per year 7.4 percent more milk and 11 percent more meat was produced. The sale of these products to the state has also increased. The production and procurement of potatoes, vegetables, flax and sugar beets has grown.

As a result there has been an increase in the level of supplies to the population of food products. Work and everyday living conditions have improved for rural workers. In 4 years of the five-year plan, 5.5 million square meters of housing will be introduced in the village. The scale of building of schools, children's preschool facilities and objects to house health and cultural facilities has expanded. Double the number of intra-enterprise roads will be built than during the 10th Five-Year Plan. The sphere of services to the rural population is being improved. The real income of kolkhoz farmers and sovkhoz workers is increasing. It is satisfying to note that in recent years a curtailment of the movement of the rural population to the city has begun. The birth rate in village families is increasing. In other words, positive changes are obvious. Our people visibly see the fruits of the implementation of the Food Program.

That which has been achieved is the result of the great help rendered by the state, of the intensive labor of field and farm workers and of the great organizational and political work of party organizations and soviet and agricultural organs. The contribution into agricultural development of labor collectives from industry, building, transportation and other branches of the national economy is significant.

At the same time, as noted at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the situation in agriculture in a number of sections remains difficult. Production output in this branch still lags behind the growing needs of the country. The key problem, as before, is the persistent increase in grain production. The second urgent task is to strengthen positive tendencies in livestock-raising and to do everything necessary to facilitate its accelerated development by means of increasing livestock productivity, of qualitatively improving the herd and of decisively strengthening the feed base. The only correct way to solve these central tasks is by means of the overall intensification of agricultural production and its transition to an industrial base.

The problems brought forth by life on the way toward transforming agriculture into a highly developed sector of the economy require, emphasized Comrade K. U. Chernenko, new and more effective solutions and thoroughly innovative and creative approaches. Based on this, the CPSU Central Committee posed the question of large-scale development of land reclamation, examining it as the decisive factor in improving agriculture and in the steadfast growth in production of grain, feeds and other farming and livestock products.

As we know, the foundation for implementing the long-term, scientifically-based program of land transformation was laid at the May 1966 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. During the time since then the state has directed about 5 billion rubles into reclamation in Belorussia. A wide frontal attack on swampy virgin lands was possible thanks to the industrial power of the country and the help of all fraternal Soviet peoples.

The republic's party organization, our reclamation workers and all rural workers have done a considerable amount to increase the productivity of naturally impoverished lands and to transform them into highly productive fields and meadows. In the republic, a powerful material-technical and scientific base for reclamation and stable collectives of water-management organizations with highly-trained cadres have been created. Our reclamation workers have accumulated rich experience in renewing lands; they are successfully dealing with plan goals. The area of drained lands in the republic has been increased to 2.8 million hectares. Over 1.2 million hectares have been transformed from swamps in the Poles'ye zone; 3.4 million hectares have been cleared of brush and rocks and extensive work has been done to lime acidic soils.

All of this has revealed great prospects and created real possibilities for considerable changes in improving the republic's agriculture, has laid the foundation for obtaining more stable results in farming and has facilitated the accelerated development of livestock raising. Here up to 30 percent of farming products, including up to 40 percent of feeds, are produced on reclaimed lands which occupy 27 percent of agricultural acreage.

Thanks to reclamation and to the implementation of organizational-political and economic measures taken by the party recently, gross agricultural production in the republic increased by a factor of 1.5 in comparison with 1965. The productivity of grains doubled. Grain procurement increased sixfold; the procurement of milk, meat, potatoes and vegetables increased by a factor of 1.8-3.3.

Behind these figures we find great organizational and political-educational work, great creative efforts on the part of all workers, their high level of political consciousness, the increased professional mastery of grain farmers and the skill to better manage the land. Reclamation has basically changed the social and cultural image of the village and the production, work and living conditions of village workers.

In passing the Long-Term Reclamation Program, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized that its main direction must become the cardinal growth in effectiveness of drained and irrigated lands and the most rapid achievement of planned productivity on every improved hectare. In the republic there are many examples of the highly-effective use of reclaimed lands. In Osnezhitskiy Kolkhoz of Pinskiy Rayon, 40 Let Oktyabrya Kolkhoz of Stolinskiy Rayon, Progress Kolkhoz of Grodnenskiy Rayon, Lyubanskaya Experimental Base of Lyubanskiy Rayon, Korelichy Breeding Plant of Korelichskiy Rayon, Novoye Poles'ye Sovkhoz of Soligorskiy Rayon and many other enterprises 30-40 quintals and more of grain, 300-350 quintals of potatoes and over 50 quintals of hay are produced per hectare with stability.

The experience of these and many other kolkhozes and sovkhozes attests to the great possibilities of renewed lands in increasing agricultural production output.

Nevertheless, the productivity of drained lands in the republic has not increased for many years and remains low, for which our party organization and its cadres were justifiably subject to criticism at the plenum in the speech by Comrade Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko.

The output of feed units per hectare of reclaimed lands has remained on the level of 23-26 quintals during the last 10 years. The kolkhozes and sovkhozes of Mogilev and Gomel oblasts produce only 20-22 quintals of feed units per renewed hectare. Improved lands are used especially poorly in the enterprises of Braslavskiy, Kormyanskiy, Khoyniskiy, Oshmyanskiy, Iv'yevskiy, Chervenskiy, Slavgorodskiy and several other rayons.

What is the reason for such a situation? On the one hand this is the result of a low level of management on reclaimed lands, which violates the agro-technology of cultivating agricultural crops. On the other hand, this is the result of incomplete work by water-management organs, of the low quality of planning and execution of reclamation work and of divergences from scientifically-based reclamation requirements.

Consequently, measures on increasing the effectiveness of using reclaimed lands must be completely concrete and differentiated. Based on accumulated

experience and existing technical-economic critical analyses, all material resources and efforts should first of all be concentrated on increasing the return on reclaimed lands. Secondly, it is essential to focus efforts on renovating existing reclamation systems with the assumption of achieving planned indicators on this land. We have a total of 1.6 million hectares on which productivity is below norm, including 800,000 hectares with networks that meet essential technical requirements. On such lands planned productivity can and must be achieved already next year. Here strict adherence to agro-technical requirements and the application of the full norm of fertilizer are required.

One of the reasons for the low return on reclaimed lands is the poor application of compost and mineral fertilizers. This year less than 10 percent of the organic fertilizer procured in kolkhozes and sovkhoses was applied to reclaimed lands. The proportion of drained mineral soils in the republic comprises over 25 percent. For the sake of comparison I will say that our Lithuanian neighbors apply one-third less organic fertilizer per hectare of arable land on the whole, but twice as much as we do to each reclaimed acre. This is why the results in Lithuania are significantly higher.

The practical experience of leading enterprises shows that in order to obtain large and stable harvests it is essential to apply no fewer than 12-14 tons of organic fertilizer per hectare of tenacious soil and 18-20 tons of organic fertilizer on light soil. Extremely small quantities of mineral fertilizers are applied to drained lands here. Last year only 163 kilograms of mineral fertilizer were used per hectare. We must stop all complaints about the shortage of fertilizer. Based on our resources, we can and must provide organic and mineral fertilizers for reclaimed lands at the full rate by means of redistribution, or more precisely, by means of the correct distribution of these resources. The BSSR Minsel'khos [Ministry of Agriculture] and Minplodovoshchkhos [Ministry of the Fruit and Vegetable Industry] and oblast and rayon agro-industrial associations must bring strict order to this matter and must make sure that already next year organic and mineral fertilizers are applied to reclaimed lands in complete accordance with agrotechnical requirements.

We know that the excessive acidity of the soil has a negative effect on the productivity of drained acreage. However, the necessary attention is not given everywhere to liming soil, which is completely intolerable. The goal is to lime all reclaimed lands that need it in the course of the next 2 years. The BSSR Minsel'khos and Minvodkhos [Ministry of Water Management] should avoid the introduction into operation of drained lands with increased acidity.

We must more fully activate another factor for increasing the productivity of reclaimed lands--improving agrotechnology and strictly adhering to all technological operations for cultivating agricultural crops. Unfortunately, this has not yet become a daily concern for specialists and directors of many kolkhozes and sovkhoses and workers of the agro-industrial association. For these reasons, in some enterprises the fields are completely covered with weeds. It is essential that BSSR Minsel'khos and Minplodovoshchkhos, oblast and rayon agro-industrial associations and directors of kolkhozes and sovkhoses implement specific measures to increase the quality of farming on reclaimed lands.

The structure of sowing areas, especially on peat-swamp soils, is in need of improvement. It cannot be considered normal that until now over 12 percent of peat lands, including long-fallow lands, have been used for row crops. This applies in particular to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of Lyubanskiy, Ivatsevichskiy, Kobrinskiy and Pinskiy rayons. The negative consequences of such practices have been discussed more than once. The corresponding documents have been approved. But, as you can see, the question has not been dealt with thoroughly. Gosplan, BSSR Minsel'khoz, BSSR Minplodoovoshchkhov, oblast and rayon executive committees and agro-industrial associations must determine the most efficient crop structure for every kolkhoz and sovkhoz with a consideration of the specialization of enterprises and with the goal of maximally limiting erosion processes; this structure must be strictly adhered to.

Specific measures must be implemented to introduce industrial technology for cultivating agricultural crops, programming harvests, assimilating scientifically-based crop rotations, and widely disseminating the experience of leading kolkhozes, sovkhozes, brigades and links which not only achieved the planned harvest on drained lands but also surpassed it.

The calculations of specialists show that by improving management on lands that do not require the rebuilding of the reclamation network, and there are over 800,000 hectares of these lands here, as we have said above, it is possible to achieve an annual increase of over 430,000 tons of feed units.

The second urgent task is to facilitate the achievement of planned productivity on those lands where so-called sagging processes have occurred due to the imperfection of drainage networks, which decreases the possibilities for obtaining large harvests. In the republic there are over 430,000 hectares of such lands. Here technological planning of soil surface and other measures to improve the water regimen are required. Proportional expenditures for implementing such measures are less by a factor of 2-3 than those for complete renovation, but they enable us to increase the return on each hectare by 8 and more quintals of feed units, or an additional 350,000 tons of feed units per year. In the coming five-year plan all such lands must be organized by means of resources allocated to the republic for reclamation.

Finally, in the republic there are over 400,000 hectares of land that was drained long ago using an antiquated reclamation network, which are in need of complete renovation. On this acreage enterprises produce one-third less than planned. A decisive course must be taken to accelerate work to reconstruct such systems. During the 12th Five-Year Plan we must reorganize the reclamation network on an area of 170,000 hectares. This will enable us to obtain an additional 200,000 tons of feed units annually.

In the republic there are 143,000 hectares of irrigated lands. In many kolkhozes and sovkhozes they are utilized with insufficient effectiveness. Last year in 44 rayons irrigated arable land turned out to be less productive than non-irrigated acreage. The return on irrigated meadows and pastures is particularly low. Their productivity does not exceed 32 quintals of feed units per hectare. How can it be any different if many enterprises irrigate

completely sparse and degenerated grasses, if irrigation technology is not adhered to and if little fertilizer is applied? Irrigation equipment is poorly maintained, often loses parts and is junked prematurely. Our agricultural and reclamation organs have come to terms with all of this. Party organizations also do not make a principled evaluation of such facts. It is essential that we bring order to the use of the cultivated lands that are more expensive in terms of expenditures. Here a maximally-large harvest of agricultural crops must be programmed and achieved.

During the next five-year plan we must complete the transition to cultivating all vegetable crops on irrigated lands. Without this under our republic's conditions it will be impossible to achieve their stable production in the required volumes. As far as feed lands are concerned, irrigation must be carried out only there where the entire complex of technological measures is carried out and where a per-hectare productivity of no fewer than 45 quintals of feed units is achieved.

In general, work on meadows and pastures must be raised to a qualitatively new level, as required by the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. For our republic, specializing in the production of livestock products, this is of special urgency. Today 60 percent of all drained lands here are in haylands and pastures. However, in recent years a hectare has yielded only 18-20 quintals of feed units. As a result of the simplistic attitude toward pasture and meadow lands, of a violation of the technology for sowing and resowing grasses, of an absence of planned work to maintain the productivity of these lands and of the unsystematic grazing of livestock, large areas of haylands and pastures return to their earlier state and become swampy or overgrown with weeds. In many enterprises meadows and pastures are treated like secondary lands; little mineral and organic fertilizer is applied to them. Is it possible to count on a large return on reclaimed feed lands in Slavgorodskiy Rayon, for example, where on half of the acreage resowing of grasses occurs at 6-year or larger intervals and where 40-60 kilograms of mineral fertilizer are applied per hectare? Last year fewer than 17 quintals of feed units per hectare were produced here. Feed lands are used poorly in Kobrinskiy, Stolinskiy, Ushachskiy, Miorskiy, Lel'chitskiy, Berezinskiy, Klimovichskiy and a number of other rayons, where fewer than 14 quintals of feed units are harvested per hectare. This type of situation cannot be tolerated any further. During the 12th Five-Year Plan it is essential to improve meadows and pastures on an area of 1.8 million hectares. The goal is as follows: beginning next year each seeded hectare must receive the required application of organic and mineral fertilizer and it must be limed if necessary. Seeding must be carried out using grasses of the intensive type. The observance of a scientifically-based structure of grass mixtures and the correct ratio of grasses maturing at different times must be adhered to, thereby enabling farmers to harvest them at the optimal time, to curtail losses of nutritive substances and to improve the quality of feeds.

The highly productive use of drained lands depends greatly on the well-organized, technically sound operation of reclamation systems. In many enterprises they are taken care of and the land yields a high return. However, things are not this way everywhere. Some directors of kolkhozes and sovkhoses

view reclamation as a type of gift requiring neither concern nor expenditures on their part. And reclamation organizations are not doing everything possible to maintain networks that are capable of operating.

There have been many instances in which reclamation networks and structures have been damaged during the building of roads and communications and electrical lines and during the uncontrolled grazing of livestock. Local soviets and reclamation and agricultural organs are obliged to strengthen controls over their preservation.

In accordance with the decisions of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, during the 12th Five-Year Plan intra-enterprise drainage and irrigation networks and structures will be transferred from the balances of kolkhozes and sovkhozes to the balance of the water-management organization, with payment of some expenditures for service coming from the state budget. This will undoubtedly have a positive effect on improving their use and on a growth in the productivity of agricultural crops. In the coming 3-4 years BSSR Minvodkhoz [Ministry of Water Resources] must considerably strengthen the material-technical base of operating organizations, supply them with cadres and organize the education of people. Wages and stimulation of labor of workers in service organizations must depend on products obtained from reclaimed lands.

The Long-Term Program for the Development of Reclaimed Lands approved by the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee foresees the continued expansion of the scale of water-management building and its improvement. In our republic it is planned to increase the area of drained lands to 3.0-3.2 million hectares and the area of irrigated lands--to 0.3-0.4 million hectares by the year 2000; to basically complete the assimilation of lands in the Poles'sye lowlands and to complete a complex of operations on the building of objects for the counter-flood protection of agricultural acreage; to increase the area with two-sided regulation of the water and air regimen; and to complete cultivation work on lands that do not require drainage. The volume of work will increase significantly in Vitebsk, Mogilev and northern Minsk oblasts, where previously reclamation work was carried out on a lesser scale.

An important stage in the development of reclamation building will be represented by the 12th Five-Year Plan. During this period it is essential to build new and renovate antiquated drainage systems on an area of 480,000 hectares, including 390,000 hectares with closed drainage, to renovate irrigation systems on 55,000 hectares, and to carry out cultivation operations on 810,000 hectares of land that does not require drainage.

A broad program of reclamation requires significant improvements in the organization of water-management building, continued strengthening of the production base for reclamation organizations and a decisive elimination of existing shortcomings. And these still do exist. In fulfilling land reclamation plans as a whole, in many regions plans are not fulfilled involving land drainage using closed drainage systems, the building of irrigation systems and peat plots and the introduction into operation of operational structures. In the last year alone 25 percent of the organizations of BSSR Minvodkhoz did not fulfill their plans related to the growth in labor productivity and 16

percent--plans related to contract work. Every fifth organization within Glavpoles'yevodstroy [Poles'ye Main Administration for Hydraulic Engineering Construction] does not deal with its plans related to these indicators. The directors of Minvodkhov and Glavpoles'yevodstroy must achieve the fulfillment of the production program of every organization according to every indicator and they must view the timely introduction of reclamation objects as a most important state task.

In implementing the Long-Term Program of Land Reclamation it is very important, as emphasized by Comrade K. U. Chernenko, to correctly select priorities in directing capital investments. It must be clearly determined what types of reclamation systems should be built and where in order to best utilize the resources allocated by the state and to obtain a maximal return on them. As long-term practice has shown, in the republic a system of two-sided regulation of the water regimen, which secures the stability of farming regardless of weather conditions, has proven itself well. Thus, in the floodlands of the Bobrik and Yasel'da rivers in Brest Oblast, where such systems are in operation on an area of over 62,000 hectares, 35-40 quintals of feed units per hectare are produced each year.

Nevertheless, unjustifiably few drainage-irrigation systems are being planned and built. They are available on only one-fourth of drained lands. During the 12th Five-Year Plan and in subsequent years it is essential to more widely move toward developing such systems. By the year 2000 they should be built on 554,000 hectares, i.e. on lands where this is facilitated by the topography of the region.

There should be more active building of polder and water-circulating systems, allowing us to regulate the water regimen of the soil, to obtain a programmed harvest and to meet the requirements for environmental conservation. In the northern and central zones of the republic, characterized by complex topography, with a preponderance of heavy and compact soils plus closed drainage, it is necessary to pay more attention to carrying out engineering and agricultural reclamation measures to regulate the surface water current and to improve the structure of the soil.

We must decisively end the practice of building structures involving the complex assimilation of lands with great lags, which results in a decrease in the return on resources put into reclamation. This applies equally to reclamation organizations as well as recruited contractual building ministries and departments. During the current five-year plan alone, Minpromstroy [Ministry of Construction], Minsel'stroy [Ministry of Agricultural Construction] and Belmezhkolkhozstroy [Belorussian Inter-Kolkhoz Construction Association] under-fulfilled building-installation work on objects of production and socio-cultural significance valued at almost 17 million rubles allocated for the assimilation of reclaimed lands.

The continued development of reclamation, a growth in labor productivity and the efficient use of land and water resources must be based fully on the achievements of scientific-technical progress and on progressive experience. The scientific-production base created in the republic enables us to carry

out reclamation on a modern and higher technical level. In recent years our scientists have provided many useful elaborations which are widely utilized by planners and builders and specialists within the agro-industrial complex. Nevertheless, the republic's kolkhozes and sovkhozes and water-management organizations await significantly more help from science.

The Belorussian Scientific Research Institute of Land Reclamation and Water Resources and other scientific institutions in the republic must focus their efforts on creating improved drainage-irrigation systems that secure the effective use of land and water resources. Close attention should be focused on questions such as increasing the productivity of labor in building and operating reclamation systems by means of introducing new technologies and means of mechanization. One of the directions in this matter involves replacing earthenware drainage with polyethylene and laying it down using a trenchless method. The introduction of this type of technology enables us to increase labor productivity of drainage links by a factor of 2-3, to curtail the volume of shipments by a factor of 5-8 and to decrease the number of workers by 40 percent. However, the Belorussian Scientific Research Institute of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, which is the main one in the country to work on the given problem, is delaying issuing norms and regulations for the planning and building of such objects.

Very urgent is the problem of creating and introducing highly-productive varieties of grain crops for cultivation on drained lands that are resistant to lodging, diseases, pests and unfavorable environmental factors and that are characterized by good food and feed characteristics. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes await greater results in the work of breeders to develop new varieties of legumes and cereal grasses, potatoes and vegetables.

The BSSR Academy of Sciences, the Western Division of VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V. I. Lenin], BSSR Minsel'khoz and branch scientific-research institutes must activate research in the area of soil science, of increasing the fertility and preservation of lands, and of biological methods for protecting plants and for natural conservation. In the final analysis, all scientific research must be directed at the efficient use of water and land resources, at increasing the productivity and resistance of agricultural crops and at using the entire arsenal of quality farming.

In implementing widespread reclamation we intrude upon nature. As Comrade K. U. Chernenko said, the approach must be very careful during the transformation of the land in order not only not to damage it but to also improve it, enrich it and increase its possibilities.

We must learn our lessons from mistakes and errors tolerated at the initial stage of reclamation, when shallow rivers were straightened without justification and when insufficient numbers of timber protection belts, water reservoirs, sanctuaries game refuges and sanctuaries were created. Unfortunately, even today attempts are made in some places to circumvent scientifically-based reclamation requirements, and this can lead to negative ecological consequences. BSSR Minsel'khoz, BSSR Minvodkhoz, Glavpoles'yevodstroy, the BSSR State Committee on Natural Conservation and local soviets of people's deputies must put a definite stop to all actions that bring harm to the environment.

In connection with this I must mention the problem of recultivating exhausted peat bogs. We have 46,500 hectares of these. As you can see, the area is a considerable one. If it can be improved it will be possible to produce a considerable quantity of agricultural products. Comrades G. A. Filippov, F. P. Sen'ko, V. I. Pavlyuchuk and A. A. Zelenovskiy must take all necessary measures to revitalize these lands during the 12th Five-Year Plan.

In general, all of us must demonstrate a more careful attitude towards the land, which is among our most valuable capital. We must do everything to suppress waste when using land for non-agricultural purposes and to strictly observe existing land laws.

The implementation of the Long-Term Program of Land Reclamation is integrally related to the rapid development and assimilation of dependable, highly-productive technology. Reclamation workers and village workers are grateful to party organizations, labor collectives of enterprises and developers who are sensitive to their needs and who seek out possibilities for producing the necessary machines and equipment. At the same time, the help of industry in this matter can and must be much greater. In particular, the Mozyrskiy Plant of Reclamation Machinery must seriously raise the technical level and improve the quality of its products. Glavpoles'yevodstroy must activate work to create new capacities in this plant to manufacture tractors modified for swamps. The Borisovskiy Plant of Plastic Goods should increase the manufacture of polyethylene drainage pipes.

Gosplan, Gossnab, Minvodkhoz and BSSR Goskomsel'khoztekhnika [State Committee of the Agricultural Equipment Association] must examine the possibility and organize the production in the republic's machine-building plants of disc reclamation harrows, planers, stump pullers and machines and units to care for drainage systems. Our enterprises and scientific-research organizations are called upon to become more active in decision-making on such important questions as the automation of managing reclamation systems.

Work to improve the training of highly-trained cadres and to secure them in production must be made a priority goal. After all, in reclamation organizations in the republic over 1,000 workers without the corresponding education are working in positions as engineers and technologists. The problem of cadres in the middle link remains severe. In many reclamation organizations there is a shortage of machine operators, but their training, including within the system of vocational-technical schools, has not been suitably organized. For the fourth year in a row plans for recruiting students with a reclamation profile have not been fulfilled in vocational-technical schools. Minvodkhoz, Glavpoles'yevodstroy and BSSR Gosprofobr [State Committee of Vocational-Technical Education] must seriously correct the situation.

The turnover of cadres remains high, as before. Every year every fourth worker leaves the building organizations of BSSR Minvodkhoz for various reasons. It is perfectly clear that the problem of securing workers cannot be solved without essential improvements in living and working conditions for reclamation workers. At the same time, this has not yet become a subject of daily concern for many reclamation organizations. Today every seventh worker in BSSR Min-

vodkhoz and Glavpoles'yevodstroy is in need of housing improvements. Reclamation workers often experience difficulties in obtaining private plots and feed for livestock and in satisfying other daily needs. To solve all of these problems it is essential to combine the efforts of reclamation organizations, soviet and trade union organs and workers in the service sphere. Of course, the everyday living problems of people must be at the center of attention of party committees and organizations and under their daily control. As emphasized at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, in concern for people, for creating proper conditions for work and life and for the continued blossoming of cultural life, the party sees the basis for production successes.

Oblast, city and rayon party committees and agro-industrial associations should organize everywhere the training of cadres in modern methods of work on reclaimed lands. We are speaking about production commanders as well as rank-and-file workers and, of course, of party and soviet workers. Cadres should be certified and on this basis all sections of reclamation building and agricultural production should be strengthened with competent people and good organizers. BSSR Minvodkhoz, Glavpoles'yevodstroy and trade union organizations must be more involved in organizing socialist competition on reclamation structures and must more widely introduce brigade contracts and other progressive forms of organizing and reimbursing labor.

The fulfillment of a broad reclamation program requires a considerable restructuring of the work of BSSR Minvodkhoz and Glavpoles'yevodstroy in the direction of greater specificity and a more business-like manner, an eye to the future and an acceleration of scientific-technical progress in the branch. Their primary party organizations must more fully utilize the right of control over the work of the apparatus concerning the fulfillment of the party's and government's directives. They must demonstrate a greater degree of demandingness toward workers for the precise utilization of job-related obligations and to educate workers in creative initiative and a highly responsible approach to work.

The proposals to the Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development for the republic should foresee a considerable increase in the growth pace of retail commodity turnover and paid services in comparison to the growth pace of monetary income for the population. In connection with this what is required is a more persistent search for reserves to increase the volume and improve the quality of consumer goods and to expand paid services to the population.

Our urgent goal is to successfully complete the plans for the current year and for the five-year plan as a whole. Ten-year results show that basically the republic is achieving the fulfillment of socialist obligations for 1984.

Growth in industrial production equalled 6.2 percent. The productivity of labor in industry increased by 5.4 percent. Socialist obligations are also being fulfilled in the above-plan decrease in production costs.

But at the end of the year many violations and shortcomings have become evident. There has been a deterioration in indicators on plan fulfillment for deliveries

of products in accord with contractual agreements. In recent months there has been a significant increase in the number of collectives which have not fulfilled plans for the basic technical-economic indicators. Most of these are in Gomel, Grodno and Mogilev oblasts and in Minlesprom [Ministry of the Timber Industry], Minplodoovoshchkhov and BSSR Minsel'stroy.

Builders are not fulfilling plans for building-installation work in objects for light industry, health, vocational-technical education, trade and consumer services. Resources for building children's preschool facilities and houses in housing cooperatives are not being fully assimilated. As before, capacities are being built behind schedule in the Khimvolokno, Azot and Beloruskaliy associations of Mogilev and Svetlogorsk, in the plants of Mogilevsel'mash [Mogilev Agricultural Machinery Association], the feed yeast plant of Mozyr and the dry defatted milk plant in Novogrudk. In order to fulfill the program of capital building for the current five-year plan all of the necessary measures must be taken to organize coordinated and harmonious work among collectives of building, installation, transport and supply organizations and client enterprises.

Today precise and uninterrupted transport operations acquire special importance. Unfortunately, as before our national economy is experiencing a shortage of railroad workers. With a general overfulfillment of the plan on the volume of shipments for 10 months, the plans involving nomenclature are not being fulfilled. The turnover norms for railroad cars and speed rates for trains are not being achieved. The management of the Belorussian Railroad must take exhaustive measures to achieve the fulfillment of the shipment plan not only in terms of volume but in terms of the entire freight nomenclature as well. Truck transport is also underproducing in many areas. As before, truck idleness and empty runs are great. Contractual agreements are fulfilled poorly. BSSR Minavtotrans [Ministry of Motor Vehicle Transport] must more actively eliminate these shortcomings.

Many trade collectives, especially in consumer cooperatives, work without stability and below their potential. The buro and secretariat of the central committee have pointed out more than once to Belkoopsoyuz [Belorussian cooperative union] and BSSR Mintorg [Ministry of Trade] that it is necessary to seriously restructure their activities. Nevertheless, this type of restructuring is not yet being felt. The plan for retail commodity turnover was not fulfilled in the republic as a whole in September and October, and in Vitebsk, Gomel and Grodno oblasts the plan for 10 months has not been fulfilled. This threatens the fulfillment of the annual plan. Serious interruptions have been tolerated in the work of the enterprises of BSSR Minbyt [Ministry of Consumer Services to the Population] in September. The existing situation in the sphere of trade and consumer services to the population requires the most intent attention to this sector of the economy and intensive daily work to mobilize all reserves and possibilities available here at the final stage of the year. Comrades V. I. Chigir, N. A. Makoyed and A. L. Grib had to be reminded once again about their personal responsibility for the unconditional fulfillment of plans for the current year and for the five-year plan as a whole in the area of retail commodity turnover and the volume of consumer services.

In speaking about the preliminary results of the agricultural year, it should be noted that as a result of the selfless labor of field and farm workers, of the intensive work of party, soviet and management organs and of the help of city labor collectives and students and schoolchildren adequate results were achieved in the republic in farming as well as in livestock-raising. The productivity of grains equals 25.5 quintals; of potatoes--180. Gross grain yield increased by 23 percent in comparison with last year. An adequate harvest of vegetables and feed and other crops has been collected. In 10 months milk production increased by 5 percent; meat production--by 10 percent. This allows the republic to fulfill the procurement plans for all types of agricultural products, and for some types of products--to compensate somewhat for the debts that were incurred last year. The highest level for all preceding years will be achieved in the procurement of grain, meat, milk and eggs. In other words, the republic's contribution to the country's food resources is becoming more and more weighty.

However, we cannot be satisfied with that which has been achieved. After all, for a number of indicators the goals foreseen by the Food Program are not being achieved. For this reason it is very important to thoroughly and self-critically analyse the results of the year in every enterprise and every rayon and oblast and to focus efforts on eliminating existing shortcomings and on further improving the effectiveness of agricultural production. Right now it is very important to utilize all possibilities to successfully carry out the overwintering of livestock and to achieve the steadfast growth of production and procurement of animal products. All of the possibilities exist for this. For the current stall-upkeep period 16 percent more feed is being allocated than was allocated last year. Now the task is to utilize it best and to achieve a maximal return on it.

Recently the Buro of the Central Committee of the Belorussian CP approved an initiative by agricultural workers in Minsk Oblast, Lyakhovichskiy, Bobruyskiy and Rogachevskiy rayons and a number of kolkhozes and sovkhoses regarding successfully carrying out the overwintering of stock and increasing the production and procurement of livestock products. This valuable initiative must be widely supported everywhere. All organizational and political work must be transferred to farms and complexes, uninterrupted operations of feed shops, machines and mechanisms must be achieved, all technological requirements must be strictly adhered to and suitable conditions must be created for the fruitful labor of livestock farmers.

It is also very important to demonstrate daily concern about laying a firm foundation for achieving a large harvest next year. The entire material-technical base must be prepared well for spring field work. The winter period must be fully utilized for the careful reflection by cadres on the results and lessons of the current year, for studying the achievements of science and progressive experience and for determining precise work directions for each enterprise with regard to the intensification of all branches of agricultural production and to increasing its economic effectiveness.

In general, during the remaining months of this year and the final year of the five-year plan all of us must demonstrate shock labor and a total effort to create a dependable basis for a confident beginning to the new five-year plan.

The October Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee has planned a great constructive program for our country's economic development and for further improvements of its agrarian sector. The realization of this program must become the primary obligation and the most important aspect of practical work of the republic's party organization, its cadres and workers of Belorussian cities and villages.

Allow me to assure our party's central committee that communists and the republic's workers will do all that is necessary to successfully implement the decisions of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and to make a worthy contribution toward increasing the country's food resources.

8228

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ROLE OF COUNTERPROPAGANDA IN INDOCTRINATING YOUTH

Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 14 Oct 84 p 1

[Article: "To Indoctrinate Young Patriots"]

[Text] The matters and concerns of the Soviet Union's younger generation are at the center of the party's attention. A detailed discussion concerning the communist upbringing of young persons was held at the 26th party congress. The necessity for improving this work was pointed out at the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and in the speech by our party's general secretary, K. U. Chernenko, at the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries.

A fatherly concern on the part of the older generation for those entering upon the path of the wider, conscious life, those who are confronted with the task of carrying out the plans of the present and future five-year plans, has permeated the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, entitled "On Further Improving Party Leadership of the Komsomol and Increasing Its Role in the Communist Indoctrination of Youth."

This document, designed for the future, as well as the speech by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K. U. Chernenko, on the problems of working with youth, were discussed at the 18th Plenum of the CP of Turkmenia Central Committee, and at plenums of the party obkoms and raykoms. After thoroughly analyzing everywhere the matters and problems of youth, the Communists outlined a program for stepping up the militancy of the Komsomol organizations, as well as specifying the sections where there is particular need for the help of older persons, their experience and skills.

In order to successfully solve this important problem, it is necessary to conduct ideological-indoctrinational work more actively and in a more targeted manner, to persistently bring it closer to the requirements of the present day, to the intellectual and spiritual demands of young fellows and girls. The party committees must strive to bring about a situation whereby each young person may profoundly understand the dangers of the aggressive plans and policies of the reactionary imperialist forces, directed at preparing for thermo-nuclear war, acknowledge with their minds and hearts their own personal sense of participation in solving the problems of strengthening the cause of peace, security, and strength of our Motherland, and labor with inspiration for the benefit of society. It is precisely in highly productive shock work, in a business-like attitude toward the cause, toward the national wealth that Soviet patriotism manifests itself.

It can be stated with confidence that these qualities are inherent in the majority of this republic's young fellows and girls. Taking part in the mass movement entitled "Shock Work, Skills, Initiative, and Creativity of Youth for the Five-Year Plan!", 223 Komsomol-Youth groups and more than 40,000 young production workers have already completed the assigned tasks of four years of the five-year plan, and 7500 Komsomol members have been given Komsomol awards.

A great deal of experience in indoctrinating patriotism and the moral toughening up of young fellows and girls is at the disposal of the party organizations of the Ashkhabadkhleb Association, the garment factories for individual sewing and knitted goods of the city of Chardzhou, the Maryyskaya GRES, the Krasnovodsk Oil Refinery, the Kommunizm Kolkhoz, the Leninizm yely Takhtinsk Sovkhoz, and the Sovet Turkmenistan Kolkhoz of Gyaurskiy Rayon. A great deal is being done here so that the young persons in every working section are not simply performers but, above all, creators, thrifty and careful masters of production, a feeling of their own personal responsibility for what is occurring in the brigade, enterprise, rayon, city, and republic.

In these and other party organizations they regularly listen to reports from Communists working in the Komsomol, and they render them aid and support. The emergence of a replacement shift of new workers is facilitated by councils of instructors which aid in the formation in each young person of a responsible attitude toward labor as the foremost obligation.

However, as was emphasized at the 18th Plenum of the CP of Turkmenistan Central Committee, this important work has been allowed to drift and is conducted in a formalistic manner at enterprises of the Turkmen SSR Ministries of Consumer Services, Land Reclamation and Water Resources. Poor work is being done with the youth here; they are failing to indoctrinate the novices with a communist attitude toward work or a feeling of pride in belonging to the working class. Hence, there are many cases of unauthorized absences from work, personnel turnover, and violations of the law.

This republic is not making enough use of such a tried-and-true form of increasing the labor effectiveness of young fellows and girls as the creation of Komsomol-Youth Brigades. For example, out of a thousand livestock-raising brigades of Krasnovodsk Oblast, only 89 are of the Komsomol-Youth type. As before, the sponsorship of young persons growing corn has a low level of effectiveness. The main cause of the situation which has been created is the lack of proper attention on the part of kolkhoz and sovkhoz managers to the cultivation of this valuable crop, the passivity of the party organizations in solving the problems of the Komsomol-Youth formations. As a result, the initiative of the Komsomol is compromised, the brigades are falling apart, and the flame of enthusiasm is extinguished.

The Komsomol has many concerns. But because of this all-encompassing nature, the principal tasks are often neglected. One of these is the Komsomol's sponsorship of livestock raising and the service sphere. The 18th Plenum of the CP of Turkmenistan Central Committee has recommended that the Komsomol concentrate its efforts on extricating from their troubles one or two livestock-raising farms in each rayon, and set up several Komsomol-Youth stores and everyday-services enterprises in each city. Such groups should become unique

Komsomol universities of initiative and intelligent management. Success will be assured under the conditions of a genuine concern on the part of the party committees, along with their multi-faceted aid and support. It is precisely on such principles that the CPSU Central Committee has posed the question, outlining measures for struggling against the formalistic-bureaucratic attitude toward Komsomol shock work.

The plenums of the party committee which have been held attention has been accorded to improving the work of Komsomol political education, drawing the best propaganda personnel into classes with the youth. It is necessary to fight decisively against such shameful phenomena as a penchant for surrogates of spirituality, to indoctrinate modesty and purposiveness in the young, to do everything possible to make the country's concerns the concerns of everyone.

The party's concern for the Komsomol is a concern for the country's future, a concern for those who are passing the baton of Marxist-Leninist conviction, of communist construction, to the following generations. Labor, everyday life, leisure, sports classes--all the concerns of young fellows and girls--are the concerns of the older generation, of the Communists. To know how to fire up the young with an interesting cause, to direct their energies at solving socially significant problems, to fill up their leisure with interesting contents, not to permit petty concerns, to arouse initiative, creativity--this is what it means to really work with young persons. Not for the sake of lines in a report but at the promptings of the heart; this is the right of an older person who wishes to see a young person as a worthy successor.

The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, K. U. Chernenko, at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of the Komsomol Organizations emphasized the following: "We do not at all intend to judge the level of party leadership of the Komsomol merely by the number of problems heard by the partkoms. It is important, above all, to constantly and deeply penetrate into those social and ideological processes which occur in the youth environment, to analyze them systematically, and to aid the Komsomol organizations in selecting the basic directions, the most effective forms of work."

This is the program for work by the partkoms with youth for today and tomorrow. A program for every day.

2384

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REGIONAL

KZYL-ORDA OBLAST MISUSE OF FUEL PRODUCTS SCORED

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian on 15 December 1984 carries on page 2 a 300-word KazTAG report entitled "In the People's Control Committee of the Kazakh SSR" on the committee's examination of the Kzyl-Ordo oblast sovkhoses' and kolkhoses' use of petroleum products.

Serious deficiencies were noted in the accounting for, storage and use of fuel products and lubricants. In six of eight rayons overconsumption of diesel fuel was permitted; in seven, of gasoline, every other farm in the Chilyyskiy rayon and almost all farms in the Karmakchinskiy and Terenozekskiy rayons have overexpended motor fuel.

Through the fault of the oblast agricultural administration, in a majority of the investigated farms there turned out to be no specific limits for expending petroleum products. The economy and over-expenditure of petroleum products were arbitrarily established at an elevated norm. The report also notes that in the farms investigated records were not kept of automobile mileage, and travel orders were improperly filled out. In sovkhoses and kolkhoses, limits for official motor transport's use of petroleum products are absent. The sale of gasoline and diesel fuel to outside organizations still takes place.

Disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the supervisors involved. The guilty parties have to compensate the government for the financial damage done. Corresponding instructions were given to the Kzyl-Orda oblispolkom agricultural administration, to the State Committee for the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture and to the KaSSR Ministry of Agriculture on the elimination of the exposed deficiencies.

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KASSR CENTRAL COMMITTEE BURO MEETS

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian on 20 December 1984 carries on page 1 a 300-word report entitled "In the Kazakh CP Central Committee Buro" on a regular session of the KaSSR Central Committee Buro. At the session, the Buro examined the work of the Pavlodar party obkom on the education of party and soviet workers' cadre reserves. It was noted that the obkom, gorkoms and raykoms of the party have significantly improved their work with cadre reserves and are raising the cadres' ideological and political levels. However, this work is currently not totally responsive to increased requirements. In a number of party committees there is no clear system for selecting candidates, nor for creating a reliable cadre reserve; also, the work being conducted in cadre education is inadequate. The Buro instructed the obkom and other party committees of the oblast to improve the education of cadre reserves, to more actively promote women, young workers and specialists with the necessary theoretical background for party and soviet work.

The Buro also examined the work of the republic's Ministry of Food Industry in Increasing the role of engineering and technical workers in speeding up progress at dependent enterprises.

The Buro also discussed the results of reports and elections in the republic's primary party organizations.

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